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ABSTRACT

To complement a volume of case studies, these four papers and an introduction discuss the problem of regional disparities in educational development from several different perspectives. Varying points of view are presented on the relationship between regional educational disparities and socioeconomic, political, and cultural development; the pertinence of regional frameworks to analyses of educational disparities; and the problems associated with policies to reduce regional disparities. The introduction by the editors summarizes the papers' arguments about ways to reduce disparities. Philip Foster draws on data from Africa to examine regional inequalities in educational and economic development and to argue for the free play of supply and demand in reducing disparities. Using European countries as examples, Pierre Furter questions whether regional equalization can be reconciled with inter-regional cultural diversity. The paper by Stephen P. Heyneman reviews the problems involved in planning the reduction of regional disparities. The final paper, by Zsuzsa Ferge, Eva Havasi, and Julia Szalai, describes Hungary's use of state planning to reduce regional educational disparities. (Author/RW)

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Regional disparities in educational development:
a controversial issue

edited by
Gabriel Carron and Ta Ngoc Châu

with contributions by
Philip Foster · Pierre Furter · Stephen P. Heyneman
Zsuzsa Ferge, Eva Havasi and Julia Szalai

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Regional disparities in educational development: diagnosis and policies for reduction

edited by **Gabriel Carron and Ta Ngoc Châu**
with contributions by
Jean-Yves Martin, Philippe Hugon, Kamol Sudaprasert, Vichai Tunsiri, David Court and Kabiru Kinyanjui

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Preface

It is now generally accepted that the period of global growth in education systems characteristic of the last two decades has not sufficed to democratize education. Equity objectives are now tending to be treated as a higher priority than overall growth. In a growing number of countries plans now seek to translate the goals of democratization into concrete terms, in the form of measures to reduce specific inequalities. People are no longer focusing exclusively on the general notion of more equal opportunities and now aim at more specific definitions of goals, such as more equal opportunities of access to different levels of education, more equal opportunities of completing a given course of education, equalizing school performance, equalizing conditions of access to the jobs and career opportunities. Further, they are now examining inequalities affecting specific categories of people: women, deprived groups, rural areas, backward regions. As they evolve, the notion of inequality, and the desire to take effective remedial measures, are coming to assume different forms: in some cases the increase in resources devoted to education has not uniformly benefited every category in society, and growth has created new inequalities; elsewhere, it is the growth of the education system which has made disparities once regarded as inevitable more keenly felt; sometimes the unevenness of economic development has sparked off new demands on the part of backward regions, and has resulted also in an increase in social pressure for more education. In most cases, the realization of the existence of disparities has been an indirect consequence of growth, and has expressed itself as a reaction against inequalities.

As part of its first Medium-term Plan (1973–1978), the IIEP carried out a series of studies of regional inequalities, to which many countries are attaching increasing importance in their economic and social development policies. Several studies deal with conceptual aspects, by examining the policies aimed at reducing regional disparities, and the economic, political and social factors which underlie these policies. In addition, several national case studies examine the way in which regional inequalities in education have assumed different forms in different socio-political contexts.

Most of these studies were discussed at a seminar organized by the IIEP in

November 1978; they were subsequently revised by their authors for publication in volume form.

In the meantime, the Institute has drawn useful conclusions from these studies and the discussion of them for its 1979–1983 Medium-term Plan. The principal theme of this Plan is the study of educational reforms, with a view to adapting educational planning and administrative methods to the new tasks entailed by the preparation and implementation of these reforms. Among them, particular attention is paid to reforms designed to reduce educational inequalities: not only regional inequalities, but also inequalities affecting rural areas, women, deprived groups, minorities. This programme will be implemented chiefly by means of co-operation with national research teams and institutions.

The Institute's programme of studies on regional disparities, as presented in this publication, has thus paved the way for subsequent activities touching on more varied aspects of inequality. These will, it is hoped, contribute to improving the methods of diagnosis, planning and administration of the measures to be taken, at both central and local levels, to reduce inequalities.

Michel Debeauvais
Director, IIEP

Contents

Introduction 9
Gabriel Carron and Ta Ngoc Châu

Regional disparities in educational development: some critical observations 19
Philip Foster

The recent development of education: regional diversity or reduction of inequalities? 49
Pierre Furter

Planning the equality of educational opportunity between regions 115
Stephen P. Heyneman

Regional disparities and educational development in Hungary 175
Zsuzsa Ferge, Eva Havasi and Julia Szalai

Introduction

Gabriel Carron and Ta Ngoc Châu

Over the last three decades the education systems of most countries have grown very rapidly. This growth has often been accompanied by major reforms aiming chiefly at providing greater access to these systems and democratizing their operation. From the research viewpoint this twofold trend has given rise to numerous studies, first in the developed countries and subsequently in the developing countries, devoted to the question of educational inequalities.

It may seem surprising that the subject of regional inequalities has been neglected in this massive international research effort. Apart from certain analyses of inequalities between ethnic or racial groups, between the sexes, or, again, between rural and urban areas, the research workers have devoted most of their attention to studying inequalities between socio-professional categories. From the scientific viewpoint, this priority can be explained to the extent that the heart of the question of educational inequalities is closely tied to the structure of society and the unequal distribution of income, cultural assets and power among the various social groups.

However, the study of the regional dimension appears both important and useful for at least two reasons. Politically, first of all, the reduction of regional disparities has become a major concern in many countries. It is striking to observe that pursuit of this objective is given priority, even if other types of inequalities between rural and urban areas or between socio-economic groups, for example, are frequently greater than those between regions. To understand this priority, one must examine the very special role played by education in developing or maintaining national unity. On the one hand, the ruling classes look upon the school as the institution which will enable them to integrate the younger generations into a national culture, and this is why they are anxious that schools should be available in every region. On the other hand, any delay in educational development is soon interpreted by the regional communities as evidence of a lack of interest by the national authorities, and is likely to give rise to regional aspirations which constitute a threat to national unity. In those countries which have recently acquired independence the danger is all the more real in that this unity is still fragile, and ethnic, linguistic and religious differences underlie regional divisions. In such conditions, the reduction of regional disparities is regarded as a top-priority political necessity.

The second reason in favour of a regional approach is of a technical nature. For the planner, the objective of educational equalization is chiefly a question of arranging the supply of education. The education service should be organized in such a way that everyone can benefit from it under the same conditions. Seen from this viewpoint, the reduction of disparities is chiefly a problem of a spatial nature. Firstly, everyone must be provided with equal opportunities of access to schools, wherever he may live. This implies an equitable distribution of the education network throughout all the regions of the country, and the setting-up of a series of facilities aiming at bringing the services available and their clientèle closer together (school buses, canteens, boarding hostels, etc.).

Attention must then be paid to whether the service provided is of the same quality everywhere. While this principle is simple in theory, its application poses several problems which are still subjects for discussion. What is the 'quality' of a school, and what criteria can be used to measure it? In fact, the regional approach lends richness and complexity to the discussion by posing the question of the diversity of physical and human, linguistic and cultural entities characterizing the various regions. In view of this variety of situations, and accordingly of requirements, can equalization of the education service be identified with pure and simple standardization? If this is not the case, how can equalization be introduced while at the same time allowing for diversity?

It is clear that the educational planner's work is not limited to the mere organization of the school infrastructure. This is, as it were, the basic task shared by him with the planner in any other social sector, whether health or civil defence. However, the school is far more than a mere service; it is at the same time the machinery by which culture is transmitted or transformed, and by which social functions and status are assigned. This is why planning as a function of the objective of equalization cannot be restricted to organizing a balanced location of educational supply, but must at the same time cover the effects that operation of this supply will bring about at the level of more general inequalities, whether of a cultural, political or socio-economic nature. In other words, the regional approach can be justified for technical reasons, but analysis cannot be restricted to this narrow framework of thought. It should, on the contrary, constantly link up the analysis of educational disparities with questions of inequalities in general.

A. Outline of the IIEP research project

These reflections were the starting point for the IIEP research project on the topic of regional disparities in the field of education. In view of the lack of an established body of knowledge, the project was above all of an exploratory nature, the main objective being to give rise to a general discussion on the importance and significance of regional disparities in various geographic and cultural contexts, and on the pertinence of the objective of reducing these disparities in various economic, social and political situations.

To attain this objective, a series of contributions were requested from research workers in various disciplines and from various countries. The result was two types of monograph. The monographs of the first type are rather general and conceptual in nature. They set out different and sometimes contrary points of view on three complementary topics: the relationships between regional disparities in education and the economic, social, cultural and political development process; the pertinence of the regional framework for analysis of disparities in the field of education; and, lastly, the potential and implications of a policy of reduction of regional disparities in this field. Other monographs deal with the specific situation in one or more given countries, endeavouring to provide a concrete illustration of certain more theoretical and conceptual points of discussion.

The eight monographs prepared were presented and discussed during a discussion workshop held at the end of 1977, which brought together the various authors and a limited number of research workers invited to give their critical opinion of the project. Most of the monographs were afterwards substantially revised in the light of the very rich exchanges of views which took place during the meeting.

For publication purposes the monographs have been brought together in two volumes. The first volume contains four contributions which set out four different and often contrary points of view on the question of disparities. Three of these contributions are of a general nature, although two of them refer to specific geographical contexts: P. Foster's study is based chiefly on the situation in Africa, and P. Furter's on the situation in Europe. The fourth contribution is a national case study setting out the experience of a socialist country, Hungary.

The authors were intentionally chosen from contrasting disciplines and schools of thought. This is why the reader will find in this work reflections based on an economist's approach as well as on a socio-cultural approach, and on a socialist outlook as well as on a liberal outlook. At no time did the Institute endeavour to impose a single frame of reference or conclude as to any convergent theory whatsoever. The question of inequalities is by its very nature a subject of controversy. The subject is even more controversial when the discussion is more specifically directed towards the policy (or rather policies) of reducing the inequalities, as was the case in this project. Not only will the value assigned to the concrete objectives of reducing inequalities depend very largely on each one's personal and ideological beliefs, but also, and above all, what can be achieved in a given socio-political system can not necessarily be achieved in another. This is merely to say that the texts contained in the first volume have no other aim than to pose questions and stimulate reflection by the planner, to whom they are chiefly addressed, concerning the potential and limitations of a policy of equalization in the context of his own country.

The same remarks apply to the national case studies contained in the second volume. From the methodological viewpoint, these studies illustrate various methods of diagnosis and analysis of the determinants influencing present disparities. At the same time, they show the implications and constraints involved in certain equalization measures applied in specific socio-economic and political development contexts. They in no way claim to present models or standard solutions.

The choice of countries, moreover, was made not as a function of the criterion of representativeness, but on the basis of more pragmatic rules and for reasons of convenience, either because contact was possible with research workers having experience in the subject, or because the data already existed and did not need to be specially collected. Three of the four studies deal with African countries (Cameroon, Madagascar, and Kenya and Tanzania), and one deals with an Asian country (Thailand). It would no doubt have been more enriching to have a more diversified range of geographical and cultural situations. However, it may be hoped that the various authors' approach to the general research topic is sufficiently open to provide their studies with a wider interest extending beyond the national framework to which they refer.

B. Contents of the present volume

The contributions contained in the present volume draw attention to at least two questions which are of interest to the planner. The first question, of a general nature, concerns the extent to which a policy of reducing regional disparities in the field of education can be carried out. Or, more precisely, why carry out such a policy and what are the results that can be expected of it? The second question is more pragmatic: how can a policy of reducing inequalities be translated into operational terms, or, more exactly, what are the objectives to choose and the means to be employed?

1. The potential and limitations of a policy of reducing regional disparities

The answers to the first question are various and sometimes radically different. P. Foster insists above all on the very close relationship between regional disparities in educational development and regional disparities in economic development. The spatial configuration of educational disparities is not the result of chance; it is 'a response to a series of factors that lie primarily outside the educational system itself' (p. 24). For him, the limitations to educational equality are accordingly quite simply the limitations to equalization of economic development. To adopt the reduction of regional disparities in educational development as an objective in itself is a costly strategy which is doomed to failure from the outset. It implies that there exists a social demand for education in the absolute, whereas in fact such demand can only be functional and, according to the author, is chiefly determined by a 'rudimentary economic calculus' by which schooling costs are weighed against future income and status benefits (p. 28).

This line of argument leads to two major conclusions. Firstly, the objective of reducing educational disparities should form part of an overall policy taking into account all aspects of socio-economic development. In fact, there are no inherent reasons to give higher priority to education than to health or development of the road network. It all depends on the level of development and requirements of each region. In other words, integrated, flexible development strategies must be defined, namely, strategies taking into account all socio-economic sectors and permitting differentiation between objectives depending on local situations. It is only a step from there to a plea for extensive decentralization and increased powers for local decision-making, and the author takes this step without hesitation. He is not convinced that such an approach would lead to an aggravation of regional disparities, and 'even if this were the case such disparities would reflect the varying emphasis accorded by local populations to investment in schooling as opposed to other forms of desired objective' (p. 41).

The second conclusion goes much further and is even more controversial in that it is directly tied up with a certain conception of development according to which imbalances are inevitable, especially at intermediate stages of development. In this context, the basic question to be asked concerning equalization is not whether the more privileged areas progress more quickly but whether the less privileged areas also progress. In other words, it is no great matter for concern that the divergence between the two extremes increases, so long as both make progress. In fact, according to the conception P. Foster argues for, equalization can only be a long-term consequence of the 'natural' dynamics of development.

The study by Z. Ferge, E. Havasi and J. Szalai sets out a different and often contrary conception. By analysing the situation in Hungary, the authors show that even in the case of a socialist society, equalization is not a spontaneous process following as an automatic consequence of the general trend of development. This equalization always implies deliberate action by the authorities. In Hungary, the reduction of regional disparities took complete form only once the principles and methods of regional planning had been clearly defined.

Three aspects of this planning seem particularly important; firstly, the fact that from the outset regionalization was based on a global approach, by which social and economic questions are considered as a whole; secondly, the gradual reduction in central controls and measures, to leave greater room for decision-making at the local level; and, finally, the constant updating of regional planning concepts. In the early 1960s emphasis was placed on the development of whole regions which, for historical reasons, had lagged behind in development. From 1971 onwards this approach, based on the principle of the homogeneous region, was replaced by the concept of the polarized region, based on a classification of the various areas into five categories, according to various criteria: population, economic resources, existing infrastructure, and the region's role and potential for development. This classification serves as the framework for attaining a twofold objective: on the one hand, promoting more balanced and economically more efficient overall development by improved use of local resources, and, secondly, reducing divergences between living conditions by setting up suitable local services or at least facilitating access to the various services (p. 184).

In the specific context of Hungarian society, this regional policy has permitted an effective reduction of disparities, in the field of education among others. However, this policy has not been free of problems, and has encountered tensions of two kinds which appear inherent to all regionalization policies. The first type of tension concerns distribution of power between the central and regional levels. While decentralization appears in itself to be a factor favouring development, excessive self-reliance is likely to benefit chiefly the regions which are already privileged. Self-reliance accordingly has its limitations, and the central level has a regulating role to play, which in practice is often very difficult. The second type of tension is between economic and social objectives. In theory, the two objectives are complementary, but in practice the equalization of living conditions between various types of communities, even the smallest, comes into conflict with more efficient use of resources at the points where these resources are located, namely in the larger communities. In this kind of situation, the principle of efficiency may be placed before that of equality, thereby holding up improvement of the situation in the less-privileged areas.

While on the whole the Hungarian study tends to show that the reduction of regional imbalances in educational development is a strategy which may have positive results provided it be the expression of a deliberate, integrated campaign, at the same time it points out the limitations to such a strategy. The reduction of regional disparities is in practice limited to equalization of access to and the quality of the education service. It has hardly any direct effect on inequalities in school attainments, which are more closely tied to the occupational structure and the social division of labour. This is why social inequalities tend to remain, even when, as in the case of Hungary, education conditions have been largely equalized in all regions of the country. The reduction of regional disparities is accordingly merely a first stage. Nevertheless, it enables a breach to be made in the cumulative effects of the regional and social handicaps, and it can even, in the long term, have a positive effect on the reduction of social inequalities. As the authors of the study put it: 'The reduction of the regional gap itself may subsequently have a salutary effect on social inequalities. If, indeed, the social structure is changing in rural areas and the educational attitudes of the better-off sectors of society become similar everywhere, the spread of the new attitude to education in rural areas may influence other spheres. Of course, educational attitudes are not formed in a vacuum. A more fundamental change in the attitudes of various social group entails adequate changes in their objective living and working conditions. And the further reduction of inequalities in these spheres requires, again, sustained and conscious efforts' (p. 232).

The contribution of P. Furter is against both of these two previous conceptions: it questions the very notion of regional equalization. The author's analysis goes beyond the socio-economic framework of the other studies, and poses the problem of reduction of disparities from a cultural viewpoint. More precisely, the question around which the study centres is as follows: what is the meaning of reduction of educational disparities in the light of inter-regional cultural diversity? If equalization leads purely and simply to standardization of the system on the basis of a given model, is it not likely to destroy regional diversity and peculiarities? As the author says, this is an emergent question which remains largely unexplored, and we are unaware of the importance it may assume in the world of tomorrow. Nevertheless, the regional movements which are growing up virtually everywhere have brought this question, sometimes violently, into the limelight, and it cannot be ignored by research.

To pose this type of question implies a change in the framework of analysis or research on inequalities. Traditionally, this research has centred around the relationships between the schooling system and the socio-economic system. From this viewpoint, the equalization of educational opportunities depends on the equalization of job opportunities and opportunities in professional life. The school is analysed inasmuch as it is a mechanism for assigning position and status in society. Furter's study is based on a different method, which concentrates attention on the relationships between the schooling system and the socio-cultural system. The school is studied in its role as an agent of socialization and transmission of culture. In this case, 'the concept of culture must be understood in its widest sense as everything that expresses and gives a meaning to life, namely our relationships with ourselves, with other people and with our environment' (p. 81). At the same time, it is 'memory of the past, a view of the present and a plan for the future'. As such, it is very closely tied to development questions and the political controversies and conflicts aroused by these questions. This is why, by this approach, equalization of educational opportunities is analyzed in its direct relationship with the organization of democracy itself: the equal rights of each individual and each community to keep alive its cultural identity and take a full part in directing and organizing society as a whole.

This approach leads to a questioning of the concept of equalization. Often the objective of providing the same educational opportunities for all has resulted in measures leading to uniformity and standardization. From the viewpoint of cultural diversity, it is not enough merely to distribute an education service equitably over a whole territory; the contents and operation of this service must also vary according to the various cultures found in the territory. In other words, the very objective of equalization implies, according to this viewpoint, different approaches depending on the specific characteristics of each community. The problem is to know how this differentiation is to be applied, and up to what point. Can the education service validly be adapted to local conditions without the participation of the people concerned, that is 'without the institutions being taken over by the people concerned'? (p. 99). What possible solution can be found to the twofold requirement of respecting local languages and the need for integration into a national and international setting? Even if one accepts the idea that the education service must be modelled closely on the diversity of local situations and that the school culture must be brought closer to the culture of everyday life, to what extent can one introduce differentiation of this service without compromising the very principle of equalization of opportunities by virtue of which it was undertaken?

While the principles are clear, the real world in which they are to be applied is characterized by conflicts and relationships of force. In other words, respect for regional cultures, their potential for self-development and the extent of their contribution to the national culture are largely conditioned by the economic and political balance between the centre and the regions. Taking as examples certain European countries, P. Furter shows the resistance that has been aroused by policies of national unity based on imposing the culture of a dominant region on a whole country. He encourages us to reflect on the possibility of developing models of cultural and educational policy 'which aim at setting up collective units, without necessarily imposing a dominant culture, and accordingly, models which comply with the requirements of cultural democracy' (p. 86).

2. *Reflections on the implementation of a policy of reduction of disparities*

In so far as concerns the second question, dealing with the putting into operation of a policy of reduction of disparities, at least two reflections of a general nature are suggested by the reading of the various contributions.

Firstly, there is the awareness that equality is a relative objective which must be translated into concrete terms taking into account the situation in each country. Both P. Foster and S. Heyneman ask themselves whether the equalization of school attainments, on which the educational policies of several countries are at present based, is a realistic objective for everyone. Could certain countries not restrict themselves (initially) to strategies aiming at equal access to schooling? It is worth posing the question, even though the answer is not obvious. Although it is true that planning should proceed in stages and that equalization of the attainments of those who benefit from the school service has hardly any meaning so long as the majority remains excluded from it, one may nevertheless wonder whether a policy of equal access to schooling, implemented without concern for the results, is not likely in the end to lead to no equalization at all. What is certain is that there are no panaceas, that the objective of equalization implies that priorities be set, and that these priorities will always be a function of the level of educational development and the economic potential and political and socio-cultural context of each country.

The second reflection, which recurs in various studies, is that a reduction of disparities in the field of education in reality implies a global operation going far beyond the framework of the school. This idea is vigorously developed by both Z. Ferge and P. Foster, although the two authors do not draw the same conclusions on the practical level. Z. Ferge pleads for integrated social action running counter to past trends, with the State playing the main role. P. Foster, on the other hand, adopts the position that free play must be given to supply and demand in the educational sector, and that planning should be restricted to guaranteeing the circulation of information and setting global development parameters governing this free play. In this, he is thinking chiefly of a wage policy more in conformity with the workings of the market, and which, combined with a more selective subsidy policy for various educational levels, should lead to greater equality of schooling opportunities (pp. 36-37).

S. Heyneman's contribution reminds us that whatever global strategy be recommended for reduction of disparities, a certain number of concrete decisions will in any case have to be taken concerning the organization of the education service itself. In actual fact, the question posed by him is essential for the planner. What schooling resources should be equalized? Should the chief concern be teacher's qualifications, educational contents, teaching facilities, or rather measures of a quite different nature? As the author says, the conclusions resulting from research are not always clear, and the choices made will not be without contradictions and reservations (p. 117).

It appears clear, in any case, that it would be dangerous simply to extrapolate certain research results obtained in industrialized countries. The idea generally accepted in these countries that there is a strong correlation between school attainments and the parents' socio-economic status does not appear to be confirmed to the same extent by studies carried out in a certain number of developing countries. A study should be made as to the reasons for this difference. If it turned out that the difference is not due to faulty measuring, this would mean that there is greater scope for manœuvres to equalize opportunities by acting on the education service, in those countries which are at the beginning of the industrialization process. However, the question remains: on what factors must one act?

There are strong indications that certain factors which can be manipulated and to which sufficient attention has not been paid in the past, have in fact a considerable influence on children's schooling. One of these factors is nutrition and health conditions. It is highly probable that a programme of food distribution and medical aid for pupils in the most underprivileged areas could have a definite equalizing effect. Others refer to the actual quality of the service provided. The problem here is that planning has often been based on a preconceived idea of quality, which was automatically associated with the level of teachers' qualifications, the number of pupils per class, the modernness of the buildings, or the sophistication of teaching facilities. Recent research, especially that carried out in developing countries, has led to the questioning of this concept of quality. It has been observed that from the viewpoint of results attained, a poor school is not necessarily inferior to a rich school, a single-teacher school to a multi-teacher school, or a school with so-called 'overcrowded' classrooms to an uncrowded school. In fact, doubts have arisen as to the existence of an absolute standard of quality. On the other hand, it is becoming more and more obvious that there is a minimum level of resources below which the education service, even if it has a classroom and a teacher, cannot operate satisfactorily: a blackboard, basic school supplies (chalk, pencils and paper, textbooks). Now these resources are often lacking in the most underprivileged areas, chiefly owing to weaknesses in the distribution system. This is why any improvement in the system so as to provide a more equitable distribution of basic school supplies could have a significant effect for the equalization of educational opportunities.

But where do we go after attaining this minimum? Heyneman insists chiefly on the importance of education curricula for an equalization policy. 'Even if students in the best equipped, most 'innovative' schools are asked to learn something silly, their time and society's investment will be wasted. The question is, what knowledge is most useful and most important for them to know, and how can this knowledge be equalized between regions?' (p. 145). The author vigorously opposes the idea that different curricula must be taught to the children depending on whether they live in rural or urban areas, or, what often amounts to the same thing, depending on whether they continue their studies or not. For him any dualism in education content is contrary to the principle of equal opportunities. Moreover, it would be incorrect to think that a non-vocationalized curriculum would not be adapted to the requirements of most of the children who will not go on later to secondary school. If, for example, the planner wishes to justify the introduction of agriculture as a teaching subject in primary schools, he would have to be sure that this subject can be efficiently taught at school and does not merely duplicate what the child already learns at home, that there is a demand from the parents for teaching the subject, that the financial and cognitive costs of teaching the subject (by teaching agriculture one cuts into the time available for studying other subjects) are justified by comparison with other possible curricula, and that the teaching of it will increase the young peoples' post-school productivity in their work.

Heyneman can find no affirmative answers to any of these questions, and pleads for a single curriculum based on the teaching of mathematics, science and languages. By concentrating efforts on these rather general subjects children in underprivileged areas will be given more equal opportunities of pursuing their studies, while at the same time those who go out to work will be better prepared to face the technological and social changes of the world of tomorrow.

It is obvious that the very firm stance taken by the author concerning the content of education curricula will not be unanimously agreed with. Certain countries have already opted for pre-vocational primary education diversified according to the economic activities prevalent in various regions. It should also be mentioned that this effort at diversification has not necessarily been in contradiction with the concern for retaining a common core of education for everyone. No doubt a more systematic assessment of these experiments from the viewpoint of their influence on equality of opportunities and their economic efficiency might provide precious data to shed light on the discussion. Pending such an assessment, Heyneman's contribution reminds us that a policy of reduction of disparities cannot be restricted to equalization of opportunities for access or even of the quality of education, but that it also, and above all, implies equality of the content of education, even if the concrete forms to be taken by this equality remain subject to controversy.

Regional disparities in educational development: some critical observations

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Contents

Introduction 21

I. The ecology of educational development 26

II. The problems and ambiguities of definition 29

III. The aims of educational policy 33

IV. The dilemmas of macro-planning 36

V. Some general guidelines for policy 38

VI. Some concluding remarks 47

Introduction

Over the last three decades educational debate in both the developed and less-developed world has in one way or another focused upon the issue of educational opportunity. In spite of this it is only recently that attempts have been made to examine critically the various meanings that can be attached to this catch-phrase and above all to discuss their implications for educational policy. In the developed countries a considerable literature has been devoted to 'mapping' inequalities in educational provision and also to examining factors that influence differential levels of student achievement and continuance in school. Valuable as this amassing of data has been it still needs to be pointed out that educational policy decisions always involve some normative judgements concerning objectives, and it is only too often that decision-makers are not very clear as to what their objectives are or why equality of educational opportunity should be a priority when ranged against other pressing development needs.

Moreover, it seems clear enough in view of resource constraints that certain definitions of equality are quite irrelevant to realistic planning in the less-developed world. As has been so well said before, the notion that equality of educational opportunity implies that all children should be educated to their 'full potential' makes little sense even in the most-developed countries. At the same time there are certain options open to more affluent societies that certainly would not be viable in the developing world. For example, the former have made great efforts to ensure greater equality of educational inputs and it would not be an unreasonable policy objective to require that national student cohorts should reach certain *minimal* levels of cognitive performance. This suggests, of course, that some basic equality of outcomes will be achieved only by a systematic policy of unequalising educational inputs. This can be done, for example, by utilising the much-abused traditional practice of class-repeating until students achieve certain minimal standards or by other ostensibly more progressive programmes of individual instruction or 'compensatory' education.

Yet I would suggest it is unlikely that such policies could commend themselves to less-developed countries. All attempts to ensure universal minimal levels of student performance involve enormous direct and opportunity costs. Quantitative teacher inputs have to be increased while at the same time the level of performance of the teaching force must necessarily be enhanced. Further, in practice, attempts to produce greater equality of outputs for some groups may also be at the expense of other minorities. It is conceivable, for example, that a poor nation can achieve some degree of universal primary education, in the sense that all children in the relevant age-cohort will obtain some few years of schooling, but it cannot ensure that these students will achieve minimal standards. If it attempts to enforce minimal standards then it may be obliged to abandon the principle of universal schooling and adopt more restrictive policies concerning initial access to schooling. In essence, therefore, I suggest that when we discuss inequality in the less-developed world we should do better to examine the concept less in terms of outputs and achievement and look simply at differential enrolment and continuance patterns as between regions or social and ethnic groups.

Further, it should be recognised that the impetus to the whole debate on educational inequality in most societies is basically political in its origins. To be sure, policy-makers often suggest that greater equality of educational opportunity (however defined) will lead to a greater development of potential human resources and will in the long run have a perceptible influence on levels of economic well-being. Whether this argument has justification or not is not the point at issue in this essay: in most of the less-developed world demands for equality of educational opportunity stem usually from some ethnic or regional minorities recognizing that they have not achieved educational 'parity' with other groups, and in so far as this is the case they cannot obtain access to their 'fair share' of occupational opportunities, income and power. People everywhere are less motivated by what they perceive to be the overall welfare of the polity than they are by their own definitions of individual or group interests, and in many societies education has become one of the principal arenas in which classic conflicts take place between status groups based on regional, ethnic or class affiliation. Unquestionably the political demands for educational equality that minorities make to government are at root frequently the expression of group economic interests.

It follows, therefore, that the issue of educational inequality, whether looked at in regional, ethnic or class terms, simply cannot be understood except in the socio-economic context in which the schools function. To put it simply, if formal education were not perceived to be the principal route to individual or group social and economic mobility in the less-developed world nobody would be very much interested in the issue of equality of educational opportunity: it would simply be irrelevant to processes of status-group conflict. It follows, therefore, that before we turn to regional disparities themselves we should examine the empirical literature on the relationship between access and continuance in schooling and its occupational and status outcomes. These relationships really determine how important equality of education will become as an issue, and in this context some parallels with and divergences from the situation in developed nations are particularly instructive.

In the developed world recent research has tended to move in a fruitful direction. In the 50s and early 60s much of the sociology of education was essentially concerned with mapping disparities of access to and continuance in schooling. We are all familiar with the general findings of this tradition of research: in *all* societies individuals with lower socio-economic provenance had lower mean levels of educational achievement and tended to drop out of school earlier, with the result that most educational systems showed increasing imparities in the relative representation of socio-economic groups the higher one moved up the system. What was not clear, however, was what these irregularities portended in terms of the future occupational status of individuals. The development of new methodological tools, however, has enabled us to focus on processes of status-transmission and attainment and has provided a clearer picture of the degree to which education is predictive of subsequent occupational and income achievement.

The results of this new pattern of research are equivocal. In developed countries an individual's own level of educational achievement is the strongest *single* predictor of his subsequent occupational status and income: in other words, schooling plays an important role in processes of individual mobility, while the direct influence of an individual's antecedent social status is relatively attenuated. At the same time educational achievement typically accounts for only about 20 per cent of the variance in subsequent status, and this suggests that a multiplicity of other factors play a highly significant role in processes of occupational and income attainment.

In summary, research in developed nations leads to the following conclusions. First, schooling does *not* contribute to the maintenance of relatively closed status-structures. In spite of the fact that imparities in educational access and continuance exist this does not imply that education is not significant in facilitating relatively high aggregate levels of occupational and social mobility, though much of this is essentially of a short-range variety. At the same time there is enough looseness in the structures of these societies to ensure that formal schooling is not an *overwhelmingly* powerful predictor of individual and group destinies.

Though research on similar lines in less-developed countries is only just beginning, I think that certain divergences from the developed-nation model are becoming apparent. It is likely in some nations that social background may explain more of the variance in the subsequent occupational achievement of individuals (perhaps in parts of Latin America), but I do not believe that this would be the case as yet in many of the new nations of sub-Saharan Africa. More important, however, is that in a large part of the developing world the importance of formal schooling as a predictor of subsequent status and income is likely to be substantially higher than in much of the developed world. The reasons for this have been discussed at length elsewhere, but in short the domination of employment opportunities by government and large-scale organisations in the modern sectors of many less-developed economies has placed a premium on educational credentialism while at the same time relatively inflexible wage-policies in these sectors have maintained relatively high rates of private return to educational investment. Although *aggregate* rates of mobility in these societies may remain low, opportunities to enchance one's status and income are heavily dependent on educational qualifications. Thus the principal route to collective and individual mobility in many less-developed countries has been through gaining access to schooling. As long as this remains the case, demands for greater equality of educational life chances are merely a reflection of the existing socio-economic order of these states: pressures for group parity in educational access result from a realistic appraisal by individuals and groups of extant opportunity structures.

It follows, however, that if the socio-economic parameters determining the significance of schooling as an instrument of mobility themselves begin to change, the whole issue of educational inequality may well lose some of its salience. If, for example, as a result of high rates of educational expansion and limited employment opportunities in some less-developed countries private returns of education begin to decline and mobility opportunities become more problematic then, in fact, popular demand for education may begin to fall. This phenomenon is already beginning to occur in some advanced societies with respect to higher education as a result of vast expansion of educational enrolments in recent years, followed by a more constrained economic situation, but there is already some evidence that it is already beginning to appear, for example, in Ghana and Western Nigeria.[1] As far as access to secondary and higher education is concerned in particular, this is probably a desirable development and could be facilitated by more flexible approaches to incomes policy and by the withdrawal of massive *across-the-board* policies of educational subsidisation. However, the main point of the discussion has been to suggest that the whole problem of educational inequality, whether it is conceived of in regional, socio-economic or ethnic terms, tends to be a response to a series of factors that lie primarily outside the educational system itself. Paradoxically, the importance of the issue has been magnified in many countries simply as a result of government actions that have placed a premium on educational credentialism while at the same time unselectively pursuing massive, subsidised policies of educational expansion. Rather than concentrate upon plans to create greater equality of educational provision as if this were a desirable objective *per se*, planners would be well advised to see whether manipulation of external parameters would in large measure defuse the issue and make it less of a source of overt group conflict.

Granted all this, it must be admitted that few governments in less-developed nations are likely to pursue such broad-based approaches. Sheer political pressures and constraints mean that the pursuit of equality of educational opportunity will become a major objective of policy and will have to be pursued regardless of its real economic and social consequences. Given this reality we can now turn to a discussion of patterns of regional inequality.

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[1] See Hinchcliffe, K. 'The unprofitability of secondary modern schooling in the Western Region of Nigeria', *West African journal of education*, 14, 1970, pp. 180-182, and 'A comparative analysis of educational development in Ghana and the Western Region of Nigeria', *Nigerian journal of social and economic studies*, 13, 1972.

I. The ecology of educational development

Much research in developed nations has in recent years concentrated upon the role of socio-economic status as a predictor of academic achievement and subsequent occupational status. By and large the problem of regional or geographic differences in access to education has received less attention, except in the United States. Yet it is apparent even in those developed countries with more centralised patterns of administration and finance that regional inequalities still exist, even though the general level of educational diffusion is such that they have become more muted. Unquestionably, however, such variations are immensely greater in less-developed nations, and the problem is compounded by the fact that geographical or regional inequalities often coincide with ethnic divisions such as those in sub-Saharan Africa. 'Tribalism' is in fact a misleading term that serves to divert attention from the real issue, which often stems from the imparities in the allocation of educational and other resources as between regions or districts.

There is no need in this essay to map the dimensions of regional inequality in various nations, since they are evident enough from basic census data and more specialised studies, but two preliminary points can be made. First, most debate on regional inequalities tends to be ahistorical in nature, but such inequalities cannot be understood without reference to much earlier processes of educational diffusion; an understanding of contemporary imparities necessarily involves an examination of the dynamics of earlier educational development, since these may indicate present constraints within which realistic planning must take place.

In some cases it is possible to show that certain educational profiles have been the result of 'historical' or apparently fortuitous circumstances. Thus in some former colonial territories the early development of schooling in specific areas was due to proximity to the coast, to the existence of climatic conditions conducive to missionary settlement and endeavour, or to the presence of particular local rulers or forms of political authority that were hospitable (for whatever reasons) to be spread of western-type schools.

The important thing is that early centres of educational development tend to maintain their initial advantages over relatively long periods. Thus, for example, the education advantages of India's 'rimland' over the 'heartland' have persisted well into the post-colonial period; the Gikuyu of Kenya have tended to maintain their educational lead over other ethnic minorities; the educational gaps between Sao Paulo and North Eastern Brazil have in no way diminished in recent decades, and so on. Indeed one of the most systematic trends that emerges is that at intermediate levels of development the absolute educational gap between 'have' and 'have-not' regions tends to increase rather than become more attenuated. This is not to deny that aggregate levels of enrolment and continuance may rise in all areas, but more advanced regions are able to capitalise on their earlier educational traditions and compound the pattern of relative inequality. In passing it should be noted in the political context of many less-developed nations that it is relative rather than absolute status that is the substantive issue.

Second, it needs to be born in mind when we speak of the historical origins of regional inequalities in education that the term historical need not be equated with fortuitous. This is not to deny that certain unique occurrences may have stimulated the early growth of schooling in some areas, but frequently the spread of education can be seen in the light of a more general ecology of educational growth. Thus Soja has demonstrated in the case of Kenya that the early spread of schooling was closely related to the diffusion of a cash crop economy, the spread of transport networks, the level of urbanisation and proximity to nodal centres of growth.[1] His findings tend to parallel some of my own conclusions concerning Ghananian development and are echoed in the papers by Martin and Hugon.[2] To be sure, the rhetorical approaches of these scholars differ but the general idea sustaining the view that processes of educational diffusion are not random but are systematically linked to other antecedent changes in economic structure is common to them all. Even Thabault's classic study of a nineteenth-century French village[3] which suggested that certain economic changes were a pre-condition for the diffusion of local educational demand uses the same perspective and suggests that some general ecological principles may govern the diffusion of schooling in part independent of particular local cultural traditions or historical circumstances.

In effect we are arguing for a 'demand' explanation of educational growth: the press for schooling is a response to new opportunity structures created by economic change, and unless the economic pre-requisites exist the level of effective demand for schooling will remain low. This is not to deny that other motivations may inspire a desire or lack of it for formal education but, in general, the economic variables are more parsimonious and powerful in accounting for much of the variance in the pattern of growth. Moreover, it need not be assumed that existing enrolment levels at any given moment are accurate reflections of demand: excess demand for schooling may exist through lags in supply or even be a result of discriminatory policies pursued against certain regions or minorities. Conversely, it is not unusual in the more backward regions of developing nations to find temporary conditions of excess supply—half-empty schools existing alongside cohorts of reluctant parents and children. But these are usually temporary phenomena and the long-term secular trends in educational enrolments suggest a broad correspondence between rates of economic and educational development.

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[1] Soja, Edward. *The geography of modernization in Kenya*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968.

[2] Martin, Jean-Yves, 'Social differentiation and regional disparities: educational development in Cameroon', and Hugon, Philippe, 'Regional disparities in schooling: the case of Madagascar', in Volume II of this series.

[3] Thabault, Roger, *Mon village 1848-1914*. Paris: Librairie Delagrave et Cie, 1945.

It follows from these observations that we cannot regard the pressure for educational equality as stemming from a 'social' demand for education, since there is simply no such phenomenon. Where school attendance is not, in fact, compulsory (as is the case in most of the less-developed world) the demand for schooling is largely a function of the calculation of private and opportunity costs as related to perceived future income and status benefits. This may become increasingly less true at the primary level, where as schooling becomes more widely diffused attendance tends to be governed by established cultural expectations, but in most less-developed nations access to and continuance in post-primary and tertiary institutions is substantially determined by a rudimentary economic calculus.

II. The problems and ambiguities of definition

If the line of argument developed in this essay is generally accepted it follows that our view of regional educational inequalities will be entirely different from that currently prevailing in many planning circles. At present, equality of educational opportunity is talked of in national terms and evidence is presented that shows that there are vast disparities in the provision of schooling to different sub-populations in every less-developed nation. But surely this is to miss the point: nations in the LDCs are sometimes nothing more than a set of arbitrary boundaries subject to the often tenuous authority of a central government. The 'nation' is not really a meaningful unit for planning, for in terms of rates of socio-economic change and levels of development it turns out to be a series of ecological zones that are often sharply differentiated. In some cases, national boundaries reflect no more than the pretensions of national élites: in many respects, for example, the Hausa/Fulani of northern Nigeria have more in common with their counterparts in Niger than they have with the population of the more urbanized southern littoral, and even where ethnic differentials are not apparent there are numerous examples in the less-developed world where zones of socio-economic development in no way coincide with national boundaries.

This point is often made in the context of political issues, but it is less often recognized where strategies for educational development are considered. *Prima facie* it does not seem to make sense to talk of 'national' policies for equality and access to schooling when the nation is itself nothing more than an aggregation of differentiated ecological zones. As we shall see, educational plans that seem realistic for one area or region are not necessarily realistic or desirable for another, and educational planners rarely confront this issue: the aim is always to 'even-up' educational facilities, often at the expense of other types of resource allocation that may have a much higher priority for the populations of some regions.

Granted that the nation state in the less-developed world frequently does not constitute a rational unit for educational or any other type of planning, we must recognize that it is, in practice, the parameter within which policy decisions *must* be made, and the desire of national élites for sovereignty will preclude any effective form of meaningful supranational educational planning. Yet it is often not recognised that *within* national boundaries the same ambiguities confound flexible *internal* strategies. When regional educational disparities are discussed the word 'region' is usually defined in terms of conventional administrative divisions that have little substantive meaning for policy. To be sure, in some countries such divisions may coincide with ethnic differentials, but they rarely coincide with ecological zones of socio-economic development. Regional inequalities in education are, therefore, little more than an artefact of the administrative divisions that exist. To put it another way, if one were to develop a national map that defined regions in terms of some composite index of socio-economic development, including, for example, income *per capita*, proportion of population in tertiary activities, level of urbanisation, exposure to transport networks, level of school enrolments, etc. and then superimposed this upon a map of those existing administrative divisions that constitute the present basis for planning, one would usually find that there would be little relation between the two sets of profiles.

This explains why if we shift the unit of analysis from the regional to the district level (or whatever the appropriate nomenclature given to smaller administrative units) we almost invariably find that the differences in mean levels of school enrolments *within* regions exceed the mean difference in enrolment levels as *between* regions. (Just as Bugnicourt has shown for sub-Saharan Africa, for example, that intranational variation is greater than international variation.[1]) It is quite likely that if we further divided our units to subdivisional levels the mean differences between these would be greater than those prevailing at the interdistrict level. In a sense we can become involved in an almost 'infinite regression' in our definitions of inequality.

Thus inequalities are an artefact of the units of definition we use, and moreover they are almost invariably calculated on the basis of *mean* levels of enrolment and continuance rates in school. Statistical exercises of this kind simply ignore the range of inequalities within and between units. Only too often the most 'advanced' segments of local populations in more 'backward' regions have better educational facilities than the more 'backward' groups in the most 'advanced' regions (whether we define groups in terms of ethnic district or socio-economic criteria). This raises the touchy question as to *who* exactly gets the benefits when the decision is made to provide extra educational resources to educationally backward areas. Often, I suspect, it is the most educationally advanced minorities within them. If the principal of allocative equity suggests that special assistance should be given to those *individuals* or families who need it most, the question becomes whether benefits allocated on a regional basis can ever meet such a policy criterion.

An equally formidable set of problems arises when we shift from issues of region and district to definitions of equality in educational provision. We have already noted that the idea of equality of outcomes, however feasible this might be in a limited sense for developed nations, is simply not on the cards for the less-developed world. But even the apparently simple notions of 'access' and 'continuance' raise some thorny questions. Do we mean, for example, that as between each region or district an equal proportion of the eligible age-cohort should be enrolled or places should be available for them if demanded? Thus it could be argued that in every region (irrespective of level of development) places should be available for, say, 50 per cent of the eligible age-cohort, and we shall assume that such places would be filled. Such a definition avoids the requirement of universal access to primary education but it raises difficulties. Are 'over-age' children to be excluded (and they are much in evidence in the schools of many LDCs)? Would affluent regions or those that exhibit more enthusiasm for schooling be entitled to exceed these 'quotas', and if so, should they do so by mobilising their own local resources or should they be entitled to central government grants whether of a full or matching variety? Would such a policy obtain as between districts as well as between regions?

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[1] Bugnicourt, Jacques, 'Disparités scolaires en Afrique', *Tiers monde*, XII (48) Oct/Dec 1971, pp. 751-786.

Moreover, the term 'access' says very little. Conventionally, enrolment ratios estimate the proportion of a given age-cohort that is in school at any one moment in time. But it is perfectly likely that although only 50 per cent of an age cohort is in school at any one point in time, some 90 per cent of that cohort may have been in school at some time or another. Almost uniformly high drop-out rates in many LDCs ensure that statistics tend to underestimate the proportion of children who have had *some* schooling, even if this has only been for two or three years. Thus the issue of access is inseparably linked to that of continuance.

One way of circumventing this problem is to enforce minimal levels of schooling in terms of years. For example, all children should attend primary school for a minimum period of five years (whether they or their parents want it or not?). Yet in many LDCs, as we have noted, there is no chance of enforcing such a principle for *all* children, and providing a full five years of school for a minority or even a majority of an age-cohort might only too often deny opportunities for two or three years of schooling to a large number of other potential students. Whatever planning techniques or devices are available, at present I find myself quite unable to assess whether more lengthy primary schooling for fewer children is preferable in developmental terms to a shorter period for a greater number. Moreover, the notion that reductions in drop-out rates can be achieved rapidly through the manipulation of educational variables (e.g. more or better teachers, new curricula etc.) has little to commend it. The factors that have the greatest influence on drop-out rates are largely exogenous to school systems themselves:[1] short of direct monetary subsidies to parents there is not much to be done about them in the short term and national campaigns to reduce drop-out have been conspicuous failures.

Issues of 'equality' of schooling at the primary level are difficult enough, but they are compounded when we raise the problem of access to and continuance in post-primary or tertiary institutions. Even if planners were agreed as to some criterion of equality in primary schooling, would they also suggest that the proportion of students who complete the primary-school programme and proceed to secondary or even university education should be constant as between regions or districts? This would ensure a similar profile as between areas, or is such a principle to be applied only at the primary level? Further problems become apparent if planners are really committed to equality in post-primary access. In some African nations, for example, it is customary for large numbers of primary-school graduates to migrate from educationally less-developed areas into urban centres to obtain secondary schooling. Where this pattern is evident there is a distribution of statistical returns that exaggerates regional inequalities, since student origin is ignored. Moreover, it is clear enough at the university level that alternative types of programme generate different degrees of job opportunity and income. Must we ensure regional parity of student representation in different fields of study to ensure equivalence of returns?

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[1] See Levy, Mildred, 'Determinants of primary school drop-outs in developing countries', *Comparative education review*, 15 (1), Feb. 1971, pp. 44-58.

And so we could continue to multiply examples of definition *ad infinitum* and point to the problems raised by them. To do so is not simply to indulge in hair-splitting exercises, for if some notion of equity is at stake as distinct from a mechanistic set of definitions of equality it is precisely these questions that must become salient in planning. Doubtless in the next few years we shall see a profusion of new and more sophisticated indices of inequalities in education. But the generation of different definitions of regional or district inequality and attempts to measure it in a more refined fashion are simply exercises in futility unless we have a clearer conception of objectives and purposes: no measurement technique has particular utility except in the light of policy objectives. In this regard educational planners are no more qualified than local political leaders to judge as between alternative ends: they can only point to the possible consequences (or non-consequences) of attempting to implement varying educational objectives.

III. The aims of educational policy

What then are the objectives that underlie the whole debate, and why should regional inequalities be such an issue? Quite apart from the immediate political pressures to which governments are subject there seem to be three more or less implicit types of objective.

The first rests on the general belief that a greater diffusion of formal education will contribute to the political development of the less-developed world. The term 'political development' is itself normatively based and I am not sure that it has any real place in the lexicon of the social sciences, but generally it revolves around such notions as political stability, greater political participation by the populace, absence of political violence, etc. It is assumed that schools are effective agencies of political socialisation in that they generate the appropriate skills, attitudes and values that are vital to welding the nation together, through producing sentiments of common citizenship and perhaps by diminishing regional or ethnic particularisms.

Actually, the evidence that the schools can justify such aspirations is all too sparse. Correlations between levels of education and various indices of political development tell us nothing as to how schools actually create conditions of political stability, for example, and there is evidence to suggest that at intermediate levels of development they may be as conducive to political fragmentation as to political integration.[1] Thus, in spite of a very considerable body of literature purporting to examine the relationships between schooling and political development, I would suggest that we as yet know so little that no existing finding could justify the conclusion that greater provision of schooling (and inferentially greater equality in its provision) would achieve immediate political objectives. If over the long run formal education proved to be conducive to political stability, for example, then we could regard this as a desirable externality: what we should not do is regard it as a priority objective of educational planning from which short-term rewards can be expected.

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1. See, for example, Samuel P. Hungtington, *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 43-47.

A second objective is based upon an assumed relationship between equality in educational provision and subsequent greater equality in patterns of income distribution. There is no doubt that the rhetoric of greater income equality (if not the active pursuit of it) has been adopted by many less-developed nations. Whether such equality is desirable in the light of other development goals is beside the point in this essay. The issue is whether the evidence thus far suggests that greater equality of educational opportunity does in fact generate greater income equality. Unfortunately, the evidence thus far suggests that it does not, and if income equality is a national objective (regardless of its cost in developmental terms) governments would be more advised to tackle the problem directly, perhaps through more efficient means of taxation and redistribution.

Finally, the argument for greater equality in education rests upon its presumed contribution to economic development as more narrowly defined. The argument that schooling promotes growth in terms of a rise in mean levels of real income *per capita* has more empirical evidence to support it than either the political or income-equality arguments. To be sure, we are not so clear as to *how* it contributes, and a series of alternative hypotheses exists to explain the phenomenon: the creation of high-level manpower; the diffusion of literacy, leading to a lower cost of information decoding; the creation of attitudes and values conducive to development; etc. Whatever the reasons may be, the fact is that private and social rates of return to schooling are often high in the less-developed world, and even given the serious limitations of rate-of-return analysis the presumptive evidence is that investment in schooling is not a bad bet for a poor country, though conditions will vary greatly at different stages of growth.

However, the evidence should not lead us to believe that equality of regional educational opportunity as we have defined it is a *sina qua non* for development and thus should be a policy priority. Indeed, the economic data would suggest the contrary: in countries achieving substantial economic growth rates the degree of income inequality, for example, is likely to rise for a time (though this may not be for long, as the experience of Taiwan demonstrates).[1] The issue it seems to me (and I am aware that there will be strong disagreement on this point) is not whether the rich are getting richer, since they normally constitute a small proportion of the populations of less-developed nations anyway, but whether the poor are also getting richer. If the income gap widens but both sets of trend-lines are upward, this is preferable to egalitarian stasis at a low level of growth. People are often worried by the widening economic gap between regions as development occurs, but the alternative may often be a no-growth situation. In practice, the development of the richer regions often facilitates the subsequent growth of the poorer, and where this is slow to occur migration is often the only realistic answer to the problem.

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[1] Dennis L. Chinn, 'Distributional equality and economic growth: the case of Taiwan', *Economic development and cultural change*, Vol. 26, (1) Oct 1977, pp. 65-79.

Precisely the same line of argument, it seems to me, applies to the educational scene. If the processes of economic and educational development are intertwined and reciprocal there is no *prima facie* case for making reductions in regional inequalities a short-term priority if economic growth is a priority. What is implied is that educational policies should be flexible and very much related to the actual level of development in different areas and districts. In some, schooling may not be an initial priority, while in others there may be very different emphasis on the provision of primary, post-primary or university education or, indeed, concentration upon out-of-school types of instruction and training. The important thing is that 'lock-step' principles should not govern the direction of national education policies.

Thus *timing* and *sequence* must be the essence of intelligent planning, and attempts to impose uniform educational targets ignore the fact that the importance of educational investment will vary from area to area. In some areas agricultural development needs emphasis, but this may initially involve the issue of types of land tenure, the introduction of cash crops and the spread of new methods of husbandry. When such changes are occurring the importance of literacy to farmers is likely to be enhanced, but this may suggest adult literacy campaigns rather than a rapid and immediate increase in primary schooling (one of the problems of such campaigns thus far is that they have often been introduced in areas where the usefulness of literacy is extremely limited). In other areas the development of road networks may seem a more pressing need, while in others the upgrading of the literacy skills of an established industrial workforce may be more urgent, and so on. If we view the development process in this way we must conclude that there is inherently no reason why equality of educational opportunity should be more of a priority than the equalization of road network densities among regions, the equal provision of hospitals *per capita*, or the even distribution of *any* resource that is in short supply.

IV. The dilemmas of macro-planning

One great danger is to regard planning in terms of *absolute* priorities: if this is the principle that undergirds policy there is always the probability that unrestrained inputs into the 'priority' will diminish returns to investment in it below the level of return that could be generated from alternatives. Indeed, the unanticipated consequences of priority planning are often unforeseen and unwanted. One wonders if educational planners concerned with regional equalities realise that one of the immediate consequences of expanding heavily-subsidised educational facilities to backward regions may be initially a much higher propensity for young people to migrate out of the region into urban centres. Even though such migrants may constitute only a minority of rural educated youth, their *aggregate* impact on rates of urban growth can be formidable. The problem will certainly not be solved by providing curricula adapted to rural needs etc. in the schools of a 'backward' area, although migration is *in the long run* not such a serious problem as is supposed: the outmigration rates of educated youth will fall as the imparities in the returns to schooling between rural and urban areas begin to diminish, as they assuredly will. Thus I personally conceive migration as a desirable and not an undesirable phenomenon; but it is startling to see planners who espouse the notions of regional equality of educational opportunity being unaware that such a priority will lead to another phenomenon that they frequently deplore—enhanced rural/urban migration rates! In most cases 'margins', not 'priorities', are the only way to fine-tune the planning process.

Although the thrust of my main argument should now be clear there are still some serious difficulties. Central planning agencies may well recognize that the provision of uniform educational facilities in all areas is neither desirable nor necessary and that a certain degree of flexibility is required. This can result in setting up a range of differentiated educational 'targets' for all areas and regions. (Planners are always willing to pay lip-service to the principle of 'flexibility', in theory if not in practice.) But this assumes that planners really do have a clear idea of how the development process actually occurs. In other words, they must have a conception of sequence and timing and understand in what order the process of change must occur in order to assure maximum benefits.

Unfortunately, we know very little concerning the nature of development sequences. Very often all the evidence a planner possesses are correlational analyses that inter-relate the various dimensions of the 'modernisation' or 'development' process. How these dimensions are related in a sequential fashion is a very different matter, and those studies that involve quasi-causal analysis have been carried out at such a high level of abstraction, e.g. at the cross-national level, that they are of little value in understanding the dynamics of change in any *particular* development situation—and it is, after all, the particular situation with which real individuals and groups are concerned.

In fact, the inability to come to grips with cause and effect or reciprocal relationships constitutes a fundamental criticism of all forms of macro-planning, which often assumes that relationships are already 'known' when they are not. For example, with all the technical paraphernalia at their disposal planners in many developed countries are often confounded by the simple problem of calculating anticipated traffic flows over a five-year period to newly-built airports. Yet in the developing world it is often confidently assumed that we can plan educational development in relation to other aspects of social change, when the conceptual problem is itself infinitely more difficult and the relevant data not even available! Some few of us suspect that the macro-planning of education in relation to broad social and economic objectives is a dead issue, but for obvious reasons this is hard for planners to accept.

V. Some general guidelines for policy

With what then are we left? We have implied that equality in regional educational opportunity should not be an absolute or overwhelming priority, that flexibility is required, but, at the same time, that planning *as commonly understood*, whether flexible or not, has serious conceptual and practical limitations. I suggest that there are two general policy principles that flow from our argument thus far. First, efforts to achieve regional equality in education on a national basis must be secondary to efforts to develop essentially decentralised patterns of educational decision-making that would enable regions, districts or local groups to exert a more decisive role in resource allocation as between types and levels of schooling or as between schooling and other felt developmental needs.

Second, and this principle is implied by the first, is that as far as is compatible with pragmatic political considerations, as much educational decision-making as possible should be left to the private arena and to processes of individual family and group decision-making. This does not imply *no* role for planning, but suggests that planners should be responsible for creating the structural arena within which decision-making must take place. Thus they will be concerned with defining parameters and ensuring the flow of information, but *not* with attempting to directly influence the infinite number of decision-making processes that they are not qualified to pre-empt. We shall return to a more down-to-earth conception of what this means for policy very shortly.

But the administration of general principles must always be modified in the light of extant realities and the pragmatic concerns of political leadership. If a nation's leadership has already decided to go ahead with enforcing some principle of inter-regional equality in education there is not much to be done. Governments are, after all, perfectly capable of setting regional quotas, and slowing down the rate of educational advance in more-developed regions with the intention of diverting resources to other less fortunate areas. In practice, this turns out to be no more than an application of the principles of political arithmetic that are, for example, so fundamental to political life in sub-Saharan Africa. In other words, reduction in regional inequalities in educational provision is necessary to defuse assumed potential repercussions from disaffected or regional minorities.

Upon this basis educational planners can proceed to draw up elaborate maps in the light of government criteria to indicate existing disparities. They can then plan operations to increase the number of teachers and schools in backward areas, calculate the costs of such exercises and oversee the reallocation of resources that all this would involve. They are also in a position to see whether the cost of such programmes would exceed current resources, and if so to advise accordingly concerning the time-period of the operations. But in this situation the planner is no more than a specialist in educational logistics where the objectives have already been decided upon.

This kind of planning will occur in any situation, but if the planner is to be regarded as rather more than a technician he should be expected to point to the putative social and economic outcomes of alternative policies and let governments make the final decisions as to what strategies should be pursued. What general principles stemming from the kind of argument that we have developed in this essay would a planner then suggest to a government of a less-developed nation, bearing in mind that these must be modified in the light of particular local political and economic conditions and constraints?

1. Governments must recognize initially that conflicts over regional inequalities in education have much of their origin in institutional spheres that lie outside the educational system. As we have suggested, a good deal can be done to 'defuse' what is essentially a political problem by altering some of the parameters within which educational decision-making takes place. Historically in most of the less-developed world the demand for education has been linked to a desire on the part of consumers to obtain full-time paid wage or salaried employment in the growing 'modern sectors' of developing economies. Typically the recruitment policies of employers in this sector have tended to stress formal educational qualifications for access to jobs while, at the same time, there has typically been a massive expansion of schooling which has been stimulated by non-selective policies of educational subsidisation. It is no surprise, therefore, that the demand for education tends to escalate upwards from the primary to the tertiary level. Ultimately, the supply of educated job-seekers tends to increase beyond the level of effective demand at current prices, leading to increased competition between individuals and groups for ever higher levels of educational access. This pattern of demand is stimulated by relatively rigid wage structures in the modern sector which guarantee high private rates of return for *those that are successful*. In other words, while the probability of occupational success may become more limited the gains are substantial for those individuals or groups who *do* succeed.

How long such a process of escalation can continue is difficult to forecast. In some measure the demand for access to post-primary and tertiary education may tend to level off, and this is a desirable trend in so far as it is already apparent in many less-developed countries that conditions of excess supply are beginning to appear, given current conceptions of the relation between educational qualifications and subsequent occupational achievement. This process, however, can be facilitated by more flexible approaches to incomes policy, since current practice frequently sustains prevailing income scales and differentials when supply conditions have changed. More market-oriented income policies will have the effect of absorbing more labour, while at the same time depressing private rates of return and *ceteris paribus* lowering the demand for post-primary and higher education. Such a strategy, as we shall note later, must be combined with a much more rigorous and selective policy governing public subsidisation of these levels of education. However, the first step must always be to recognise that what is seen to be an 'educational' problem is by no means solely this.

2. Although the above policy could be applied beyond the primary level I believe that certain other considerations must be introduced into strategies governing the development of primary schooling. To be perfectly consistent one might well argue that the provision of primary education should be left to processes of individual and group decision-making, and that the role of the State in the enterprise should be minimal. There is no intrinsic reason why, for example, the provision of primary education should be free any more than the provision of medical services. Why not, therefore, allow processes of decision-making based on the calculation of private benefits to govern the process of educational diffusion?

Granted this, I think that a reasonable case can still be made that if central government undertakes a role in educational provision the locus of its major efforts should be with the primary schools. Whatever the private or social rates of return might be (and indeed these are typically highest at the primary level for most LDCs), there is evidence to support the view that the widespread diffusion of literacy and numeracy is not only a part response to economic development but is itself a catalyst in the growth process. In contrast to earlier views that stressed the critical 'need' for high-level manpower, I believe that much current judgement leans towards the idea that literacy and numeracy (and inferentially primary schooling) is more important in the development context.

To stress this, however, does not imply that primary schooling must be fully funded from central public sources, nor does it suggest that the provision of such schooling must be equalised as between regions. What it *does* suggest is, that if central public revenues are available but limited, money spent on primary education is, at this stage, a better bet then money spent on other educational sectors. The state is not required to fully finance such activities but should attempt to provide limited assistance, with full acceptance of the principle that if local regions and communities wish to generate resources to top-up and expand facilities beyond minimal levels they should have power to do so through local taxation and, if necessary, graduated scales of fees. Unfortunately, plans for equality of educational opportunity often imply that primary schooling should be both free and compulsory. However, there is no reason why variable fees should not be utilised, or dispensed with altogether, depending on local and individual resources. Moreover, attempts to make primary schooling compulsory are simply not viable in most LDCs. Compulsory education laws are, in fact, effective only when 90 per cent of children are *already* in school on a voluntary basis; attempts to enforce attendance where substantial numbers of children are not voluntarily in school (whether through their own or their parents' decision) have always been failures.

There is no self-evident reason why such strategies will perpetuate regional inequalities. One of the lessons to be learnt, for example, from the history of parts of sub-Saharan Africa is that where local populations are committed to the notion of schooling they are capable of a rapid transformation in its availability (witness the achievements of the Ibo areas in the South Eastern sections of Nigeria in the pre- and post-World War II periods). It must not be assumed that the principles indicated here would inevitably lead to any more persistent differentials than more centrally sponsored programmes. Even if this were the case such disparities would reflect the varying emphasis accorded by local populations to investment in schooling as opposed to other forms of desired objective.

3. This principle follows directly from the above statement. Not only should patterns of educational decision-making be decentralised, but where central government is able to provide assistance to regions and local units such support should not be highly specific. Communities are exercised not only over the problem of schooling but frequently on many other issues. One wonders, for example, in spite of the valiant efforts that have been made to provide primary schooling for the children of some Saharan nomadic peoples, whether if these people had been given the option they might not have preferred more water bores. So long as people are given no options they will always accept a marginally desirable benefit if it is ostensibly provided free. To devolve power from the centre necessarily means that local people have real authority to allocate resources and make decisions in what they conceive to be their own interests, and one suspects that the typical arguments used by central government authority to deny such authority sometimes reflect its fear of letting the power escape from its own hands. Arguments concerning local 'ignorance', the greater possibility of 'corruption' in resource allocation, etc., have a hollow ring in view of the actual experience of many LDCs in recent years. More often than not when local communities are really committed to an objective they perform extraordinarily well. Parenthetically, it is also worth noting that central governments will still have a great deal to do in the sphere of education, but it is possible that if they have less to do they might do it more effectively. The production of textbooks, the diffusion of educational information, general inspectorial functions to help sustain minimal standards, teacher training, etc. are all examples of activities in which it is to be expected that the State will play a critical role.

4. In many of the educationally more-developed LDCs primary schooling seems to be less controversial at present, and the most acrimonious debates focus on regional disparities in secondary and particularly university education.

The response of the State to pressure for equality in these sectors should be cautious, for two reasons. First, there is a very great danger of over-expansion at these levels in the light of current market demand, particularly if programmes of subsidisation are pursued in response to regional pressures. Moreover, many LDCs ignore the fact that their enrolments at these levels sometimes already approach those prevailing in some more-developed nations in the immediate pre-World War II period—which provides a cautionary note concerning just how much secondary or university education is needed to assure development.

Second, present policies of general subsidisation often increase rather than diminish imparities, and most empirical studies show that substantial groups who pay for such education through taxation hardly profit from it in terms of educational access. There is, in fact, often a net transfer of educational benefits from less to more affluent segments of the population. Thus it is perfectly possible for a central government to provide resources to build secondary schools and possibly a university in a backward region only to find that it is disproportionately subsidising the children of the élite of that region. Greater parity in regional representation is achieved at the expense of less equity in socio-economic provision.

At the secondary-school level my own suggestion is that central government should be directly responsible for the provision of a number of highly selective secondary schools that would draw upon the national catchment area, through competitive examination. These institutions would be unashamedly élitist in their *intent*, but the real question is whether they would necessarily be élitist in the composition of their student bodies.

Evidence would suggest that the relationship between socio-economic status and academic achievement may be looser in many LDCs than in the developed world, and one should not assume that one consequence of a highly selective system would be to fill the schools with the offspring of 'socially advantaged' families. Indeed, in many LDCs the proportion of the population that could be so categorised is so small that even if their mean level of academic achievement were higher than that of the total eligible cohort they would still constitute only a minority of the total secondary-school population. In my opinion, the notion that academic examinations *per se* merely lead to the 'social reproduction' of existing élites in the LDCs is greatly exaggerated: frequently the 'social reproduction' effect is due, in large measure, to the inability of suitably qualified students from less advantaged circumstances to finance their studies.

Thus at the secondary-school level one should advance the principle that no academically qualified student should be denied access to the élite sector as a result of financial need. However, the assumptions underlying this are vastly different from those of many who are concerned with regional inequalities. Support should not be given on the basis of regional or ethnic criteria, nor on the fact of coming from an under-privileged minority, but it should be given on the basis of *individual* or family need. If the principle of assistance to collectivities is accepted the consequences are often unfortunate, as for example in the United States, where educational subsidies given on the basis of ethnic affiliation could well end up in the transfer of benefits to the more affluent members of minorities at the expense of their own poorer members and the less fortunate members of the general population.

To return to the question of the size of the secondary sector, it needs to be made clear that although the provision of post-primary schooling by central government may remain limited there is no reason why additional secondary schools should not be created by regional and local authorities on the basis of their own resources, whether partly through local taxation or voluntary action. These schools may, if they wish, follow the curricula of the élite establishments (they probably will do so initially), but the important thing is that alternative sources of funding can lead to educational diversity, which is in my opinion a vital and often forgotten element in educational development. The view that local communities are usually unable to sustain support for secondary schooling seems questionable in the light of recent Kenyan experience. Where government rushes in to provide secondary schooling on an extensive scale on the basis of assumed regional disparities it may in fact, turn off the very sources of self-help and community action that are at the heart of the development process.

5. Unquestionably, university development provides a major focus for conflict between groups in the LDCs, and consequent demands for regional parity, since university training is perceived as a principal key to mobility, status and income. At the same time governments are often persuaded (wrongly in my view) that future development overwhelmingly depends on a sufficient supply of high-level manpower, and it is small wonder that pressures for university expansion continue to mount in many countries.

At the same time, the *per capita* costs of university education are crushing; and if the governments of poor nations are willing to bear them many may well end up in a similar situation to that of Nigeria, where in 1974 42 per cent of recurrent public educational expenditures went to the support of tertiary institutions whose student bodies constituted less than one half of one per cent of all the school population.[1] Such a situation should cause disquiet even among the most thoroughgoing élitists!

When policies of massive university subsidisation are conjoined with strong regionalist pressures for parity a potentially disastrous situation could result, and Nigeria is a good example. The late 1940s saw the creation of the University of Ibadan, supported by federal funds and designed to serve the whole Nigerian constituency. By the time of commencement of the Civil War in 1967 the situation had changed considerably. A new federal university had been created at Lagos and new regional institutions existed in the Eastern, Western and Northern regions as a response to Ibo, Yoruba and northern ethnic pressures. It is doubtful whether any of these institutions matched Ibadan in quality, and their student populations were substantially 'local ethnic' in composition, but this was a perfectly acceptable situation so long as regions were fully prepared to meet the costs.[1] The university population was still small and the burden not intolerable.

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[1] Unesco, *Statistical yearbook, 1976*. Paris: Unesco, 1977, p. 570.

Since the end of Civil War in 1970 the situation has been made vastly more complex by the functioning of the currently nineteen States which have replaced the four former regions, and by the happy circumstances of growing oil revenues. Unquestionably the promulgation of the new States was an act of statesmanship that defused many of the issues that had led to the Civil War, and even the creation of a few more States in the future will not threaten and indeed may enhance the viability of the Federation as a whole. The problems of higher education, however, continue to mount in the new context.

Predictably, there is now a general acceptance of the principle that each State will have its own university to meet needs for parity. In some measure, this implies 'local higher education for local jobs for local boys', but this is not in itself a disastrous situation. The real problem is how these new institutions are to be financed, and the glittering prospect of continued oil revenues may engender poor decisions. The federal government is now committed to supporting thirteen universities, while upgrading other institutions to university status and at the same time urging a massive programme to achieve universal primary education.

At present, federal revenues stemming from oil exploitation are being distributed generously to the states on the basis of a formula that gives extra help to the 'backward' states. If the federal government, however, wishes to play a major direct role in the support of new universities while at the same time making university education free to all students, the long-term consequences could be serious.[2] States will, in effect, have shifted the burden of decision-making and generating resources on to the federal government (although the universities will be created in response to their interests), while heavy student subsidisation will escalate pressures for university access to even greater proportions. In spite of some Nigerian opinion that believes the 'need' for high-level manpower to be inexhaustible, there is a reasonable prospect that in the years ahead a surplus of graduates might do little more than man the bureaucracies of their home states or enter teaching.

Thus the notion of according powers to States with respect to some areas of educational development while expecting the federal government to bear a major burden of financing state universities could have little to commend it. It would seem more appropriate to provide federal subventions, with the clear understanding that States will be responsible for the allocation of those subventions to their various educational sectors. If a State wishes to have a university it must accept the notion that it will be responsible for meeting both capital and recurrent expenditures, and it must also recognise that such development might occur at the expense of expanding, for example, the primary sector. It is conceivable that some States might decide to found a university based on the principle that the responsibility of primary and secondary schooling might best be devolved on to small districts and localities, with powers to raise revenue through taxation and voluntary effort. Such a compromise is preferable to concentrating responsibility and planning at the centre. Once again it must be recognised that such devolutionary policies do not imply that Federal authority be divested of all important functions. These might include some joint regulation and calibration of university standards; assistance in faculty recruitment through central agencies; the provision of informational services and advice on finance, etc. But such functions would not imply the development of State institutions financed directly by *Federal* money.

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[1] It is true that in the early years of the northern region university a majority of students (especially Yoruba) came from non-northern groups owing to the shortage of qualified candidates from the region.

[2] It was originally intended that all universities should be tuition-free but this policy seems to have been reversed by the decision to raise university fees in 1978. This was met by violent student opposition in several institutions.

Very serious consequences could also follow from accepting the principle of tuition-free university training (plus, possibly, maintenance assistance) to all 'suitably qualified' students. As British experience shows, the supply of suitably qualified candidates can always be expected to expand, and policies designed to provide numerous student scholarships (however inequitable they may be in fact) will work only so long as one is planning a very tiny, élite university system. Such has been Nigeria's actual experience to date. It is often forgotten that the Asquith Report, which laid down some general principles for the development of what were then colonial universities in the 40s, suggested that student financing might be based on the idea of a revolving loan fund. In the event, colonial and post-colonial authorities, anxious to demonstrate their generosity and progressive orientations, ignored this advice and more often than not proceeded on the basis of providing generous tuition and maintenance scholarships to qualified students. In Nigeria by the late 60s the system was already breaking down owing to the expansion in university education: although 60 per cent of students were obtaining assistance the rest were receiving no aid at all, and some were obliged to abandon their studies. Granted the increased prosperity of Nigeria, any future large-scale university expansion based on the scholarship principle is likely to lead to the same inequitable consequences.

It would be better if the Nigerian government accepts from the outset the assumption that, as far as possible, university training should be paid for by those who benefit from it, through either the acceptance of the idea of full-cost loans or the principle of a flat rate educational tax on future earnings of graduates (although we shall not discuss the relative merits of these alternative policies in this essay). Such strategies are always more equitable than direct grants, as we have noted earlier, and relieve not only the State but the parents of the students from the burden of support.

It may be rejoined that recent attempts to develop loan schemes in, for example, Nigeria and Ghana have met with large-scale student opposition or temporary university closure, and thus it is concluded that they will not work. Governments fail to recognise that student opposition is, in fact, a result of precisely the policies they themselves have pursued: they have created a university-student constituency that is no less self-seeking than any other politically organised group and with intrinsically no more claim on national resources. I suspect that hasty governmental backing-down in the face of student pressures is due to no more than a fear that students constitute a potential threat to already fragile régimes. If this is the belief there is nothing much to be done about it except to point out to governments that students are seldom the 'tribunes of the people' in the way that they love to conceive of themselves, and in the sole case where an African government has stood firmly against demands that students be treated as a specially privileged élite opposition very quickly evaporated. Moreover, governments must weigh the consequences of provoking negative student reaction now against the longer-term consequences of alienating much larger sections of the population who will never enjoy the advantages of university training (but who are obliged to pay for it).

Thus, in summary, policies designed to achieve greater regional equality in the provision of higher education do not necessarily involve 'levelling up' by multiplying regional institutions unless this is a strong priority for local populations, as expressed not only in 'demand' but also by a willingness to accept the costs. Devolutionary principles combined with the notion of user-finance are likely in the long run to assure greater equity and indeed openness of university systems than any type of centralised macro-planning.

VI. Some concluding remarks

It has been suggested in this essay that much of the concern over regional inequalities in education tends to be misdirected. The current situation, indeed, reminds one of the story of the gentleman who when asked why he was looking for a lost valuable under a street lamp a long way from where he actually dropped it replied 'Because it is lighter here!'.

One suspects, in fact, that current policies to diminish educational imparities in some LDCs are often based upon looking at the obvious rather than on assessing the more important but less evident factors that influence educational growth. As we have suggested, the most immediate remedies may have unanticipated consequences and may not diminish inequalities, or they may decrease one form of inequality only at the expense of enhancing another. The problem is that governments feel under such pressure to respond to immediate pressures that they may find themselves committed to policies the outcomes of which are only too problematic.

A second factor that must be noted is that the less-developed world often feels constrained to achieve some degree of parity with the developed nations in terms of the pursuit of egalitarian aims. The LDCs are rightly sensitive to issues of political and economic dependency in the world scene, but they are sometimes less conscious of a degree of intellectual dependency which leads to their espousing objectives and programmes that are currently objects of discussion elsewhere. The fact is that ideologies are exported as easily as technologies, and much of the debate on equality of educational opportunity in the LDCs simply resonates to issues that have salience in the developed nations; often there is little comprehension of the economic and social context within which they have been generated. In view of their *own* problems I believe a good deal of the discussion of equality in the LDCs is not very productive: just as futile, for example, as plans for 'lifelong learning' or 'learning to be' are in nations that are not yet able to provide just a few years of primary schooling for the majority of their young people. If national élites simply wish to jump on to fashionable band-wagons and pursue rhetorical exercises about reducing imparities in educational provision without any clear conception of why this particular issue should be important there can be little basis for rational decision-making.

Finally, the hard questions often tend to be concealed behind an ideological smokescreen. It is very likely, for example, that the position I have taken in this essay will be construed as a 'capitalist' solution to problems, since it is heavily predicated on the utilisation of market mechanisms. Some reflection, however, should lead to the conclusion that many of the principles set forth here are equally applicable in both socialist and capitalist societies (whatever these terms may mean in the context of current realities).

The trouble is that issues concerning the ownership of the means of production are confounded with the question of resource allocation, so that individuals frequently identify socialism with forms of centralised macro-planning and capitalism with processes of decision-making based on market forces. Such is not the case. Indeed, there is one current example that illustrates this point. Nearly all observers concerned with development in the People's Republic of China have contrasted the inertia and inefficiency of its industrial sector with the dynamism and development of its rural communes. It is not surprising to find that industrial planning is largely centralised and subject to the fiats of the state bureaucracy, while in large measure the communes have been allowed wide discretionary powers concerning their own development within a very broadly conceived set of parameters. Their decisions have not only involved issues of agricultural development and individual renumeration but have also influenced the direction of many educational matters of local concern. This is perhaps the primary lesson that the People's Republic has learnt from the Soviet experience: planning from the bottom is often to be preferred to decision-making consistently undertaken at the top! This essay has attempted to show how such a principle might be applied in our pursuit of educational equality in the less-developed world.

The recent development of education: regional diversity or reduction of inequalities?

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Thesis I

The methods and models usually used by educational planners tend not only to minimise the differences *between the regions* within *a country but also to underestimate the importance of the* regional demands *for education which remain unsatisfied. Our purpose will therefore be to examine how an analysis of the claims put forward by regional movements—using several examples, mainly European, to illustrate this—can enrich the diagnosis of problem-situations on the one hand and, on the other, to what extent a strategy for* reducing inequalities *in the area of education can* respect regional diversity. *It would no doubt be useful if this discussion were to make out a clear-cut case, either for an 'equalisation' which increasingly unifies the systems of education by standardising them, or for a 'differentiation' which would make them increasingly capable of responding to the particular needs of individuals as well as communities. However, at the present stage of research—at least in Europe—we feel that it is impossible to do more than* explore *the ground, for the time being at least.*

A

Before dealing directly with the subject for debate, namely, to equalise and/or differentiate systems of education so as to improve their quality, it would be useful, I think, to point out the limits of this monograph and define its character. First of all, and despite the fact that we shall endeavour to underline whatever is directly relevant to the specific problems of developing countries, this monograph is based on European 'cases' and, in the main, on conditions in Spain and Switzerland. Secondly, in accordance with the classification suggested by those responsible for this IIEP research project,[1] this paper constitutes one of the 'conceptual monographs'. In other words, our intention will be to endeavour

1. To make a detailed review of the knowledge available within the various disciplines. This is knowledge already known, but it has not always been assessed within the 'integrating' context of regions.
2. To point out frankly some of the methodological difficulties, some of the contradictions in the results and, above all, the numerous uncertainties with regard to the interpretation of the data—all of which help to explain why we should not be hasty in drawing practical conclusions.
3. To summarise all the reliable and valid conclusions which already enable concrete action to be taken.

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[1] *IIEP Information* No. 6, Paris, 1977, p. 2.

This is therefore an *explanatory* work dealing with an *emergent* problem which we are by no means certain will be 'the' problem of tomorrow.

B

From a personal point of view, this reserve stems from the fact that the research which we hope to have completed in the fairly near future is not yet finished.[1]

It is also due to a common failing of research dealing with education: we are in fact struck by the very minor importance which has so far been assigned to the identification, analysis and assessment of regional differences within a country, not only with regard to the development of educational systems but also in the interpretation of what has come to be called the 'world crisis' in education. Similarly, it must be admitted that these differences have played but a small part in the recent growing awareness of the limited capacity of educational sub-systems to contribute in a decisive and effective manner to the democratisation and equalisation of opportunities.[2] It is thus not surprising that the 'regional factor' has been neither explained nor even taken into account in the corresponding theories on schooling, on education and even on instruction in its broadest sense.

To illustrate this somewhat disillusioned opinion perhaps it would be useful to quote briefly two examples from the many international contributions which in fact claim to deal with this 'crisis in education'. These two examples were chosen on account of their exceptionally wide audience following their translation into innumerable languages. The first of these is *The world educational crisis*,[3] written shortly before the events of May 1968 by P.H. Coombs, with the collaboration of several IIEP researchers—a work whose title at least was premonitory. The second is *Learning to be*,[4] which was compiled by an international commission, under the chairmanship of E. Faure, and commissioned by Unesco with the object of finding, to some extent, the remedies for these events. However, it is striking that in their analyses of the problems and in the solutions proposed, neither of these works makes reference to the regional question or takes into account regional claims in the growing demand for education.

The International Commission responsible for *Learning to be* refers on only one occasion (page 70) to differences in levels of enrolment within the same country. What is more, when it talks in terms of 'regions' it is in fact referring to *inter*national or *supra*national regions (e.g. pp. 49-54), which reflects standard usage in multilateral organisations. Such organisations in fact share the opinion that 'regionalism is only an historical stage in a long process towards universality'.[1]

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[1] This involves a programme of research on inter-cantonal and intra-cantonal inequalities in education in Switzerland, forming part of the 'National programme of research on regional problems particularly in mountain and border zones'.

[2] G. Carron and Ta Ngoc Châu, *Regional disparities in educational development*, Paris, IIEP, 1978, p. 2 (roneo).

[3] P.H. Coombs, *The world educational crisis: a systems analysis*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1968.

[4] E. Faure *et al. Learning to be*, London, Harraps, 1972.

In the same way P.H. Coombs, when he comes to analyse the so-called 'qualitative' problems of educational sub-systems, states confidently that:

— their outputs are rejected by the socio-economic context;
— their structures favour élites at the expense of the masses;
— their organisation helps to widen the disparity between enrolment levels in rural areas and those in urban areas;
— their bureaucracies are anti-democratic, particularly when they make no provision for genuine and effective participation on the part of those concerned, etc.

However, these statements in no way derive from any questioning, or even less any research, on regional differences. P.H. Coombs' conclusions do not—or did not at that time[2]—envisage alternatives involving, for example, measures of regionalisation or recourse to regional planning. His proposals at that time were no more than a series of measures for improving or reorganising educational sub-systems, involving at most a degree of decentralisation in the implementation of development programmes. To this he added the need for greater flexibility and closer co-ordination with other sectors of development. In short, a series of measures whose primary effect would be to 'improve the operation' of the present sub-systems *without* calling into question the underlying unitary and unitarist model—which moreover corresponded with his functionalist turn of mind.

This is why the IIEP research programme on regional disparities in educational development breaks entirely new ground, in common with other multilateral organisations[3] and even certain individual countries, which are also beginning to discover the importance of *intra*-national regions and the implications of today's regional movements.

In short, up till now it had all been as though the 'democratisation of education had been designed to fit a concept of equal opportunities with respect to education defined almost entirely in relation to the socio-economic system (i.e., the structure of society; the professional hierarchy; the development of the job market, etc.). In this context, equality had too often been seen in terms of the extension to the *entire* country of the same form of education for everyone, even if, more recently, there has at last been some talk of differentiation, although primarily in the case of individuals'.[1]

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[1] Statement made by J.C. Gautron in his general report on the seminar on 'Regionalism and universalism in modern international law', held in Paris in 1977.

[2] The viewpoint put forward by P.H. Coombs in *The world educational crisis*, op. cit., is not in fact necessarily the same as the position he was to adopt several years later following the research he carried out with the aid of another international team under the aegis of the International Council for Educational Development and on behalf of IBRD and UNICEF (*Attacking rural poverty*, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1974, and *New paths to learning*, ICED, 1973).

[3] We are referring both to an OECD research project on the regionalisation of educational policies and the Council of Europe's study on decentralising cultural policies together with its study project on school neighbourhoods.

C

How does one explain this new orientation which, in analysing the equalisation of opportunities in education, is *also* ready[2] to take into account the aspect of cultural diversity as evidenced by the differences between regions and by their demands, whether explicit or not? What are the reasons which impel us, particularly *today and in Europe*, to devote increasing attention to a type of research which calls into question the traditional theory of reducing inequalities and which insists on the fact that the right to differential treatment is a demand which is no longer formulated solely by *individuals* but *also by communities?*

The first of these reasons is certainly historical: the concept of the school, the definition of its role in the socio-economic dynamic, and the theories and ideologies involved seem[3] to have undergone a profound change over a period of certainly less than two generations. This is the argument put forward by A. Touraine with a great deal of conviction:

> In a society of farmers and merchants, where it was as difficult to cross social and economic barriers as it was to break down cultural divisions, the school was regarded as a means of liberation. I can remember the complete faith that the miners in the north (of France) had in the school, the only chance their children had of getting away from the mine and the mining villages. And for the teachers, the school was a weapon against the local grandees and the priests, against all the monarchic and aristocratic forces and traditions of the country. The working classes, who were prevented by the propertied class from sharing in progress, looked to it as a source of knowledge and a path to liberation. I am thinking of Blanqui, the Andalusian anarchists and all those revolutionaries who pinned their faith on knowledge and education. There is nothing new about inequality—it was obviously greater when part of the population was illiterate. But the school is no longer a liberating force—the old barriers have disappeared and now it is within the school that inequalities are most apparent. Science, technology and qualifications have become instruments of domination in the meritocratic society, and nuclear fission has dramatically coupled knowledge with power. It is no longer sufficient to deprecate the amount of equality in the school; it is even more important to realise

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1. A particularly striking example of how such differentiation has been confined to the individual rather than applied at the collective level is the current project of the Department of Public Education in the Canton of Geneva given the name of '*Project Rhapsody*' (Geneva, 1977).
2. Carron & Ta Ngoc Châu, op. cit., pp. 2-3, make it clear that the use of a regional approach in no way precludes the use of other approaches; these approaches are, in fact, complementary.
3. We prefer to be very circumspect because we feel that there are not sufficient systematic historical analyses available to provide a definitive answer to this controversial question, about which educational sociologists are still divided.

> that, whereas at one time the school was an outlet in a closed world, a hope in a self-perpetuating social structure, it has become a barrier in a changing culture and may well seem to be an instrument of self-perpetuation in a society which increasingly shapes its own present and its own future. Hence the need for a fundamental re-appraisal of the educational system, going far beyond a mere search for an equality rendered all the more illusory since the school *transmits* rather than creates social inequality. This presupposes in the first place no longer regarding as sacred the whole bureaucratic system of rules, programmes and inspection which prevents our society from repossessing its school and setting it free.[1]

This remarkably clear and concise argument does of course call for several comments. First of all there is the hypothesis of the inertia of educational sub-systems, which live by a vision of their role and function which is obsolete in relation to present-day requirements. The formal—and even non-formal—educational supply does no more than respond to the *apparent* demands for education, which are a far cry from the *real* demands; whence the dissatisfaction with regard to educational institutions. Then there is the essential hypothesis of the distinction between all that schooling claims to do and the 'incapacity' of the clientèles to make use of all these resources. This dissociation parallels another and more serious one which F. Edding had already pointed out in 1963:[2] that it is not sufficient merely to propose theoretical and potential opportunities for education to an ever-increasing number of individuals if there is not at the same time a concrete possibility for them to use this education to improve their standard of living, their socio-economic status or simply their job. However, although it is true that economists have accumulated a wealth of data which show that universal education can promote the mobility of individuals, for many years now they have had increasing doubts as to whether it is capable of modifying *collective* inequalities.[3] It would appear that this inability is to a large extent explained by the fact that education has only a minor influence on socio-economic structures since it is itself only a *sub-system*, highly dependent on its surroundings.

The complex relationship between the educational sub-system and the social system as a whole is of concern not only to economists and all those who study this problem at a macro-economic level—it is also causing a change, *within* the educational system, in our conceptions of the mechanisms by which inequalities in culture and knowledge are transmitted. In the paper which he submitted to an IIEP seminar, which drew upon work done by a certain Dobzhansky, did not T. Husén rightly point out that our policies of providing equal opportunities were too often the reflection of a narrow concept of cultural heredity? Is it not high

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1. A. Touraine, *Un désir de l'histoire*, Paris, 1977, pp. 187-188.
2. F. Edding, *Okonomie des Bildungswesen: Lehren und Lernen als Haushalt und als Investionen*, Freiburg, I.B., 1963, pp. 311-348.
3. As notable examples of these doubts, we can quote the works of J. Hallak, *A qui profite l'école?* Paris, P.U.F., 1970, and L. Emmerij, *Can the school build a new social order?* Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1974.

time that we rid ourselves of this and admit that such heredity is a complex and, above all, a pre-eminently *social process?* This heredity will not be re-defined solely as the result of the family influence but as the result of *all* the links which parents establish between the family reality and *all* the inputs from the innumerable institutions outside the family which contribute to the younger generation's learning process. Viewed from this 'ecological' standpoint, the learning process and its results will be determined not only by the educational awareness of the family circle but also by the relationships which exist between it, the school and the environment. In our opinion—and this is one of the hypotheses of our research—the *quality of education* cannot be defined in the absence of an assessment of these 'ecological' relationships.

However, is there not an overwhelming tendency in educational planning to envisage the *quality* of education in accordance with a model which only serves to accentuate the collective inequalities between the centre and its peripheral zones, between urban areas and rural areas and between regions within the same country?

In fact, if we accept that—despite the opinion and warnings of the specialists[1]—this quality is often, not to say always, defined in relation to *an ideal model* on which each establishment should gradually mould itself or which serves as a yardstick to measure 'quality', then the inevitable result is to concentrate the supply—and the best of it—in a few 'top-class establishments', which can only increase the polarisation of the sub-systems. What is worse is that the effects of this cultural concentration will add to the *already cumulative* effects of other inequalities, as was shown to be the case both in a survey of inequalities in the public health area in Switzerland[2] and in a recent study on the process of industrial development in the different regions of Spain.[3] It was seen, for example, that certain regions did not have, or no longer had, a full range of educational services comprising all the levels, which meant that it was more or less obligatory to change regions in order to have access to the upper-secondary levels and to higher education. A similar trend is becoming increasingly apparent in technical and vocational education, at any rate in Switzerland.[4] By the same token, the number of incomplete schools, both at the primary and secondary level, can provide a fairly accurate indicator of this inequality of treatment as far as the supply is concerned. On the other hand, if we accept that quality is a relative notion—is it not defined on the basis of a series of norms decided

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1. C.E. Beeby, (ed.), *Qualitative aspects of educational planning*, Paris, IIEP, 1969; R.S. Adams (ed.), *Educational planning: towards a qualitative perspective*, Paris, IIEP, 1978 (Seminar on Teaching/Learning Strategies, held at the IIEP, Paris, 1976).
2. P. Gilliand and M. Diserens, *Santé publique: analyse factorielle des disparités entre cantons suisses*, Genève, 1978.
3. Miguel A. de & Salcedo J., *Dinámica del desarrollo industrial de las regiones espanolas*. Madrid 1972, cf. pp. 296 and 298.
4. *Troisième rapport sur le développement des hautes écoles en Suisse: éléments d'une vue d'ensemble de la politique de l'éducation*, Berne, 1978.

arbitrarily which can be imposed only by usage or cultural dependence[1]—then should we not adopt a completely different principle? An educational activity would be considered as one 'of quality' once it had been tailored *to suit the expectations of those concerned*. Since these expectations differ not only from one social group or class to another but also from one region to another, we can therefore conclude that the quality should also be differentiated.

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[1] A survey carried out in Brazil is of particular significance in this connection: based on the theme of numerous U.S. research projects, but in the context of research work on aspirations inspired by P. Chombart de Lauwe in Paris, S. Weber, stimulated and inspired by Paulo Freire's theory of 'conscientisation', set out to examine whether the *levels of aspiration* differed between social groups and social strata in the Recife region in the state of Pernambuco in Brazil (S. Weber, *Modèle dominant et aspirations à l'éducation, un exemple au Nord Est du Brésil*, Brazilian edition, Petrópolis, 1976; French edition, Paris, CNRS, 1976). If that had been the case, this would have implied differentiating the educational supply for the various social groups. In fact, this survey revealed that the levels of aspiration were lower amongst the poorer groups *because* these had become resigned to the barriers imposed by a process of social conditioning and by a social structure linked to a capitalist and dependent system of production. These 'lowly' aspirations are fundamentally no more than their aspirations for a better social integration; they are the signs of a genuine acceptance of what is offered by a society which manipulates aspirations. However, it is the school—and the use made of it by the existing social structure—which determines what one *should* expect from this society. The supply determines the demand and this is why the poorest members of society, *conditioned as they are by the dominant model*, instead of demanding a 'different' form of education, clamour for the same one. A fact which needs to be remembered and emphasised is that this survey was carried out in a particularly repressive socio-political environment.

Thesis II

In order to take appropriate *action, i.e. with the right amount of resources and with the right objectives, one* needs to know how to make a correct diagnosis*—in other words, recognise what is important in a concrete situation, separate the essential from the non-essential and be aware of even the most subtle differences. In this respect a diagnosis is still a relative, quasi-subjective operation since it obviously depends on one's scale of values. It is therefore essential that we should state clearly and at the outset what we consider to be the important element. In our case, this is the* differences *in the spatial dimension of education as this is experienced by all those involved in this process. But it also means analysing* how *to do this, i.e., under what conditions can regional problems or regional demands provide evidence of differences within a single territorial unit which are generally not apparent in macro-national diagnoses? What are the implications of this in terms of the conception of the space corresponding to a national educational sub-system? What repercussions does it have on the sources of information?*

A

Although the comparative lack of interest which we have so far noted with regard to the analysis of regional differences can be explained by the dimensions of the problem and by its ideological preconceptions, we have to admit, particularly in a work whose purpose is to provide practical assistance to educational planners in their everyday work, that *micro-analyses* are infinitely more complicated than macro-analyses. It is not difficult to discern what is concealed by an apparent unanimity, owing to a misleading uniformity, behind resounding affirmations of national unity. However, there is nothing magical about an ability to distinguish the real from the false—it depends on what information one has, on what indicators one selects, etc. This point was sufficiently discussed at a symposium organised at the IIEP in December 1977 for us to be able to draw upon it, and more particularly since we have no special competence in this area. On the other hand, we feel it would be useful to emphasise some of the other methodological implications of such an approach.

The first thing is the need for the researcher to state clearly *what he regards as important*. What may still appear in the first IIEP papers[1] to be a purely technical discussion, e.g. on the subject of indicators of quality, becomes a much more general question of an epistemological kind: on what logical grounds does one justify such a differentiated interpretation of reality? The question has also its practical and political aspect: for what reason and on whose behalf are we attempting to demonstrate that the actual distribution of education is not experienced in an identical manner by all the users? This inevitably leads us to be wary, if only by being suspicious of official statements from ministries or authorities which claim sole competence in the matter. Such an approach seems to us to be justified because, like the sociologist Berger,[1] we are convinced that there is nothing to be gained from burying our head in the sands of a so-called neutral objectivity when confronted by questions which are not only legitimate but vital.

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[1] See Carron and Ta Ngoc C., op. cit., and in particular pp. 17-38 as well as the discussions at the workshop held at the IIEP in Paris in December 1977.

In the present paper we feel that we should give at least brief answers to three questions with regard to which we think it necessary to make our position clear, since these answers will condition all that we shall be saying later. The first of these is strictly epistemological: it consists in giving full value to the difference. The second concerns the central problem of the *relationships between supply and demand,* looked at from a spatial point of view. The third involves the definition and assessment of educational *'effects'*, and thus the appraisal of the quality of an educational activity.

B

The first of these questions is of a philosophical nature but I think that it is a question which must be faced by any researcher and any specialist in contemporary social science. The question was originally raised by historians who had become increasingly interested in the uniqueness and fortuitousness of each historical formation. As a result there was a rash of macro-social and macro-historical theories, which explains the interest not only in the differences[2] but also in the unique and irreplaceable continuity of each situation—since 'it is History which makes a people what it is'.[3] This question was echoed by anthropologists, who will even go so far as to claim, as did G. Balandier,[4] that 'there is no knowledge except through difference; one's neighbour is not only recognised for what he is himself, but also serves as a means to greater self-knowledge'. These two currents of thought, by no means recent in origin, have now converged into a flood-tide sweeping away the linear concept of progress and laying bare the multiplicity of social models and their irreducible variety, which today is acknowledged even by sociologists such as A. Touraine: 'If today we recognise the limitations of ethnocentrism as well as the crimes of ethnocides, this is not merely the result of a liberal outlook but because we recognise that societies develop in accordance with very different models defined by their forms of action upon themselves. By the same token, society can no longer be seen as a train whose locomotive is the economy and society and culture as the carriages, moving along fixed lines with stations marking the stages in its progress. We are obliged to recognise the variety of modes of development, i.e. the differences in the transition from one system of production to another, from one style of traditional action to another. One can no longer define a culture in terms of its conformity with a standard model of progress'.[1]

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[1] P.L. Berger, *Pyramids of sacrifice: political ethics and social change*, London, Allen Lane, 1976.

[2] P. Veyne, *L'inventaire des différences*, Paris, 1976.

[3] J. Berque, 'Du Maghreb à l'Hexagone: qu'est-ce qu'un peuple?' in *Pluriel*, 13, Paris 1978, pp. 5-19.

[4] Balandier G., *Histoire d'autres*, Paris, 1977, p. 8.

Should this therefore be taken, somewhat naively, as implying an historical relativism? Should one adopt the view that, since nothing is comparable, there is no longer any point in looking for norms to compare what is completely and radically individual and unique? We do not think so at all. As H. Lefebvre pointed out in 1971 in his plea in favour of differences, 'every difference implies a relationship, otherwise we would not be able to perceive it . . . as a difference'.[2] Bourdieu and Passeron[3] were no doubt right to pose the question of incomparability in frank and direct terms, in particular to all those who so readily use international norms, the 'official' documents of multilateral organisations and macro-national comparisons. At the international level, as the present Director of the IIEP[4] points out, we need to be particularly aware of this pertinent criticism. As far as we are concerned, we believe, philosophically, that recognising the value of differences in epistemological terms leads neither to relativism nor to scepticism. We are convinced that methodological solutions exist, provided one situates each analysis of an educational sub-system in its context and takes account of the spatial dimension of educational phenomena. Which brings us to the second point in this thesis.

C

To make the discussion clearer, we are going to compare, in a somewhat summary fashion, two conceptions and two approaches to the *educational space:*

A. Should we concern ourselves primarily with analysing the *distribution* of educational establishments within a predetermined area so as to determine the *territorial coverage* of the educational service(s)?

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1. Touraine, A., *Un désir* . . ., op. cit.
2. Lefebvre H., *Le manifeste différentialiste*, Paris, 1971.
3. See their paper entitled 'La comparabilité des systèmes d'enseignement' presented to the symposium on '*Education, démocratie et développement*', Paris, 1967, pp. 21-58.
4. In his paper presented to the last World Congress on Comparative Education, London, 1977 and published in *Recherche, pédagogie et culture*, Paris 1978, 35-36, pp. 23-28; cf. M. Debeauvais, 'Le rôle des organisations internationales dans l'évolution de l'éducation comparée'.

B. Or, on the contrary, determine the *presence and projection within the social space* of the individual space of each network of educational activity?

In the first case we are dealing with the familiar topic of the *geography of education*, which analyses the distribution of a service throughout a continuous and uniform space and recommends its extension with the help of such techniques as school mapping, for example. This involves determining the manner in which educational systems are distributed within and throughout a given territory by listing all the establishments, specifying their location, possibly examining the relationships between them and, even although this is fairly rare, studying the 'micro-environment' within which each one operates. This geography of education, as proposed by M. Debesse,[1] is in fact based on highly questionable premises.[2] It tends in fact to concern itself solely with the supply, as if this were the same for everybody everywhere. The object of the exercise, and this is a very specific object, is to ensure an *even* distribution of the educational sub-system throughout the different regions.

However, as R. Ryba for example has frequently pointed out,[3] the space corresponding to an educational activity cannot be defined solely in relation to a geographical distribution of the supply. It depends just as much on the ties which are created between establishments which constitute a *hierarchy amongst themselves* as it does on the relationship which exists *between this geographical distribution of the supply and all of the demands for education.* From this specific viewpoint—although it in no way excludes the other which it enriches and amends—this purely educational space is defined as much by physical accessibility (expressed, for example, in distances in terms of proximity and remoteness) as it is in terms of *cultural and social distance*—i.e., the extent to which the populations directly concerned accept and identify with these educational establishments and activities. This explains why a multidimensional analysis is required. Although the educational space is first of all defined by an analysis of physical *distances*, this analysis needs to be taken further and expanded by a study of the *social and cultural distances*. It should be completed by an assessment of its *educapacity*, by which is meant 'the overall educational capacity within a given environment, measured by the educational influence of the family, the social classes, the language, the mass media and the educational establishments'.[4] All of which creates relatively difficult theoretical problems, which are the prime concern of current research.[1] This educational space has to be related to the other specific spaces—which means deciding the *interfaces*, i.e., 'the characteristics of the points of contact with the whole set of activities to which the individual being educated is subjected'.[2] This set is neither fixed nor constant, since it will depend on unforeseeable changes in the individual's existence and on the eventual evolution of the community—not to mention the fact that the other sets are experienced differently, depending on the interests of each individual. Hence it is no longer possible to work with a conception of space which sees this as a mere *framework*, uniform and regular, into which one can without more ado and without distinction project different variables in order to decide, from a bureaucratic and technocratic standpoint, a balanced geographical coverage, optimal locations or even a maximum efficiency for the educational services. However, if we wish to grasp 'this inhabited reality, transformed and inhabited by Man'[3] which is implied by a conception of space as a *social product*,[4] we have to resort to new methods based in particular on the study of objectivised spatial behaviour patterns, i.e., 'the ways in which a person perceives his own environment, his fellow-beings and the surrounding reality'.[5] The major problem in making such a diagnosis will be to find suitable ways and means of *making visible* a space thus collectively formed and produced. That is why the prime objective of our research project,[6] over and above the analysis of the indicators and statistics which enable one to assess differences in the geographical coverage of the Swiss cantonal educational systems, is to reveal the implicit, but constant, realities which we describe as *regions* and which find expression in the form of specific behaviour patterns in the area of education *and* culture. We are assuming that it would be possible, through these group cultural behaviour patterns and in relation to the cultural demands of regional movements, to identify, define and assess an emerging 'regional consciousness' which would perhaps imply a specific social project, in particular with regard to cultural development.

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[1] M. Debesse, 'Pour une géographie de l'éducation' in M. Debesse & G. Mialaret, *Traité des sciences pédagogiques*, Vol. III, Paris, 1972, pp. 401-409.

[2] Bugnicourt J., *Disparités régionales et aménagement du territoire en Afrique*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1971.

[3] Ryba R., 'School and community: concepts of territory and their implications' in *School and community*, Manchester, 1975, pp. 63-75, '*Territorial patterns of diversity of education*', Manchester, 1977; 'Aspects of territorial inequalities' in *Comparative education*, 12-3, 1976.

[4] We have borrowed this term from M. Parédes Grosso who, in his thesis entitled *Macroeducación* (Madrid, 1970) not only endeavours to define this as precisely as possible (p. 39 et seq.) but, more importantly, suggests a way of evaluating this quantitatively using the theory of sets (pp. 43-45).

Let us take for the moment a relatively simple and specific example to illustrate the contrast between the 'geographic' approach to the educational space and another possible approach which we will term 'interdisciplinary'. In one Swiss canton—the Grisons—as in most of the mountain regions of that country, the infrastructure in general and education in particular is being more and more seriously affected by a static and even declining population trend, structural changes in the distribution of the population, the effects of migration, etc. Several specialist research workers at the same university have undertaken

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1. Petrella R., *De l'espace abstrait et géographique comme contenant à l'espace social comme produit*, Bruxelles, 1978.
2. A. Moles, 'Media systems and educational systems' in *Prospects*, Paris, 1975, 2, pp. 165-192.
3. L. Gambi, quoted by R. Petrella, op. cit.
4. Lefebvre H., *La production d'espace*, Paris, 1972.
5. Brock C., 'La géographie de l'éducation: aspects d'une sous-discipline' in *Bulletin de l'Association francophone d'éducation comparée*, Sèvres, 1976, 8, pp. 11-15.
6. Op. cit.; these hypotheses will also be verified in other research projects forming part of the 'Swiss national programme of research on regional problems in mountain and border zones'.

a study of the relationship between these population trends and the question of education. A geographer, for example, has analysed this micro-situation[1] on the basis of the following hypothesis:


Population changes
Concentration of the school supply
Closure of "village" schools
The village loses its attraction

The merit of this specialist's work—which follows others in the same area of research[2]—is the fact that it directs the attention of planners and administrators, as well as of educationalists, to the massive resurgence of a problem which seemed in recent years to have disappeared in Switzerland, namely, the value and importance of having in every commune decentralised, single-stream schools (with no separate educational levels). The maintenance of this form of schooling would be justified not only by virtue of its direct contribution to a strategy to stem the rural exodus, but also because its 'quality'—viewed from this angle—would be neither better nor worse than that attributed to streamed, inter-communal schools with specialised teachers. This is what persuades these geographers to recommend a diversification of the forms of schooling and a more flexible system of locating schools. However, in more or less the same Grisons region, another specialist, an ethnologist (*Volkskünder*), made a similar study of this cultural development but his conclusions were different: according to him,[3] what is happening is that a new spatial entity is emerging, i.e., the *region*; and this *supra*communal entity constitutes a space which is distinct from the traditional space. Little by little it secretes its own institutions, particularly in the area of leisure and culture. The dialectical relationship between this new perceived entity (the supracommunal region) and the existing traditional spatial entity (the communes and the town) tends to cause a polarisation and almost a separation of activities, i.e. political life = communal entity; cultural life = supracommunal region; economic life = the town outside the region and the communes. This would explain the prevalence of 'commuting', i.e. the regular

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1. H. Frohlich, *Die Schuleversorgung in der Region Mittelbünden: ein Beitrag zur Bildungs und Bevölkerungsgeographie*, Geogr. Institut Univ. Zurich, 1977.
2. R. Uehlinger, *Raümliche Aspekte der Schulplanning in ländicher Siedlungsgebieten: eine Kulturgeographische Untersuchung in 6 Plänungsregionen des Kantons Bern*, Geogr. Institut Univ. Bern, 1976.
3. R. Kruker, '*Gemeinde-Region in Zur problematik ländlichen Raumabgrenzung*' in *Jugend und Freizeit auf dem Land*, Volksk. Institut Univ. Zurich, 1976.

daily or weekly journey made by those who earn their living *outside* the region, but who *live within* their region.[1]

This discussion on the educational space has led us to examine more closely *the relationships between the school supply and the demand for education* on the assumption of an emerging regional consciousness. We can summarise this in the form shown in Figure 1.

In our opinion, the advantage of Figure 1 is first of all that it highlights the *complexity of the supply*: this has to be grasped both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions. But also, and above all, it highlights the complexity of the *demand.* This is shown to be fundamentally an *aggregate of the demands* (in the plural) of various social groups whose motivation is governed by the relationship between their aspirations—often illusory—and their expectations—often pessimist. These groups are, if not conditioned, at least influenced by non-economic motivations—such as working conditions; ecological conditions; attachment to their country, to their neighbours, and to their locality; the quality of their social life and their relations in their neighbourhood—in short, a whole series of characteristics which normally escape the attention of the so-called 'human resources' specialists but which may well play a part in this kind of interdisciplinary approach to the educational space.

D

The third question which seems to me important at this stage of the discussion concerns the definition and assessment of the 'effects' of education, which we can consider as the *evaluation of the effective quality of the educational services*, i.e., of the outcome of the relationships between supplies and demands (cf. Figure 1).

The earlier discussion on the subject of the dialectic of the supplies and the demands for education in relation to the educational space cautions us first of all to be prudent with regard to any interpretation which would restrict all of these effects solely to the *immediate* results of the educational process. In this kind of interpretation, the effects of an activity are seen as the resultant of its interaction with a given clientèle. They are measured in terms of the *stages reached* in the transformation of a personality—stages expressed in terms of diplomas and qualifications, as levels of instruction or simply as the number of students who have completed a course—which leads one to consider improvement in the quality of education as 'a qualitative change in the education . . . (which is designed to) change the quality of children's educational performance . . . by inducing teachers to change the way they teach', to quote the explicit

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[1] On the subject of these commuting phenomena in France see C. Jegouzo, *Exode agricole et offres régionales d'emploi*, Rennes, 1977.


allocation of resources in relation to the expressed demands and their political weighting
real demand
apparent demand
effective quality of the educational services
quantitative and qualitative supply from the educational sub-system
demand to be satisfied
capacity of the populations concerned to adopt the institutions
regional pressure
What happens assuming a more balanced geographical coverage ("geographic" hypothesis)
What could happen assuming the emergence of a regional consciousness ("interdisciplinary" hypothesis)

FIGURE 1.

Thesis II

recommendation made by the editor of a recent IIEP report on the very subject of 'qualitative planning'.[1]

However, in our case, from the 'regionalist' viewpoint which we have adopted, this kind of orientation for qualitative planning is obviously inadequate because it in no way modifies the interaction between an activity and its context—as would occur for example with the use of a form of training and education related to the possibilities provided by the labour market, the present and future cultural development of a region, etc. Without a thorough knowledge of this context and its *cultural life*, of the culture as it is *experienced* within a region as well as their relationships with the *school* culture as produced by the educational activities, it is impossible to define clearly, even in a rudimentary manner, the contribution made by these factors. In order to do this, as H.M. Levin pointed out at this same IIEP seminar on qualitative planning, one has theoretically to make a clear distinction between the *results of education* and the *results for the society from the educational process*, which he defines as the 'social outcomes of the educational sector—outcomes that are generally not immediately observable because they tend to be removed from the educational setting in both time and location' (p. 60). All of this has led to different attempts to identify and take into account the *indirect* effects or what A. Meister has termed the 'fall-out' in his evaluation of the impact of functional literacy programmes on economic, social and political development.[2]

However, there is still a second consequence which has to be mentioned: these effects should not be regarded merely as an 'output' which will thereafter either enter into a development process or be rejected because it is inadequate; this 'output' is itself a *process* which precedes the educational activities and continues thereafter. From a regionalist viewpoint, it would seem essential to have an understanding and consequently an appreciation of the effects of education which make it a *process of social construction*, whereby the individual concerned regulates his own education and decides its conditions and objectives. The development of a regional consciousness and, even more, of a regional project will in fact greatly depend on the *positive relationship which the population will be able to establish between its own living culture and the school culture*. In other words, the educational 'output' is the *multi-dimensional resultant* of the relationships between:

— all of the *education acquired* previously or simultaneously through experience of life as an individual and as a member of a group. This education is directly conditioned by the *pervading and/or informal education* as this is experienced within a space as the result of the particular characteristics of a group, its habitat and its cultural development. This training will vary in relation to the life-style and the specific characteristics of the social groups

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1. R.S. Adams, in *Educational planning: towards a qualitative perspective*, Paris, IIEP, 1978, p. 13.
2. A. Meister, *Alphabétisation et développement*, Paris, Anthropos, 1973; cf. also the theoretical and practical implications which we have deduced in *Effets économiques et sociaux de l'enseignement*, Vevey, 1978 or in the *Cahier de l'IUED*, No. 3, Geneva and Paris, 1977, pp. 1-120.

concerned. This is what we have termed the *living culture* of the 'learners';

— and all the *purely educational inputs*, whether these are formal, non-formal, systematic or not in origin. These inputs therefore constitute all the *supplies* provided by an educational sub-system within a given administrative space. However, this is generally the only dimension of the educational process taken into account by researchers, whereas for us it constitutes only the *school culture*.

Thesis III

Not only is it difficult to assess the identity of a 'region', *particularly conceptually, but also to analyse it in terms of its origin and its history. Only a concept based on the* theory of dependence *enables one to comprehend regional movements as positive manifestations whose objectives, above and beyond the differences, disparities and particularly the inequalities, are to establish a democratic pluralism where diversity can flourish.*

A

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the 'regional question' is the lack of precision, the confusion and the contradictions associated with the very concept of the 'region'. We are very far from knowing with precision what this 'other' reality is which appears, somewhere, between the individual phenomena and the macro-social units. What is its level within the administrative organisation and, in fact, how does one determine its limits? These doubts, which to a certain extent are classic, are compounded by more recent demands: how should a region be defined not only as a geographical unit but also in terms of its internal dynamics? In terms of its relationships with other social forces? In terms of its origin and its structure?

We shall be examining some of these questions in detail, but only those which have a direct influence on the processes of schooling and training.

First of all, it should be borne in mind that the region originates from the hypothesis that there are social realities which have had, *during the course of history*, sufficient organisation and internal cohesion to constitute a people, i.e. 'an entity which tends to be long-lasting and specific'.[1] However, this 'historical entity' is not always easily recognised, particularly when it does not manifest itself in the form of a specific geographical area with clearly defined boundaries and limits.[2] This is obviously the case of very many minorities whose historical permanence is none the less assured, not to say explained, by their capacity to transmit—through formal or informal education—their specificity, their values, in short their civilisation, from generation to generation.[3] These minorities develop into regionalist movements, i.e. the historical entity becomes a regional consciousness, when two spatial elements coincide. First there is the emergence of a *feeling of belonging*, which takes the form of highly emotional concepts such as one's 'native land', 'home country', 'birth-place'. It could be said that this sentiment is an expression of a desire to be united in a collective and common identity, manifested in proximity and neighbourliness. This feeling is allied to another, equally deep and equally emotional, which tends to make a *distinction between neighbours and outsiders*. The limits or boundaries of this social and cultural entity do not necessarily coincide with any spatial limit nor with any precise and officially recognised border. In many countries,[1] in fact, the official divisions have often been decided in opposition to, or in spite of, traditional boundaries. This has considerable implications for educational planning because, in modern states, the division into educational zones and units corresponds with the administrative boundaries and not with the spatial distribution of the various existing sub-cultures.

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[1] Berque J., 'Du Maghreb . . .', op. cit., p. 6.

[2] As examples of situations where these conditions apply: *nomads* (Cf. J. Bugnicourt, op. cit., Chap. V); *pariahs* such as the Gypsies, Jews and Palestinians; or regions straddling several borders, such as the trans-border region of Geneva (cf. *Les régions transfrontalières en Europe*. Geneva, 1975 and C. Raffestin, *Sociétés et frontières*, Geneva, 1975).

[3] See the historical research undertaken in connection with the University of Michigan's programme of *Non-formal education* (Cf. Furter P. *et al.*, 'Le programme d'études de l'éducation extra scolaire de l'université de Michigan' in *Geneva-Africa*, 1975, 2, pp. 102-115, or the study by Z. Halévy, *Jewish schools under czarism and communism*, New York, 1976).

B

Having said this, we should emphasise the fact that the *method used in defining a region and acting upon it to a large extent conditions its individual reality*. Let us take a few examples:

1. One, *purely analytical*, method is to group together neighbouring territorial units which have a similar degree of institutional development—in our case, education. In this way we end up with 'uniform regions' where the 'region' is 'a spatial unit which in itself combines the various forms and characteristics of spatial organisation in the form of a single basic framework'.[2] First of all, let it be said that this is a very notional unit because it varies in relation to the phenomena observed or the level one uses as a reference.[3] In such cases, it is even doubtful whether one should use the term 'region', because this is a purely artificial unit. And lastly, it may well be meaningless because this portion of territory within the same whole, characterised by the repetition of certain features, has 'been the result of a division which bears no relation to the inhabitants'.[4] This is exactly the criticism that J.-Y. Martin makes of this method, because it overlooks the

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[1] J.-Y. Martin, *Social differentiation and regional disparities: educational development in Cameroon*, and P. Hugon, *Regional disparities in schooling: the case of Madagascar*, both in Volume II of this publication; Cole J. and Wolf E., *The hidden frontier: ecology and ethnicity in an Alpine Valley*, New York, 1974.

[2] R. Petrella, *De l'espace abstrait...*, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

[3] K. Sudaprasert, V. Tunsiri and Ta Ngoc C., *Regional disparities in the development of education in Thailand*, in Volume II of this publication. Cf. comments in this connection in G. Carron and Ta Ngoc C., op. cit., pp. 7-8.

[4] Chiffelle F. *et al.*, *Typologie de l'espace rural: étude théorique et application au Canton de Neuchâtel*, Neuchâtel, 1977.

entire social dynamic and because it will be of little use in action or in introducing programmes.[1] 'Regional' techniques and approaches exist which bear no relation to regionalism except outwardly and in name only.

2. In contrast to this, the second method consists in fact in starting with the *operational* dimension of the 'region'. G. Carron and Ta Ngoc C. analyse this at length in their discussion on the *functional or nodal region*.[2] In this case, let it be said that the operational dimension does not necessarily correspond with the perceived dimensions. In fact, this type of region may, in the last analysis, remain as much foreign to the collective desires of those concerned as does the analytical region. In particular, this type of 'programme region' is ambiguous since it can lead to an action which may equally well be:

— either *inter*-regional, where it is a matter of stabilising national conditions by reducing the 'differences' *between* regions, i.e. a remedial action stemming from a distributive policy which corrects excessive 'disparities' without necessarily modifying the rhythm or the structure of regional development which give rise to these 'inequalities';[3]

— or *intra*-regional, which, on the contrary, is primarily concerned with the quality and the dynamics of development *within* a region. In this second case, it is no longer a question of 'closing the gap' or 'aiding underprivileged regions' but helping to create or strengthen a regional consciousness within the national 'diversity'.

3. A third series of methods attempts to get round this obstacle of the internal/external relationship of a perceived region and, instead, proposes an *administrative* region. They do this by trying to find 'natural', and therefore objective, criteria which as it were *determine* the structure of a region. In R. Petrella's view[4] one can include in this group two types of method which, at first sight, seem fairly distinct.

The first type is concerned with what is termed *regional geography*. This involves defining a certain number of 'natural' regions on the basis of constant

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1. J.-Y. Martin, op. cit., p. 23.
2. Carron and Ta Ngoc C., op. cit., pp. 10-16.
3. To avoid distracting the reader's attention we have not described in detail the reasons why we make a clear distinction between these different notions. However, we feel it would perhaps be helpful to define what is meant by these terms in this particular document:

   differences: All the relationships of alterity between two constituent elements of one or more educational systems which are regarded as comparable.

   disparity: Anything which tends to fragment social cultural reality thereby, in some cases, preventing any form of comparison, exchange or communication.

   inequalities: What happens as the result of differences becoming cumulative effects which are detrimental to an individual, a group or a community, judged on the basis of a norm applicable to everyone.

   diversity: A situation in which differences do not engender inequalities and where disparities do not prevent communication between the various subcultures.
4. R. Petrella, op. cit., pp. 16-22.

factors with sufficiently fundamental characteristics to enable them to persist throughout history and whose permanence would ensure the population's homogeneity and its social cohesion. In fact, this implies, through the concept of a 'regional nature', reverting to a substantialist theory of mankind.[1] In fact, this research method—which *'naturalises'* the regional reality—overlooks an important and vital dimension of the problem, i.e. the fact that 'the region has made its appearance primarily in European societies created by the Industrial Revolution; that it is, from the point of view of its speech (usage of words and their referents), as well as from the point of view of concrete situations, the product of an ideological concept and very specific historical and political practice which result from the alliance between the Nation State and industrial capitalism. It is this ideology and this practice ... which have given the term 'region' its present meaning of a space within the national space, of an intra-national unit of organisation hierarchically subordinated to the central authority. The term has been given this content by the ruling classes who control the state and the available material and non-material resources'.[2] On this basis R. Petrella is able to show in detail[3] that the second type of research, inspired by *Marxist analysis*, differs from the regional geography approach, by demonstrating that the region is not only created by man, but that it is also created by the 'others'. This they do by controlling capital and its development within today's process of industrialisation, the concentration of power and the division of labour—in short, such processes as help to create a *dialectic between the centre and the periphery which leads to the vicious circle of dependence*. We can measure the extent and the disastrous consequences of this dialectic primarily in the developing countries which are confronted with 'a combination and an accumulation of under-equipment, the effects of the drain on their resources and of feelings of hopelessness and frustration, which make certain situations desperate, particularly when to this is added repression by force'.[4] But, paradoxically, it is in fact this conviction of inexorability and fatality in this second type of research which gives it a certain resemblance to the traditional approach of regional geography. In a word, in both cases we are basically dealing with a determinism: one insisting on the 'natural' causes and the other on the 'historical' causes—the difference being that in the Marxist scenario this determinism is *deliberate*[5] so as to cause a rupture in the 'course of events'.

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1. Lacoste Y., 'Brader la géographie, brader l'idée nationale', in *Herodote*, No. 4, Paris, 1976, pp. 9-66.
2. R. Petrella, *La renaissance des 'cultures régionales' en Europe occidentale*, Paris, Entente, 1978, Chapter 2.
3. R. Petrella, *De l'espace abstrait ...*, op. cit., pp. 16-22.
4. Bugnicourt J., op. cit.
5. There is in fact an implicit *will*, since what is involved is the creation of a tense and dramatic situation which only a rupture of a revolutionary character can and should resolve.

C

Although the determinism of the Marxist analysis helps to throw light on critical situations which we shall be examining in connection with the final thesis of this monograph, does it not however gloss over other facts such as the resistance, emergence and the rallying force of a regional consciousness and its regional demands within these peripheral areas? We believe this to be so, particularly with regard to certain facts which the Marxist analysis tends to minimise, namely:

1. Certain research results seem to indicate that there are regional behaviour patterns which can change when faced with perceived inequalities. From being merely passive reactions, these behaviour patterns can become, once this consciousness becomes active, regional movements of protest and pressure.[1]
2. This emergence and this transformation are certainly not linear or necessarily productive of progress. 'The identity of a region is shaped by the forces of history and marked by different doctrines, their conflicts and their encounters with other forces, sometimes opposed, often dominant and always exogenous'.[2] In other words, History past and present must be taken into account, analysed and interpreted in relation to the *possible* future of the region concerned.
3. In this elucidation of a regional project, it is essential to realise that it does not necessarily either take shape or evolve in a completely coherent and systematic fashion. Not only will it be modified by the various influences and the actual conditions of the moment, but it may well adopt a different form depending on the spaces involved—cultural, political, economic or social. A region's identity is not the same nor present simultaneously in each space—it may develop more rapidly or more rigorously in one space than in another. At most, one can agree with R. Petrella's hypothesis[3] that an *interaction* will occur and that, little by little, an identity will emerge as the overall result of their probable linkages. It is therefore by no means impossible that, during the course of this process of identification, differences and even incompatibilities will occur for which solutions or remedies will have to be found.
4. Lastly, one needs to bear in mind the fact that this process of identification takes shape essentially at the level of action, as part of the dynamic of social movements.

If this is to give rise to a genuine regional *consciousness*—which is indispensable for the elaboration of a *coherent regional project and for the creation of a*

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[1] See the works of J.-Y. Martin, op. cit., P. Hugon, op. cit., as well as the comments of Carron and Ta Ngoc C., op. cit., pp. 41-47.

[2] Cf. Cenlivres P. in one of the internal documents of the Institute of Ethnography at Neuchâtel University, 1978.

[3] R. Petrella, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

communicable identity—it is still vital that machinery be set up for negotiation between groups, that exchanges of a symbolic and intellectual kind are strengthened and that cultural activities are transformed into a process of cultural development. None of which is easily accomplished, bearing in mind the fact that the cultural element in such movements not only acts as a unifying factor, due to the existence of a cultural memory, but also serves as an instrument for accentuating differences and distances.

Thesis IV

The peculiar feature of the cultural element *within the regional dynamic is the fact that it is both a memorial of identity and an instrument of distinctness. This is very clearly apparent with regard to the* linguistic factor. *This has but little value* per se, *although it plays a decisive role in the identification of a region. On the one hand, the language is useful in bringing people together, enabling them to communicate and form themselves into a community. On the other hand, it is essential as a means of clearly marking one's distinctness from outsiders. The linguistic factor becomes paramount only when the school makes it the main instrument in the process of acculturation and national integration. The school in fact imposes one language as the principal one and outlaws the others as 'dialects'. Bilingualism is not necessarily the solution, except on an individual level and from a psychological point of view. It should not become a principle of collective organisation, because the only collectively acceptable solution in a multi-lingual situation is to regard it as natural. The cultural element is not constituted entirely by the linguistic factor—it also comprises the* heritage of all that *which constitutes a community's past. Yet is it not paradoxical to define the cultural element as memory when we are living in an era when traditional sources are being forgotten? When they are gradually disappearing? How can one interpret and utilise a heritage which also includes everything which has* not yet *taken place?*

A

The difficulty in interpreting the cultural element stems from the association within the linguistic factor of two apparently unreconcilable functions, i.e. *the expressive or symbolic function*, which enables it to confer or withdraw a person's social status, and the *instrumental function* which makes a person capable—or incapable—of taking his place, finding his bearings and making the most of a situation. In the first case, the language has a value which is an asset to the person who possesses it and a liability for the person who does not. This is why such terms as linguistic 'distinction', 'stigma' or 'mark' have come to be used. In the second case, it is the situation which gives a value to the language. We think that, in view of this duality, no purpose would be served by attempting the impossible task of reconciling such contradictory attitudes, nor by pretending to move from one function to the other on the pretext that one was 'emotional' and the other more 'rational'.

Our attitude will be to find *tactics* to fit the objectives and conditions to achieve these. In certain situations, for certain groups and in relation to certain objectives, it will be better to opt for the expressive function—in others, the instrumental. Although it is not unheard of for such situations to occur successively during the course of the development of a social group, this is not always the case.

It is important to make it very clear that by using the term 'tactic', we are relativising the problem 'of language' which tends to monopolise the attention of educationalists. No doubt, this is the most obvious and the most flagrant of all the problems of cultural development; none the less, as we shall be seeing in more detail later on, it is often no more than a screen—although an impressive one—for a more fundamental conflict. That is why, if one restricts the problem to that of a common language or reduces a regional question to that of a regional language, one is limiting oneself to 'solutions' which bear no relation to the magnitude of the cultural demands. Not only is there nothing 'in the language' which would be *per se* more profound, more deep-seated or more fundamental than the other cultural dimensions[1]—and it is not because a language is primarily 'spoken' that it will be any closer to experience or more existential—but also it could be dangerous to allow oneself to be carried away by the undeniable richness of a language and conclude, as so many Germans did,[2] that it must be safeguarded at all costs because it derives from some ineffable substance which is the making of a nation. Nor is it sufficient to quote some theory of Gramsci with regard to 'cultural hegemony'[3] as a justification for considering the language *per se* as representing a conception of the world and for converting the linguistic question into a political question. Although it is true that a language *can* become the dominant factor—in which case 'we must dominate the language or run the risk of being colonised by it'[4]—one has equally to beware, in such claims, of the pitfalls of racism where one succumbs to the temptation of ethnic myths, or where one comes to regard the language as 'the cradle of nationality' or where one falls into the trap of 'organic and natural' concepts of nationality.

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1. C. Grassi, among others, has analysed the difficulties of relating the linguistic factor to all of the characteristics of a community in 'Aspetti della vita di comunita alla luce delle inchiesti dialetteti', *Comunita*, No. 49, 1957, pp. 68-73.
2. There is, in fact, a very old Germanic tradition which dates back at least to the Romantics — cf. Fichte and Herder — who popularised the idea of 'language as the crucible of the nation'; this is a concept which even M. Weber was to adopt later when he talks of the *Gemeinschaftkeitsgefühl* in *Economie et société*, Vol. 1, Paris, 1971, Fr. transl., p. 424. One needs to be all the more wary of this myth since it was destined finally to be enshrined in the triple association of blood, race and fatherland in National-socialism's *Blut und Boden*; which is remarkably well analysed and explained by E. Bloch in *Erbschaft dieser Zeit*, published in Zurich as early as 1935. In this connection, see also Oriol, 'Les cultures en mouvement, propos épistémologiques : à l'écoute des communautés immigrées' in *Pluriel*, No. 14, Paris, 1978, pp. 13-27.
3. As R.G. Paulston does somewhat too readily by quoting Gramsci to support his defence of the theory of ethnicity in 'Ethnicity and educational change', *Comparative education review*, 1976, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 271 and 273.
4. In this connection, see in particular the preface written by G. Deleuze for the remarkable work by H. Gobard, *L'aliénation linguistique : analyse tétraglossique*, Paris, Flammarion, 1976.

B

As for us, in this vast and highly controversial problem,[1] we shall concern ourselves only with the side-effects and consequences which *directly affect educational policies*,—the specific tactic to be adopted when choosing the language or languages for an educational system.

To do this, we shall take three examples and examine them in turn: France after the Revolution; the former colonies; and present-day Spain.

Many experts regard revolutionary and post-revolutionary France as an almost perfect example of the predominant influence which a written language—French—has had in the creation of a nation state.[2] Like M. de Certeau, for example,[3] they point out that the revolutionary state even went so far as to consider the use of provincial dialects as tantamount to counter-revolutionary behaviour—except in Alsace, where the dishonourable stigma could not in fact be applied because the mother-tongue of the revolutionaries in Alsace was German! The unifying logic of the revolutionaries created a situation where their effort to reduce the political opposition to a minority and then to a marginal influence finally assumed the proportions of a linguistic crusade with, as its ultimate result, the stigma that 'to speak Breton was to be a reactionary'. This initial interpretation, although valid for the revolutionary period, needs to be qualified as far as the subsequent period is concerned. In fact, as A. Touraine so rightly points out, this cultural and linguistic dominance came increasingly to be considered as legitimate in so far as it enabled Frenchmen, who otherwise would have had no chance of freeing themselves from the structures maintained by the forces of reaction, to share in technical progress and the liberation of society. Was it not worth while accepting a certain degree of linguistic uniformity in exchange for undeniable social advancement? To accept cultural submission to a system of values imposed by the central authority in Paris, because such submission would in fact enable some, particularly the more deserving, to become part of the national bureaucracy without prejudice to those who preferred their traditions? But it is becoming apparent today that the social cost of such an operation is an increasingly heavy one. In the first place: what is the value of promoting a *few*, rootless individuals at the expense of the progress of an entire group? And then again, what is there to say about a policy which aims at separating an enlightened, i.e. French-speaking, élite from the mass of the people, who will bear the stigma of their provincial dialects?[1] In fact, is this not a form of quasi-racical discrimination, making a distinction between those who are 'true' citizens and . . . the rest?[2] And the social cost of all this has to be high when one considers the time it took for this process to take effect, despite the convictions and the resources of the teachers who took over from the commissaries of the Revolution. From a collective point of view, this promotion of a minority élite within the national bureaucratic machinery of government cannot be dissociated from a downgrading and an abasement of the rest of the population. This has resulted, in particular, in a 'dialectisation', i.e. the transformation of *peripheral languages* into mere 'dialects'—which may explain the provincial's inclination to silence.[3]

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[1] Not only does this theoretical discussion revolve around the idea of a 'natural' or 'organic nation' which became the pretext for a controversy between G. Tugène, Y. Person and the Marienstras in *Pluriel*, No. 12, Paris, 1977, pp. 63-78, but it also encompasses the problem raised by Whorf-Sapir's hypothesis cf. C. Lévi Strauss, *Linguistique et anthropologie*, Paris, 1952, pp. 93 et seq.; C. Grassi, 'Sociologia e linguistica' in *Comunitá*, No. 51, 1957, pp. 90-93; A. Schaff, 'Problèmes de l'ethnolinguisme' in *Diogène*, Paris, No. 46, 1964, pp. 127-150.

[2] G. Tugène, 'A propos de la nation organique' in *Pluriel*, Paris, No. 11, 1977, pp. 75-94.

[3] M. de Certeau *et al.*, *Une politique de la langue: la Révolution française et les patois*, Paris, 1975; R. Balibar and D. Laporte, *Le français national. Politique et pratique de la langue nationale sous la Révolution*, Paris, 1975.

It would seem that this inexorable dialectic, which links the promotion of the few with the demotion of the many, often involves still more subtle mechanisms which are perhaps more clearly apparent in colonial situations and, in particular, the 'French-speaking' question. In fact, in this case the so-called social promotion is no longer even real. Not only does it not necessarily enable the colonials to become familiar with all the possibilities of the language—one can master written French without really knowing how to speak it[4]—but, what is more, the 'literary' or 'administrative' language thus acquired does not include the 'technical' language, or *vice versa*. As an excellent analysis of English-speaking countries shows,[5] a colonial can acquire a technical mastery of the coloniser's language without however succeeding in gaining social acceptance—which would imply a similar mastery of the use of the language of society. In other cases, the language taught in the schools is not always the true spoken language; it only corresponds to what the state and its administrative departments choose to adopt from the immense richness and diversity of this spoken language. This is demonstrated for example in a study, not of the coloniser's language, but of the 'national' language used in an official literacy programme in Africa,[6] where the 'Bambara' vocabulary adopted for this programme was not the real Bambara language, but merely a *variant* chosen by the government. The author of this study is no doubt right in saying that it is not enough merely 'to control the language of a country in order to command the thoughts of its people' and that they are clever enough to find ways and means of getting round such obstacles. Nevertheless, even here there is the danger of creating second-class citizens, as happened with the linguistic policy of the French Revolution.

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[1] F. Elegoet, 'Langue bretonne, langue stigmate' in *Pluriel*, No. 9, Paris, 1977, pp. 55-62.

[2] C. Guillaumin, 'Race et nature, systèmes des marques, idée de groupe naturel et rapports sociaux' in *Pluriel*, No. 11, Paris, 1977, pp. 39-55.

[3] One could counter this assertion by quoting the example of the French-speaking population of the Swiss Jura who are extremely proud of *their* French. However, in their case, they are confronted with the German-speaking Swiss and not the Parisians. Cf. H. Giordan, 'Questions de territoire, la crise de l'écriture française et les écritures minoritaires' in *Pluriel*, No. 9, Paris, 1977, pp. 3-11 and, in the case of Canada, R.D. Heyman 'A political economy of minority group knowledge demands', mimeographed document, University of Calgary, 1977, reproduced in *Compare*, 1978, No. 8, 1, pp. 3-13.

[4] A. Sauvageot, *Français écrit, français parlé*. Paris, 1962.

[5] C. Graves, 'Social control of the use of English in developing countries', in *Compare*, 1978, No. 8, 1, pp. 119-122.

[6] Sissoko A., 'Alphabétisation et socialisation de l'Etat, analyse du matériel de post-alphabétisation au Mali', in *Pluriel*, No. 14, Paris, 1978, pp. 29-41.

No doubt, these often quoted examples of France and post-colonial situations need to be put in their proper perspective. In some cases, the loyalty of individuals and groups to their original identity is so strong as to make it no easy task to convince or to colonise them. Moreover, other European countries have been intelligent enough to ignore this policy of assimilation, linked to dialectisation, by in fact recognising the existence of *bilinguism.*[1].

We are witnessing today a change in attitude—which is extremely valuable from a practical viewpoint and highly significant from a theoretical viewpoint—towards situations where bilinguism exists. Without going into detail, we would simply say that bilinguism is apparently considered as a *satisfactory solution for the individual*—and even perhaps a very beneficial one—since it enables him to 'juggle' with situations which have become increasingly complex as the result of internal migration. Some are even in favour of *trilinguism,* a situation involving learning an *international* language, a *national* language and a *vernacular or regional* language. This solution, *beneficial to the individual,* could well prove to be an illusion on the *collective* level, i.e. when it is proposed as a statutory and universal solution. In this case, it could be regarded as the first step or a subtle way of slowly and surreptitiously replacing the dominated language by the dominant language.[2] These are, in our view, the conclusions which we can already draw from a number of recent studies of the situation in Canada,[3] from several European studies,[4] and, in particular, from analyses of the situation in Spain which currently provides an extremely varied and interesting field of research.[5]

The situation in Spain is both like and unlike other European situations. On the one hand, we can see some of the *same* phenomena of cultural patterns being imposed by several urban centres in opposition to those of the periphery. It is therefore possible to draw the obvious parallels. The periphery in Spain, as in France, has been often crushed and repressed as in the crusade against the Languedoc or in *Catalonia,* cut off and thrown into limbo as in the case of Britanny and *Galicia;* it has become a unique case of a semi-'no-man's-land' as in the case of Alsace, the Jura or *Aragon,* not to mention the formation of ghettos in the case of the Basque country. However, these comparisons must not be taken too far, because Spain is a 'normal abnormal' case. For example, the central government has never succeeded, even in the Franco era, in completely imposing its authority. Despite the fact that the Castilian kings and the Catholic church joined forces to implant, throughout all the reconquered territories, the same faith, the same political organisation and the same language in a common concern for religious and *political* unity, this imposed unity—however great its power and however merciless some of its methods—has never succeeded in eliminating all the peripheral centres within the country. Not only did these manage to subsist but they continued to develop. This is why the mono-linguism of the Castilian state has never succeeded in becoming a single national culture. Although Castilian has become the 'Spanish' of the central government, Spain is still a varied linguistic entity made up of several units, each of which is a candidate for autonomy.[1] We are therefore dealing with a unique case of a policy of assimilation which has failed. Proof of this is the fact that the new constitution no longer recognises the existence of 'Spanish', but *Castilian,* which has become the official state language, but with the same status as the other national languages.[2]

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[1] *Bilinguism* is a *social* phenomenon resulting from the superimposition of two languages or two equally accepted varieties of the same language; the one considered as the 'high' language is the official language, the other, considered as 'low', is the vernacular. It is therefore different from *bilingualism.*

[2] This interpretation is not entirely a new one because it had already been hinted at, perhaps not in the same terms but at least in the same sense, by P. Bovet in an article which attracted considerable attention entitled *Les problèmes scolaires posés par le bilinguisme* (1935), reproduced in *Pierre Bovet et l'école active,* Neuchâtel, 1978, pp. 85-93.

[3] There is an excellent series of articles on the situation in Canada in a special edition of the revue *Compare,* No. 8, 1, 1978, dealing with the subject of *Linguistic minorities and national unity* (I).

[4] Amongst the studies dealing with the situation in Europe, see R. Petrella's major contribution entitled *Les régions et l'Europe: étude exploratoire sur les cultures régionales dans la Communauté européenne,* Bruxelles, 1976.

[5] Our analysis will be based primarily on the works of T. Ninyoles and, in particular, *Cuarto idiomas para un Estado (el castellano), y los conflictos linguisticos en la España periférica,* Madrid, 1977.

In a situation as complex as this, *various* strategies are possible, e.g. that of the Basques and the Catalans who seek official recognition for a multi-linguistic situation which would involve the *officialisation of languages on a territorial basis.* This consists in allowing each territory—or territorial unit—the right to possess and apply a linguistic unity. Each unity constitutes a region within a federal framework, which presupposes a pluralist state where each language, at least in theory, enjoys the same status. However, this territorial principle has no meaning unless one takes it to its ultimate logical conclusion. To grant legal recognition to a language is still not enough to ensure its actual adoption. It is not sufficient merely to 'revive' a language; the human group to which it belongs must also be given every chance of development because, in the last resort, it is this group which has to be recognised as specific, unique and possibly entitled to certain rights. We are therefore obliged to go beyond the principle of territorial rights to that of *individual* rights.[3]

The first principle would allow a community the right to demand recognition and legal protection for its language solely within its *own* territory. The second principle requires that this language should serve a particular purpose and a particular individual. This recognised language must be of some use, i.e. as a means of identity, as a means of achieving status, as a means of acquiring knowledge, as a means of furthering technical, technological, scientific and cultural progress within the region, and as a means of finding a job. In short, this recognition serves no purpose unless it forms part of a larger whole.[1] But how then is one to reconcile the first, spatial principle with the second, which goes beyond strict territorial limits? Is the solution a multi- or bilingualism applied to the entire country? This would be a twofold error: on the one hand, it would be a waste of resources since in Spain there are one-language regions where it would be both useless and artificial to encourage the use of other languages; on the other hand, the second, artificial and minority language will inevitably be eliminated because bilinguism is the first step towards the replacement of the dominated by the dominant language. One can of course attempt to convince individuals that exchanges at an international, national and even inter-regional level require at least some knowledge of other languages—but then this is purely an *individual* decision which can hardly be converted into a general rule.[2]

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[1] Opinions vary as to how many distinct regions there are in Spain—for a discussion of these various viewpoints see A. de Miguel, *Recursos humanos*, op. cit., pp. 1-32.

[2] Cf. Art. 3 of the new Constitution which states: 'el castellano es la lengua oficial del Estado'. This provoked violent reaction, e.g. J. Marías in 'Cuantas divisiones tiene el Papa?' in *El País*, Madrid, No. 43, 1978, pp. I and III.

[3] Cf. R. Petrella, op. cit., p. 190 and also Ninyoles, op. cit., pp. 33 *et seq.*

In fact, the confusion created by the simultaneous application of the two principles can be dealt with and overcome only by a policy of *cultural development* which clearly indicates that no solution can be found, either as regards the choice of the language or with respect to the rights of the individual. It will become apparent only in the linguistic implications of the type of cultural development selected and which constitute its frame of reference and integration. The linguistic problem is primarily a cultural problem.

C

In order to get a clearer idea on the subject of cultural development, let us briefly examine what is meant by the *cultural element* in this context.

Let us mention first of all that the cultural aspect—despite its spectacular dimensions and its provocative visibility—has provoked hardly any systematic social studies or even the collection of objective, controlled data. In fact, it is often mentioned only when economists, sociologists or planners cannot find any other factors to explain a phenomenon. However, we refuse categorically to assign merely this residual role to the cultural element: either it is as important as we believe, and this is therefore demonstrable, or it is a pure illusion which should be unmasked so as not to give rise to false hopes.

The first difficulty is due to the *polysemy* of the term 'culture'. Culture can mean an object—goods, precious items, etc.—just as easily as it can describe a person. It can just as well be a permanent or a transient reality. None the less, in both cases the 'cultural element' is often no more than a mixed bag of characteristics for which one sometimes wonders how it will be possible to find a common denominator.[1] In this context, we shall be using the term 'cultural' to mean *everything which expresses or imparts meaning*. This conceptual definition situates culture primarily as a *framework*,—a series of perceptions (images, myths and motivations) which impart meaning to our symbolic relationships with ourselves, with others and with our environment, whether this be natural or artificial, i.e. nature or a landscape. But it is also an indispensable *code* for deciphering everything which is charged with meaning, which is something our society is far from lacking as the result of the growth of an industry specialising in the production and reproduction of cultural goods. It is culture's function as a code which makes it an instrument of exchange and social communication. That is why the culture industry as such is the reflection of a society of consumption and social communication to which contemporary education should provide an initiation.

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[1] Cf. R. Petrella, op. cit., pp. 26-188 and 192 in particular.

[2] Cf. R. Ninyoles, op. cit., pp. 233 et seq.

This cultural field, marked out by works of art and directly linked to industrial development, has also a *history*. The cultural element is also memory. By recalling this statement by F. Dumont[2] we do not wish to create any misunderstanding: this reference to History in no way implies singling out in culture only that which concerns the heritage from the past, but equally recognising in this heritage all that which has *not yet* been able to exist. History is here understood as an assembly of achievements as well as of aspirations.[3]

One needs however to specify the nature of this genesis which occurs in a History based on the pattern of the 'not-yet' fully achieved. The models used by the various development ideologies provide us in fact with a choice of interpretations:

1. In a *consensual interpretation of modernisation*, cultural development would be proposed to the populations concerned as a quantitative improvement, in contrast to the present situation described as 'traditional'. Their needs (in terms of modernisation) would be determined in accordance with a frame of reference presented as being basically exogenous. These needs are already known and taken into account and their aspirations would be measured and evaluated in terms of these predetermined needs.
2. In a second interpretation—which is diametrically opposed to the first—what would be stressed on the contrary would be the *value of the subjectivity of the human resources* involved. This subjectivity which, hitherto, had expressed itself in the form of dreams, fantasies and yearnings for a qualitatively better world, would henceforth take the form of aspirations-desires, which would become real social detonators. This is why this interpretation is described as

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[1] See the list of these characteristics compiled by M. de Certeau in *Culture au pluriel*, Paris, 1974, pp. 227-266.

[2] F. Dumont, *Le lieu de l'homme: la culture comme distance et mémoire*. Montreal, 1968, pp. 189-227.

[3] With regard to the meaning of heritage, see the work of E. Bloch and in particular his *T. Münzer*, Fr. transl., Paris, 1964, pp. 124 et seq.

'revolutionary'. The system of education would, for example, systematically seek to transform imaginary desires into aspiration-desires through a process of *conscientisation*. Experience has however shown that this increase in the vigour and vitality of the human resources does not necessarily mean more power to change conditions which weigh heavily on the present situation, so that the process of conscientisation may often degenerate into a useless display of fireworks or prove to be damp squib.

3. A third and more critical interpretation attempts to overcome the contradictions of the first two perceptions and avoid the limitations of both models. With regard to the first, it considers that there never were any real needs, but only a psycho-social conditioning which has induced populations to interiorise 'needs', which were in fact manipulated from the outside. But it also rejects the second model because aspiration-desires are not distinguished from *expectations*, i.e. opinions on the *real* possibility of obtaining or attaining what is experienced as an aspiration. Thus expectation, which enables the chances of success to be measured, inserts itself between the imaginary and the real. Since individuals are trapped in pre-established networks of probabilities which limit their horizon, they have very little chance of employing a strategy other than that of the '*status quo*', although they know that there is another possible alternative.

This criticism is justified in so far as it does not reduce the number of possible alternatives. One would need therefore to examine more closely the dialectic of *aspirations and expectations*, particularly to see whether, by raising the level of the aspirations, it would not be possible to diversify the expectations and at the same time find new solutions. In which case, the cultural element can be defined as a common cultural ground which is formed by constant genesis and self-production involving processes of destruction and recreation.

A good example of this dynamic dialectic, even in the most deprived societies with an almost total lack of resources, is the case of the Maya Indians in Southern Mexico, whose surprising vitality has been revealed in several recent works.[1] Here we find the vitality of a cultural heritage in all its essential forms:
(a) *The preservation of survivals* in the form of material and social relics which are protected and preserved as a *heritage*. An arrangement of monoliths represents the content of a past which was once 'ours' and provides matter and theme for an identity. Although such measures of protection are indispensable for education, their educational value is limited because they have little to do with the living experience of the Past. This is why they often result only in the creation of museums, reservations and collections of monuments where the 'others'—the tourists—come to contemplate 'death in all its finery'![2]

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[1] A good summary of the works of H. Sieverts will be found in 'Estabilidad étnica y dinámica de límites en el sur de México' and in F. Barth, *Los grupos étnicos y sus fronteras*, Span. transl., Buenos Aires, 1976, pp. 131-151. H. Favre's study, *Changement et continuité chez les Mayas du Mexique: contribution à l'étude de la situation coloniale en Amérique latine*, Paris, 1971, provides a useful adjunct from a synchronic point of view to the work of de Sieverts.

[2] M. de Certeau, op. cit.

(b). The presence of these survivals can often be the pretext, and sometimes the reason, for a rediscovery and a reassessment of this history by those who are its heirs. In this case, the culture becomes a *source of resistance*, both aggressive and passive, whereby communities rebuild their cohesion and their identity by constantly carrying out 'repair work' on their civilisation. The scope, conditions and quality of this resistance will depend to a large extent on the population's resources, the real control it has over its status of dependence and the margin of manœuvre which the outside authority is willing to grant it.[1]

(c) It is not impossible, although it is rare, for there to be an equilibrium between an external pressure which is sufficiently discreet to tolerate a relative degree of autonomy and an individual desire for self-assertion which overcomes the flight and withdrawal into particularisms. In such cases, these survivals and this resistance can ultimately be transformed into *expectations*. This is the working hypothesis which we have adopted with regard to the regional protest movements in the Swiss Jura and in Spain and their impact upon the systems of education.[2]

D

Whatever the specific goals and individual aims of these various cultural actions may be (e.g. *protection* of a heritage, cultural *resistance*, the *creation* of new hopes or even a nationalist *populism*), they all presuppose a certain tolerance on the part of the centre, particularly since their dynamism will gradually arouse concern. The centre is quick to repress. And this is why regional cultural adopts a camouflage. It is not only memory, i.e. a source of subversion in the name of a past which is not yet dead; it is also *distance to avoid repression*. As soon as regional culture begins to serve current grievances, it no longer has merely an expressive value, it becomes a *weapon*. First of all for tactical reasons as, for instance, in the symbolic use of time and space in a Carnival.[3] This example moreover enables us to understand another of culture's crucial roles: *it amalgamates yet discriminates at the same time*. If a social movement composed of minority demands is to assert itself, it must be solidly built to resist

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1. A particularly dramatic case of a situation where the minimum conditions for survival were reduced to such an extent that this resulted in the total destruction of a population's culture has been analysed at length by A. Cândido in *Os parceiros do Rio Bonito: estudo sobre o Caipira paulista e a transformação dos seus méios de vida*, Rio, 1964.
2. The case of the Swiss Jura interests us because of its unique educational and cultural dimensions which force the observer to acquire new techniques of observation. The case of Spain is unusual because we can, for example, contrast the situation in Galicia, where the past still exerts a powerful influence, with the ambivalent attitude in Catalonia which is passing from the stage of resistance to the stage of hope.
3. For example, D. Fabre and C. Camberoque, *La fête au Languedoc: regards sur le Carnaval d'aujourd'hui*, Toulouse, 1977.

the centrifugal force of localisms.[1] But, at the same time, it must demonstrate its differences from the 'others'. It will provide emblems and rallying symbols of all kinds to unite the movement but which, at the same time, will present it to the others as radically different. Within the movement, the cultural element, at least during the carnival, makes everyone feel like brothers whilst, externally, putting a clear distance between them and the others.[2] The internal communion reaches such a pitch that it becomes incomprehensible for the others. Its expression demands exclusion; exchange implies enclosure; the culture reveals by concealing.[3] This complex situation is reflected in the opposition between the gestures, attitudes and deliberately fleeting oral expressions and the essentially written, restricted and explicit academic language—an opposition which will once again result in a bilinguistic situation.

But is not this all still on a symbolic plane? Is this analysis not wandering off into an area of vain hopes? Is not the alternative which we are describing with regard to cultural development based on a 'culturalism', not to say a 'humanism', which is as illusory as it is attractive? Have we not unconsciously strayed from a level where a symbolic development is undeniable to one where, on the contrary, all the facts prove that what is decisive, even where cultural development is concerned and in the last analysis, is the combination of economic and social forces?

In fact, on the one hand, we believe that within some regions it is possible to discern a capacity for defining and maintaining a separate cultural development whose specificity should be recognised by the government and the powers which control the centre. It is this capacity which makes legitimate their request that the status and use of their language should be effectively recognised *among other cultural rights*. This hypothesis assumes not only that a potential of endogenous forces will be created as the result of the present regional movements but that, under certain conditions, these forces will provide the motive power for *another* probable form of development. On the other hand, it is true that these regions continue to be subjected to the influence of a cultural development from the outside, guided and inspired by external forces. Under such conditions, the recognition of a separate linguistic status is only an expedient; it may even constitute a waste of energy and resources. We must now examine this contradiction in greater detail, taking into account the relationship between the present-day development of mass-communications media—which are always exogenous—and the resurgence of peripheral cultures—where we claim to see endogenous factors at work.

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1. See the comments by U. Windisch and A. Willener on localism in the Jura in *Le Jura incompris*, p. 26, or the results of the survey by S. del Campo et al., *La cuestión regional española*, Madrid, 1977, pp. 122 et seq. on the importance of the feeling of 'patria chica' in Spain.
2. P. Hugger, *Rebelles et hors-la-loi en Suisse*, Lausanne, Fr. transl., 1977; A. Willener and U. Windisch, op. cit.; H. Fabre and C. Camberoque, op. cit., etc.
3. F. Barth, op. cit., p. 57, mentions a particularly significant study on this subject which reveals that the Scandinavian Laplanders use silence as their most eloquent means of expression vis-à-vis the outside world.

Thesis V

Within regional protest movements there are social forces which can provide the motive force for another form of development. The task of cultural development is to give these a communicable form and construct the models for them. But is this not illusory in a society where mass communications exist? The important thing therefore is to ensure that present-day social communication will permit and encourage the growth of a regional consciousness and the development of collective projects. All of which implies that we should focus our attention on the different aspects of communication.

A

With regard to the role of the 'cultural element' in regional development, our opinion was divided between:

- the enthusiasm of those who feel that one can in no way overlook the contribution of the imagination, in view of the importance of perceptions in the formulation of the demands which inspire social movements and the symbols employed by regional movements in their struggle for identity;
- and the scepticism of other researchers who see only fantasies in all this or, at most, pure possibilities which it would seem are highly unlikely ever to be realised, based on a diagnosis of the possibilities *actually* available within a region and as revealed by an analysis of the facts and their tendencies.

To avoid falling into the trap of sterile controversy and to steer clear of what seems to us to be basically a contradiction, we wondered whether it would not be worth while analysing the notion of cultural development in accordance with the *categories of Utopian thought.*

On the basis of previous research,[1] we discovered in fact that cultural development and Utopian thought had several social functions in common:

1. Cultural development presupposes the *perception of a possible future*—which is inherent in the concept of 'development'—because it introduces a cultural model which differs not only from the one which dominates the *status quo* but also from those which could be transmitted by historical tradition. As is implied in the theory progressively developed in the works of J. Dumazedier[2]

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[1] On the subject of the Utopian theory and, in particular, its social conscience see our comments on the work of Ernst Bloch (*Dialéctica da Esperança*, Rio, 1974, first edition, pp. 125 et seq.); as for its applications to education, see our study, *The planner and lifelong education*, Unesco/IIEP, Paris, 1977, pp. 19-34.

[2] Although J. Dumazedier had begun to envisage this function both in his work on Latin America (cf. *De la sociología de la comunicación cultural a la sociología del desarrollo cultural*, Quito, 1963), and in connection with his research on cultural life in Annecy (cf. *Loisirs et culture*, written

dealing with the study of leisure and contemporary popular culture, cultural development as a Utopian category would, for for example, enable one to discern an *emergent and conflictual* 'learning society' in contrast to the present learning situation as perceived *via* the diagnoses used hitherto.

2. Cultural development is part of a *global project*—whence the guiding-ideas of a learning 'society' or 'city'—which, as a general rule, involves all the social actors and which is opposed to any tendencies towards cultural fragmentation. As was demonstrated by a pioneer study on an experiment in cultural democratisation in the Swiss Jura,[1] it could then provide the inspiration for models of a cultural policy aimed at creating collective units without necessarily imposing a dominant culture, i.e. models which would meet the requirements for a cultural democracy—which means that such a policy would need to go much further than simply attempting to break down the barriers between the various sectors or promote co-ordination and co-operation between the various institutions concerned. Cultural development encourages, for example, regional movements to become involved in projects designed to promote or democratise culture, in which micro-cultures, ancient crafts and perhaps even ancestral traditions can continue to find their expression, stimulate one another and, who knows, find new dimensions within structures which are more open to cultural precursors such as the more advanced technological influences.
3. Lastly, and perhaps above all, cultural development seen from a Utopian viewpoint implies *a principle of coherent action* which would enable one to link and combine within the same regional development the various strategies as these have been defined, according to the preferred levels of the various actors concerned. It proposes therefore that there should be inter-relation, particularly of a practical kind, between
   — *the level of the populations* where, depending on the type of changes in the *culture experienced* by the individuals, it is possible, as A. Moles suggests,[2] to adopt the hypothesis that, as the result of a progressive process of stratification, the thinking of the adults will attain a systematised structure, starting from a 'mosaic' structure followed by a sedimentation structure (Figure 2);
   — *the level of the educational activities* where, as a recent thesis presented at the University of Geneva has shown,[3] it is possible to devise and organise educational strategies which support and facilitate the process referred to in

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in collaboration with A. Rippert, Paris, 1966, pp. 303-333), the clearest statement of his theory in this connection will be found in his most recent work, written in collaboration with N. Samuel, *Société éducative et pouvoir culturel*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1976, pp. 233 *et seq*.

[1] M. Bassand *et al.*, *Un essai de démocratisation culturelle: le CCJ*, Berne, 1976.

[2] Here we shall be drawing mainly on the study entitled 'Adult motivation to thought structuralisation', which A. Moles wrote in collaboration with F. Müller in *Permanent education*, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1971, pp. 141-204, without however overlooking the argument put forward in *Socio-dynamique de la culture*, Paris, 1967.

[3] P. Dominicé, *Evaluation et formation*, Geneva, mimeographed thesis, 1976 (due to be published shortly).

structure	mosaic	sedimentation	systematisation
constituent elements	proximity	variable	coherence
constitutive elements	events	concrete ideas semantemes generators	associative units based on an historical synthesis
method	probability of association	construction	combinative by the interaction of elements
results	particularism	particularity	universalism
	LIVING CULTURE valid for the entire population and in daily life. *No education* but a more or less conscious structure	**SCHOOL CULTURE** phase of knowledge organised in accordance with systems of thought. *Depends on an education,* which, in theory, *does not aim at self-education.*	**AVANT-GARDE CULTURE** the work of specialised elites. *Linked to processes of dissemination and interpretation* which attach great importance to *self-education.*

FIGURE 2. Mosaic, sedimented and systematised structures of thought and the different types of cultures possible (according to A. Moles).

A. Moles' series of hypotheses by the use of a teaching/learning system which is primarily concerned with the educational aspects of its action and which aims at the adoption by the 'self-educators' of the three fundamental learning procedures, i.e. self-evaluation, self-education and creative capacity. These three objectives will be re-interpreted by those concerned—whether they be specialist educators or professionals concerned with the educational aspects of their non-pedagogical activity—in accordance with three lines of force. First of all, their constant concern must be to negotiate with their partners. Secondly, their manifest desire will be to create situations where the acquisition of the knowledge which is indispensable to an individual and to a community—already begun with the self-teaching of the 'self-educators'—is amplified, improved and developed by the educational inputs as such—whether these be formal or non-formal in character. Thirdly, they will attempt to create the conditions for a greater autonomy on the part of the 'learners' so that these become capable of taking a stance *vis-à-vis* the output of the *avant-garde* culture as these are produced by their specialised creators;

— and, lastly, *the institutional level,* where the first task is to link up all the educational and cultural services which exist in a given environment, on the one hand by breaking down the barriers between the separate operations and, on the other hand, by persuading them to set up the procedures necessary for co-operation; finally, by convincing the non-educational services to become educational resources. This entire institutional strategy should lead to the creation of a cultural development community which would manage its own learning processes—whether these be in the formal, non-formal or non-educational sectors—as part of a more global development project for the local and regional community. (A model for setting up this institutional strategy will be found in the conclusion of the report on Lifelong Education[1] which B. Schwartz and his collaborators prepared for the Council of Europe—see Figure 3).

However, even if this digression into the realm of Utopian thought has—as we hope—provided a clearer picture of the notion of cultural development in the sense we use this term here in relation to regional movements, we are still only in the realm of the possible. We still have to discover what conditions are necessary for these possibilities to become probabilities, if not certitudes. We shall be attempting to specify and define at least some of these conditions by examining the main objections to the idea of cultural development in such a context.

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[1] This model, which had already been outlined by B. Schwartz in *L'éducation demain : une étude de la Fondation européenne de la Culture*, Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1973, pp. 211-222 was fully developed in his *Rapport final sur l'éducation permanente*, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1978, pp. 84 et seq.


Situation zero
A given environment depicting this situation
Sports centre
Conservatory
Places of work
Library
G.P.O.
Shops
School
Museum
Street
Bank
Hospital
Town Hall
Administration
Arts centre
Vocational training
Services of an educational nature functioning autonomously
Services of a non-educational nature functioning autonomously
Shops
Street
Non-specific phenomena
Note: these lists are not exhaustive
First series of changes
The educational and cultural services link up : possible patterns
Vocational training
Shops
School
School
Street
G.P.O.
Museum
Library
Town Hall
Conservatory
Places of work
Hospital
Links are created between educational and cultural services
Breakdown of barriers between separate functions
Second series of changes
1. Services of a non-educational character become educational resources
Shops
School
Places of work
Hospital
Vocational training
Administration
2. They become educational: i.e. the educational network becomes dense with multiple scattered location of resources
Arts centre
Places of work
Administration
Museum
School
Sports centre
Library
Hospital
Town Hall
Bank
Street
Vocational training
Breakdown of barriers between separate functions
2-way links

FIGURE 3. *A model for institutional strategy.*

B

The strongest, or at least the most radical, objection is levelled against the fundamental hypothesis that the *living culture can be transformed* even in the presence of exogenous factors. However, most of the examples proposed by the 'modernisation of man'[1] would seem to indicate the contrary, i.e. that, not only in the encounters between widely differing civilisations but also in the exchanges between presumably relatively similar micro-cultures, what we see is very often not processes of transformation but the outright superimposition or, in most cases, the replacement of one culture by another. Frequently, the endogenous living culture is replaced not even by an *avant-garde* culture but by an imitation which we term the school culture. This school culture is made up essentially of *potted versions* of merely a few of the works borrowed from *avant-garde* cultures, those which are regarded as 'classics'—i.e. sufficiently exemplary to figure in the school curricula,[2] sometimes supplemented by borrowings from traditional works in the living culture whenever these are judged 'worthy of retention'—in reality, because they seem in conformity with the norms of the school culture. How is it that this school culture has managed to impose itself and that this imitation culture should act not only as a compulsory filter for the *avant-garde* culture but also as a barrier to the living culture, which is allowed to become despised and forgotten?

An interesting explanation is suggested by P. Bourdieu and J.C. Passeron in their theory of school education as a process of reproduction.[3] Let us take a look first of all at the theory and then at a significant application of it to the pattern of cultural development in Spain.

The replacement of the living culture by the school culture is sanctioned in our societies by the conviction that, for us to be able to communicate to one another within the context of a unified modern state, it is essential that there be a consensus of opinion with regard to a *cultural code*. Although this code is described as universal—which it is in its effects, because it enables all those who have assimilated it to communicate easily with one another—it is, in fact, far from universal in its origin and in the way it was selected. It was selected primarily because it was the code closest to that used by the bureaucracy, because it could be easily assimilated by the ruling classes, because it was part of their cultural traditions, because it was closely identified with the values of the ruling classes, etc. Given this fundamental unity, it is of course neither impossible nor forbidden for groups or individuals to envisage and assume differences. Such differentiation will however be limited by the framework already fixed by the code and will always be against a background of a presumed

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1. P. Fougeyrollas, *Modernisation des hommes: l'exmple du Sénégal*, Paris, Flammarion, 1967.
2. J. Dolch, *Lehrplan des Abendlandes: Zweienhalb Jahrtausend seiner Geschichte*. Darmstadt, 1965.
3. P. Bourdieu and J.C. Passeron, *Reproduction in education, society and culture*. Beverley Hills: Sage Publications, 1977.

identity. The code imposes its rules and, as a result, disqualifies whatever fails to comply. This differentiation is still further limited by the fact that very early on in our education (not only formal but also non-formal—when we are learning the rudiments of social behaviour and the language within the family circle etc.) the institutions constantly foster our loyalty to a code which we very soon assimilate and interiorise in the form of 'a coherent programme of perceptions, thoughts and actions which will guide us for the rest of our life'.[1] This code, which constitutes the dominant system of thought, will very soon be associated with works, models and examples which will together symbolise the national character and which it will be the school's responsibility, depending on the circumstances, to impose *via* a form of cultural violence, to propagate with missionary fervour, or simply to reproduce *ad nauseam*. Thus the civilising role of the modern state[2] can develop as the result of a formidable strategy of cultural unification and actions concerned not only with the creation of a system of thought for the individual but also with the formation of a national character or even a feeling of patriotism. One example of this, among anothers, is the radical Swiss government's civilising project which, during the entire second half of the nineteenth century and despite a scrupulous (?) respect of each canton's educational and cultural peculiarities and particularities, none the less succeeded in propagating the concept of a united Switzerland—as evidenced not only by the creation of a National Day (August 1), but also by the promotion of a patriotic art, by school textbooks which make abundant use of this iconography, and by public festivities, which are as significant as they are varied, such as the folklore festivals and national competitions of marksmanship and gymnastics.[3] Everything combines to produce a single, coherent demonstration of the quintessential 'national' unity of what was, officially, only a Confederation.

In this context Spain is also a particularly interesting case, as demonstrated by a study[4] based on the same theoretical premises used by Bourdieu and Passeron. C. Lerena, with the help of empirical evidence and solid historical argument, attempts to demonstrate how the history of education in this country can be explained by the desire to preclude any alternative to the dominant model for cultural development imposed by Madrid. According to the author, this secular policy has succeeded so well that he feels that there is no longer any need to mention the regional question, since any divergence from the imposed model is a mere illusion (p. 76). Not only does this rigid attitude concerning the exclusion of alternatives constantly dominate educational policy but, as part of the same desire for unity, it coincides perfectly with the development of a royal and increasingly centralised bureaucracy and with a religious orthodoxy ferociously opposed to any form of heterodoxy. All the cultural resources of the State—as well as those of the Church—are mobilised in the same operation to impose a single model against which 'peripheral' Spain can do nothing except dream of turning the world upside-down. Over the course of history everything which seemed, or claimed to be, an alternative was in fact no more than a variant of this dominant model. These were not in fact plans which drew their inspiration from regional movements or regional demands, but fleeting expressions of the desire of counter-élites—as much in favour of unity as those in power—to accede to this power in their turn. This is why, from the end of the seventeenth century, one encounters sucessively a desire to create an 'enlightened despotism', plans for 'popular' education or a 'non-denominational school', etc., without there ever being any really serious threat to the system set up by the monarchy. On the contrary, this system was constantly improved, particularly under the modernising influence of the Bourbon dynasty (pp. 150 *et seq.*) who were clever enough to allow the liberal counter-élite, during the second half of the nineteenth century, to begin setting up its parallel institutions as, for example, in 1860 the famous *Institución Libre d'Enseñanza* (pp. 210 *et seq.*). Even the fall of the monarchy in the twentieth century was not the signal for the collapse of the system, as was proved by the cautious policy of the Second Republic with regard to education. Although it is true that primarily, in this progressive move towards modern capitalism, the Franco régime represented a retrograde step because, during its later period, it endeavoured to halt everything in the name of an increasingly anachronistic vision of the future (pp. 258 *et seq.*), it was sufficient that Spanish capitalism, which was pro-Europe and in favour of Spain's integration within the international market, should have need of new human resources for the system once again to adapt to the demands of the situation. This is why C. Lerena feels that the recent reform is only a first phase, on the verge of the year 2000 (pp. 261 *et seq.*), in a process whose final aim is to create an educational system where 'one will programme those who should belong to each social class' (pp. 267 *et seq.*).

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[1] Bourdieu, 'Systems of education and systems of thought', *International social science review*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Paris, Unesco, 1967.

[2] Y.A. Cohen, 'Schools and civilizational states' in *The social sciences and the comparative study of educational systems*, Scranton, Penn. International Textbook Co., 1970, pp. 55-147.

[3] F. Zelger, *Heldenstreit und Heldentod: Schweizerische Historienmalerei des XIX*, Zurich, 1973.

[4] C. Lerena, *Escuela, ideologia y clases sociales en España*, Madrid, 1976.

Despite its obvious merits however, the limitations of this interpretation become apparent when one examines its implicit assumptions. First of all, it is difficult to understand why such a unitary project, which has had so many centuries during which to gain acceptance, which has been so powerful and so undisputed, has still not succeeded in imposing its national plan for cultural development and, even more, has not succeeded either in reducing the extent of regional demands or in preventing regional movements from taking these up with more conviction than ever. In this connection, is it not surprising to note that a recent study apparently indicates that there is a positive correlation between the degree of education and the intensity of regional feeling, with the authors concluding that 'the more educated a person is, the more regionalist he becomes'?[1] Should it not be remembered that even the timid and prudent tolerance of the IInd Republic with regard to regionalism was sufficient to terrify the future supporters of Franco and cause them take up arms? It is indeed a curious form of 'symbolic' violence which has to resort to bayonets—moreover, to little avail—in order to convince its opponents! In fact, is not Larena's focusing on the 'success' of the unifying plan linked to a second assumption which makes him see the peripheral phenomena as purely residual elements? Has not the author rather a tendency to use the term 'peripheral' as a synonym for 'marginal' (pp. 139 and 150)? Whence his obvious tendency to treat these facts 'of little importance' with excessive scorn. Which brings us to a third assumption which consists in systematically treating everything which is 'Utopian' as illusory (p. 76). This unflattering comparison is of course qualified by the ingenious hypothesis that Utopia is no more than the ideology of the counter-élites when they are opposing what the centre proposes and imposes. However, we feel that this hypothesis is unsatisfactory because it does not in fact adequately explain either the existence or indeed the permanence of such demands—in particular those of the regional movements—or, what is more, the fact that they are not necessarily élitist nor counter-élitist. In fact, what this theory excludes *a priori* is the possibility—which is however borne out by the facts—of the *simultaneous* existence of several ideologies within the same society. This final assumption however is of great importance to our discussion of the possibilities of cultural development. For Passeron, Bourdieu and Lerena, there is no genuine alternative to the process of schooling with its structure and links with capitalist society which necessarily make it the instrument of a modernisation *via* the imposition or substitution of cultures rather than *via* the transformation of the living culture. For it to be otherwise, one would have to demonstrate the *multi-location* of culture,[1] which is precisely what they deny *a priori*. The problem thus becomes one of knowing *whether it is true* that, in our societies, one should equate education and schooling or, on the contrary, whether it is not just as indispensable to place equal emphasis on all of the methods and forms of activity which contribute to the development[2] of a society. This is the viewpoint—in opposition to the assumptions of the theory of reproduction—held by those who attempt to discern the emergence of new educational realities; the studies on the Jura[3] and those on the town of Annecy[4] are good examples of this.

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[1] S. del Campo *et al.*, op. cit., pp. 183 and 218.

C

The second objection is concerned, even more than the first, with the practical aspects, which however does not detract from its theoretical value—quite the contrary.

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[1] M. de Certeau, *La culture au pluriel*, Paris, 1974, p. 160.

[2] Cf. the definition by J. Rovan in 'L'animation dans la société française contemporaine', *Peuple et culture*, Paris, 1967/68, pp. 37-52, which has much in common with the community development approach or the operations attempted by the ICEA in Canada (*L'animation*, Montreal, 1967).

[3] *Séminaire sur l'animation culturelle et l'éducation permanente*, Berne, 1976, pp. 123-204; the work of M. Bassand, op. cit., as well as our own comments in Furter, op. cit., pp. 17-19.

[4] Op. cit. See also the conclusions, influenced in fact by J. Dumazedier, which *Peuple et culture* drew from this in *Planification et éducation populaire*, Paris, 1961.

Even if, as the result of regional analyses, we were in fact to succeed in demonstrating the multi-location of culture and the diversity of existing micro-cultures, in listing the manifold agents and all the factors at work in a region's culture and, why not, in identifying the trends towards differentiation within educational systems and the innovations brought about by teachers who create a link between the school culture and the living culture, there is nothing to prove that we should be able to discover a coherent plan in all of this or even sufficient common ground to warrant the conclusion that all these contributions—however fruitful and interesting they may seem—really help the development of *a* region. There is a great risk that these results will remain vague and disconnected and appear at best as an aggregate of data, facts and observations concerning various aspects of the culture in a given environment. This can be explained first of all by the methodological difficulties which we have already referred to in our discussion on the various ways of defining a region and, in particular, by the difficulty of linking the different perceptions and defining the interaction between the spaces concerned. But it is not only the methodology which is at fault here. The appearance of dispersion within the cultural area is the outcome of situations where regions have been, and sometimes still are, literally dismembered to such an extent that there is no context in which a cultural influence could operate, for example, in the form of a coherent development plan; in short, the lack of a cultural policy only goes to prove the complete absence of the means, conditions and sometimes even the minimal political rights which are indispensable to achieving a relative degree of autonomy, even if this is restricted to the area of culture and education. Not only will the existence of such a power vacuum certainly not encourage the processes of regional identification but it may well be used as a pretext by the central authority when it wishes to subject the periphery 'to a series of successive and prolonged cultural interventions which will cause a change, considered both positive and necessary by *those responsible for the life of the nation* (our italics), in the entire symbolic context in order to transform into assets all of the available intellectual and physical resources of the population'.[1]

Some experiments have been made in an attempt to come to grips with this problem of an irrational dispersion of effort or the authoritarianism of an external culture. Some have done this by seeking to associate their action with a shrine or with a particularly important historical monument or, quite simply, by building in an easily accessible spot a 'focal point' such as, for example, an Arts Centre, which could then gradually extend its influence to the entire area concerned. Although this strategy has the advantage that it gives substance to a cultural project and symbolises its unity by enshrining it in a monument, it seems nowadays somewhat naive since it tends to shut itself up in what, when speaking of Arts Centres, A. de Baecque sarcastically described as 'blockhouses'[2] better suited to defend or highlight a culture rather than to develop it in a forceful

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1. J. Dumazedier, 'Education des adultes' in *Enciclopedia universalis*, Paris, 1970.
2. A. de Baecque, *Les maisons de culture*, Paris, 1967.

manner throughout the entire region. It is interesting to note that it was in fact the limitations inherent in just such a strategy which persuaded the Jura Arts Centre movement to abandon its plan to build such a 'Centre' and instead to set up a network of development activities.[1] In this respect, it parallels other experiments[2] whose main aim is to combine, on the one hand, *a planning of the cultural facilities* which 'defines the scale of resources to be employed, their geographic distribution within the country and within the region, their type and their nature so as to ensure that the facilities required for cultural encouragement are available within the area concerned' with, on the other hand, a *form of such encouragement* which 'aims at a quality impact and which will enable the individual to participate in something which is meaningful for him, which he enjoys and which above all instils in him the urge to recreate what he has perceived'.

As an illustration of this, we can quote the proposals put forward by P.H. Coombs and his team at the ICED[3] which have subsequently been adopted by the World Bank and WHO. These basically suggested setting up *systems of micro-planning* to attack (*sic*) poverty in a specific area by co-ordinating all the activities and institutions at grass-roots level. To do this, one would first of all need to set up a system of information feed-back between the various decision-making levels so that the users were genuinely involved in the negotiation of the training programmes and projects which concerned them. Then the planning processes should be decentralised to the level of what Coombs in fact terms micro-planning so as to be able to deal with the adults in their home surroundings and organise a favourable environment for their self-education. Finally, one would have to envisage the possible need for a de-institutionalisation—in other words, voluntarily limiting external action to the building of infrastructures, supervision and evaluation, allowing the users the freedom to organise themselves in their own way. The most interesting feature of this strategy is its attempt to give widespread currency to the idea of 'self-reliance', since it means adopting a strategy of co-operation and co-ordination aimed at creating a space which exercises a certain control over outside intervention and interference. However, in actual fact it would seem that this strategy has not always been greeted enthusiastically by governments which—and we shall see why in the last chapter of this document—are unwilling to envisage operations which could undermine their efforts to achieve national unity. In other countries, however, the political conditions have enabled more progress to be made.

In Italy, for example, several experiments are being carried out as part of a programme of 'decentralisation—Italian style'. A team in Naples, for instance, is directing and supervising an operation involving cultural development and lifelong education which is using the *school district* as the geographical base for the development of a *learning community*. The aim in this case is 'to create a community which manages its own learning processes at the formal and nonformal level as part of the more general development of the local community. Its objectives are, firstly, to identify the nature of the local demand for education in relation to the community's other development needs and, secondly, to devise educational solutions which are linked in a variety of ways through the different services provided by the formal and nonformal agencies'.[1]

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[1] M. Bassand *et al.*, op. cit.

[2] Cf. the proposals of *Peuple et culture* on the subject of cultural planning: Paris, 1961 and 1967.

[3] P.H. Coombs *et al.*, *New paths to learning*, New York, ICED, 1973.

However, with regard to this experiment and all those which currently are based on the idea of the school district, it is perhaps wise to remember the remark that J.B. Loubser made concerning the example of the County Boards of Education in the United Kingdom.[2] He wondered whether the reason why such a project had proved possible was not the fact that non-educational conditions *already* existed, independently of the educational system and even of cultural development, which *in fact* explain this success. This in any case is the conclusion we draw from a recent experiment in Denmark.[3] In this instance, what is involved is a complex series of operations involving of course educational functions, *but also and perhaps chiefly* the economic and social functions. The neighbourhood assumes responsibility for all of its relations with the State and the outside world. The neighbourhood not only insists on a global approach but, what is even more important, it emphasises the role of non-educational conditions (including political conditions) in carrying this out. It is no longer merely a question of hoping that 'the school will become part of a society, which is itself transformed into a school',[4] nor even initiating a process of interaction, but rather provoking conflictual situations which oblige society to make a critical self-appraisal. As we have already suggested, the Danish experiment is not based on the belief that problems are more easily solved when they are on a small scale, or that one should withdraw into one's village or shut oneself up in one's region; instead, one should address one's regional demands to their prime source of origin, i.e. the centre. In this there is none of the 'small is beautiful' delusion: it is the entire society which must become democratic and pluralist if it wishes to meet the challenges made by the regions.

D

Now we come to the third objection, which is perhaps the most difficult one to deal with. Is all of this still possible in the post-industrial societies which are taking shape at present? Have we not gone beyond the stage where we can control post-industrial societies solely from their centres? The vast and new

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1. This project is described by our colleague P. Orefice in *Educazione e territorio un modelo locale di ricerca educativa*, Florence, 1978; it was made the subject of a research project described in *Un modelo territoriale de programmazione educativa il progretto di recerca*, Naples, 1978.
2. Loubser J.J., *The York County Board of Education: a study in innovation*. Toronto, OISE, 1972.
3. N.I. Meyer *et al.*, Oprør fra midten, Copenhagen, 1978.
4. To quote the unfortunate phrase of Nietzsche quoted by A. Girard in *Cultural development: experience and policies*, Paris, Unesco, 1972, p. 69; there is an astonishing parallel with the educational slogan of Ché in Cuba!

means of mass-production of cultural goods rely, in fact, to a large extent on an ultra-modern industry which, more than any other, has succeeded in concentrating its production at a few specific points—the transmitters—whilst covering practically unlimited areas of consumers—the receivers. In this context does not cultural development on a regional pattern become a vain hope? Even supposing that the central authority was willing to set up regional transmitters, tolerate pirate stations and permit independent closed-circuit systems—which is obviously not always the case, judging by the difficult negotiations in a number of European countries with regard to the monopoly and control of mass media—this does not necessarily mean that these stations will have the means to implement such a policy.[1] In our view, this question is made even more fundamental by the fact that it involves the popular conception of 'mass media'. It becomes no longer solely a question of whether cultural development is based on verifiable assumptions, but whether the conditions exist for reversing an opposite and already firmly entrenched trend.

Although there is much research which confirms this hypothesis of an almost complete concentration of modern communications media,[2] it is interesting to note that there are other studies which adopt the opposite view,[3] basing their argument on the idea that all communication is basically an *exchange* where there is a reciprocal relationship and a two-way flow between the different elements. In more precise terms, we shall be working on the basis of two sub-hypotheses:

1. Communication is distinct from information in so far as it is not only the result of a transmitter's effect on a receiver, but a complex process of exchanges where dialogue is possible. This is why communication is fundamentally a social experience, although it is not a social institution—which explains why there is some difficulty in grasping this social reality and why there is a socio-pedagogical concern that it should not be regarded merely as the audience of a medium. In other words, not only does 'mass communication speak to *all* men *without necessarily saying the same thing to each of them*',[4] but it is also essential to create the conditions for organised reception of the message.
2. In order to perceive this communication as an exchange, it is essential to distinguish four basic elements: the *transmitter*, of course; the *message;* the *receiver* and its organisation; and lastly, *the feedback to the transmitter.* These four elements have to be considered together because they inter-react one with the other—which implies a multi-disciplinary approach. The object of such an analysis is to find out *how information becomes communication as the result of a two-way flow which enables the public to influence the transmitters.*

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[1] R. Petrella, op. cit., 1976, pp. 160 et seq.

[2] A. Pasquali, *Comunicación y cultura de las masas: la masificación de la cultura por medios audiovisuales en las regiones subdesarrolladas*, Caracas, 1963.

[3] J. Dumazedier, *De la sociologia.*, op. cit.

[4] J.L. Aranguren, *Human communication*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1967.

This is why we insist on the fact that in every communication there is always an activity of translation, deciphering and interpretation even if there are not the institutional conditions nor the means for this to express itself clearly and positively. Which brings us back to the central question of a *social pedagogy of communication* whose object is to inculcate an ability to express oneself on the basis of a perceived message—which M. Tardy has aptly defined as 'knowing how to start with messages whose novelty is undeniable—starting with their form; knowing how to recognise the existence of unique pedagogical situations; and finding satisfactory solutions to these new problems'.[1] However, this pedagogy, these objectives and this problem could not exist unless there is a positive correlation between them and formal education. There is in fact an obvious relationship between an education which involves a passive attitude with regard to the information supplied by the teacher and a system of learning which discourages the ability to look for new or different information. Both of these lead to a submissive attitude *vis-à-vis* the dominant culture of the centre and to a passive attitude *vis-à-vis* modern mass media. On the other hand, the main thrust of M. Tardy's argument implies that the methods of cultural development should be consistent with a different conception of the education that precedes them. It also involves asking the question whether, as a whole, the post-industrial society of consumption would tolerate such participation on the part of those concerned and, when it does so, with what object? This discussion on mass media, their control and their utilisation has become an important issue for our society because it involves the whole question of the fundamental objectives of regional policies.

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[1] M. Tardy, *Le professeur et les images*, Paris, 1968.

Thesis VI

Participation is impossible without the appropriation of institutions *by the users. Such participation cannot be seen solely in terms of local power. Nor is it necessarily furthered by measures of devolution, diversification or decentralisation which the centre may decide to take on the pretext of 'regionalising' its operation. Genuine participation presupposes informing the population, their ability to control their relationship of dependence and the possibility of their having their own resources—in short, cutting the ties of paternalism. However, in the social area it will be seen that the most daring experiments are currently being undertaken not so much in the area of education or training but in the area of* health. *By making an assessment of these we will be able to specify the relationship between aspirations and expectations as well as the importance of the processes of negotiation in establishing a cultural democracy.*

A

The challenge which we have accepted with regard to mass media is to create *educationally* the conditions for regional participation with the help of cultural development activities, whilst at the same time recognising that these conditions *presuppose non-educational measures* decided outside the region and dependent on the (good-) will of the centre. The centre, particularly in highly centralised countries, is increasingly willing to envisage measures to regionalise its planning system, its administrative apparatus and sometimes even to grant a considerable degree of autonomy.[1] We are now much more aware of the fact that the more a country is centralised, the more difficulty it has in controlling the implementation of decisions in the periphery.[2] Other countries have found that their recent prosperity has created a surplus which enables them to make a fairer allocation of resources on a geographical basis and offset the trends towards concentration.

Not only have these conditions favoured regionalisation, but the technical facilities are now available and a number of strategies have been tried out. One can, for example, first of all *decentralise* the facilities and resources so as to broaden and extend the institutional coverage so that this is uniform throughout the entire country. This is the classic policy of increasing the number of educational establishments, using in principle the tehniques of school mapping and localisation. Sometimes, though more rarely, a *diversification* of curricula will be envisaged or accepted in order to take more account of regional disparities, providing that these are not too serious. Such diversification has been applied in particular in the area of vocational and technical training as the result of pressures and demands from various sectors of industry. This is a way of ringing the changes on a theme which will of course, itself, remain unchanged. The centre may be particularly in favour of diversification when this involves using local resources to cover the operating costs of a programme which is still defined by the centre. Lastly, it is not impossible, although much more unusual, that this *decentralisation* of facilities and responsibilities enables the distance to be reduced between the making of decisions and their implementation by bringing 'the administration closer to the place where people live'.

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[1] *International symposium on national equality in education—final report*, Vojvodine, 1976.

[2] *Education for planning*, Vol. 1/1 of Progress for planning, London, 1973.

But do all these measures really encourage participation on the part of users?

To answer this question, one strategy has sometimes been artifically contrasted with another claiming, for instance, that decentralisation is more conducive to popular participation. However, experience in Europe has shown that this is not the case.[1] What is important is the combination and interlinking of all these elements as well as their interaction. Decentralisation alone may even prove more dangerous than centralisation if it means making a pact with local leaders to prevent their opposition to the will of the central government.[2] The Americans, for a long time, have been aware of the progressive role—as they say—of federal institutions as opposed to local authority.[3] In fact, by insisting too much on the importance of local power, one may either fall into the trap of accepting what appears to be the obvious, since what in fact falls within the competence of the local authority is not perhaps the most important aspect, as M. Bassand showed in the case of Switzerland;[4] or, alternatively, one may allow oneself to be won over by the idea of 'indirect rule', so dear to the British, which again is not necessarily democratic. In fact, local power is not democratic simply because it is 'local'; it needs to be proved that it is representative and that it makes real provision for participation, in particular of all those who constitute the 'non-public'.[5] Local power *per se*, decentralisation *per se* and federalism *per se* have but few innate virtues. It is not by getting enthusiastic over the latest 'gimmick' of 'grass-roots participation' that one will have found an answer to the question of how to ensure the population's *effective* participation in a system

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1. *La décentralisation culturelle*, Bruxelles, 1976.
2. The paralysis caused by the power of local leaders has been well portrayed by M.W. Vilaça in *Coronel Cornéis*, Rio, 1965, as well as its effects on Brazilian political development. These problems had already been outlined by M.I. de Pereira Queiroz in 'O mandonismo local na vida política brasileira' in *Estudos de sociologia e de historia*, São Paulo, 1957, pp. 194-301.
3. *Education and social policy: local control of education*, New York, 1970.
4. M. Bassand and J.P. Fragnière, *Le pouvoir dans la ville : essai sur la démocratie urbaine*, Vevey, 1978.
5. On the question of the relationships between local authority and popular participation, see all of A. Meister's work plus, as far as European towns are concerned, J. Dumazedier's study *Société éducative*, op. cit.; for the case in north-eastern Brazil see 'Sugestões ao planejamento local' by F. de O. Mota in *Boletim econômico da Sudene*, Recife, 1967, III, 2, pp. 45-53.

which has no provision for this. How is one to convince a bureaucracy that it should leave an opening so that communities can take over institutions and adapt them to the dynamic of their own development? How is one to involve school entry in the dialogue between micro-cultures as part of a process towards cultural democracy?

Since there is a wealth of literature on this subject—in particular on the relationship between the 'school' and the 'community' where, moreover, the school does not correspond to education nor the community to the basic population units[1]—we do not think there is any need for us to dwell on this specific and limited relationship. We prefer to turn our attention to two different problems. Firstly, in the light of the policy adopted by UNICEF and by WHO of encouraging *the local population to participate in basic health care,* we shall be examining whether such participation amounts in fact to no more than a new form of popular mobilisation which has nothing to do with a genuine democratisation of public services. Secondly, we shall be resuming our discussion on the subject of *conscientisation* and looking at the reasons why, at least up till now, it has always failed and why it seems destined for failure. Although these two topics might seem fairly remote from the problems of the 'school', they are nevertheless at the heart of the problems concerned with education. On the one hand, the health sector's interest in participation highlights education as a factor in a basic health-care strategy. On the other hand, there is not one contemporary theory on education which does not make reference to the miraculous possibilities of conscientisation, particularly on the part of those who believe in a revolution via education.

B

As early as 1975[2] WHO, under the influence of UNICEF—and perhaps more vaguely under that of P.H. Coombs and his team at the ICED—began to consider the question of 'how best to provide for the basic health-care needs of the populations in developing countries.' A year later, as a possible way of dealing with this problem, WHO was considering whether the methods and results of induced techniques of *participation* might provide a valid solution.[3] It is not possible for us, within the limits of this paper, to examine all of the

[1] Among others: W. Brand, 'Some reflections on centralization and decentralization in education' in *Organisational problems in planning educational development*, Paris, 1965, pp. 65-73; K. Eide, 'Participation and participatory planning in educational systems', *Prospects*, Vol. III, No. 2, 1973, pp. 147-163; all of the European Society of Comparative Education's work *School and community*, Manchester, 1976; and, above all, the OECD survey dealing with 'the educational community'.

[2] *Comment répondre aux besoins sanitaires fondamentaux des populations dans les pays en voie de développement*, edited by V. Djukanovic and E.P. Mach, Geneva, 1975 and H. Mahler's comments in *WHO Chronicle*, Geneva, 1975, 1, pp. 278-281.

[3] K.W. Hewell (editor), *Participation et santé*, Geneva, 1975.

problems involved in this decision, particularly since we deal with these elsewhere.[1] We shall confine ourselves to emphasising the direct links with education.

If we accept the 'pyramidal' concept which apparently underlies any health system aimed at the basic care of the population, we are immediately confronted with a number of educational problems:

1. Any move to promote the participation of the population in the health-care area will find itself confronted with the dramatic opposition between patients and medical staff with regard to the *control of medical knowledge*. Not only does the doctor occupy the position of a 'boss' in this pyramid—a popular image which must have strong connotations for people whose lives are profoundly marked by paternalistic structures—but he is above all a specialist who seems to be isolated by an incomprehensible learning and knowledge which the non-initiated find impenetrable. Under such circumstances, how can it be expected that positive attitudes towards information and self-education will appear spontaneously amongst the patients in particular and amongst the population in general, since their 'ignorance' is deliberately maintained by the medical ideology?[2] The only alternative would be to demonstrate that there is a valid *popular knowledge* which needs to be brought out into the open. In other words, we are once again faced with the necessity of acknowledging the existence of parallel cultures which have to gain recognition in the face of opposition from a dominant culture which is either scholastic or *avant-garde*. In such circumstances, the education objective, rather than being that of devising a 'more sophisticated form of training in hygiene and improving the techniques of health education' by modernising it, for example, with the help of audio-visual gadgets, should be to take a certain number of ambiguous and conflictual situations where there was (as yet) no certain and definitive knowledge so as to *oblige the health staff to give some thought to the educational aspects of a health activity which claims to be based on the participation of the population.*
2. The elementary health-care 'pyramid' assumes that at the base there exists a certain ability to diagnose illness, to take preventive action and even carry out simple forms of self-treatment, which means much less involvement of specialised medical personnel at this level. Some basic health-care programmes therefore attach a great deal of importance to the distribution of elementary manuals, reference books and handbooks to encourage these 'self-help' activities. Others do not do this at all or reduce such information to a minimum. Why these differences? Should one disseminate information and training of an essentially practical kind, to inculcate automatic habits and

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[1] In connection with the 'Health and Education' group of the IUED at Geneva University, which has been working since 1976 on a series of hypotheses based on an assessment of technical assistance programmes.

[2] R. Frankenberg and J. Leeson, 'The sociology of health: dilemma in Zambia, Zaïre and China', in *Sociology and development*, E. de Kadt and G. Williams (ed.), Tavistock, 1974, pp. 255-278.

attitudes or, on the contrary, should people be made to think? What is the value of this information and its real objectives: repetition of a message? to provide a simple handbook? to serve as the basis for training? All of the facts selected for dissemination constitute, we are told, an indispensable 'minimum'. Very well, but selected on the basis of what *criteria?* And who defined these? Has someone examined what effects the form has on the content, since any message will be conditioned by its form? What is the impact of this information? From what groups of population was it derived? Has any assessment been made of its utility? We thus in fact find ourselves faced with the same questions, whose importance we noted in the previous chapter, regarding this form of mass-media social instruction directed towards social communication—which, in our view, seems to show that there is an obvious parallel between these problems of 'an elementary approach' to health-care and the regionalisation of education. It would therefore perhaps be useful to examine whether one should not adopt a common approach, compare methodologies and carry out parallel experiments in these two problem-areas which, despite appearances, are of such a similar nature.

3. However, there is more to obtaining the population's participation than supplying it with information. Its motivation will depend on how satisfied it is with the activities and with the quality of the goods and services provided. At grass-roots level, however, there is always a conflict between what people want and what they are offered—a problem similar to that concerning the quality of education.[1] Would it not be useful, as E. de Kadt suggests,[2] to compile a systematic inventory of these tensions and conflicts of interest which are inherent in participation—unless one believes that participation consists simply in manifesting one's support? On the one hand, are these conflicts due to divergencies between the 'patients' *perceptions* of health-care activity and those which medical personnel have adopted? Should one not know more about the signs, the quality indicators and the tangible results on which each side bases its judgement of the quality, adequacy and suitability of a service, of the medical personnel or of a specific activity?[3] This approach is, in our view, a particularly interesting one because we can well imagine that the population living in a region will have other criteria than the planners and the administrators. On the other hand, one must also take into account the way these conflicts have been dealt with and their repercussions and effects over both the short and the long term.

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[1] See G. Carron and Ta Ngoc Châu, op. cit.

[2] This refers to a research project compiled by E. de Kadt under the title of *Health care and the distribution of welfare in Chile*, Sussex, no date.

[3] In connection with the insufficiency of health indicators cf. H. Massé, 'Child indicators development and public health' in *Assignment children/Les carnets de l'enfance*, Geneva, 1975, 32, pp. 18-32.

C

These preliminary reflections on a problem which is a vast one—as recent WHO and UNICEF documents show[1]—serve to remind us that information and its use, the satisfaction or lack of satisfaction with the quality of public services and the intensity and degree of participation are linked to a large extent to *the ability to determine the real needs*.

In order to deal with such conflicts, to know who is right, the population *also* must be able to express all the reasons for its disagreement. Aside from the obvious lack of logic in a pyramidal organisation's 'decentralising' the health-care system without heeding the problem of the concentration of medical knowledge, there is also the fact that populations are not taught or conditioned to know what they want. But not only do they have to know this but also be capable of dealing with differences of opinion, of learning how to arrive at a majority opinion, of learning how to anticipate and recognise which of their needs they can satisfy unaided and those which require outside assistance on another level—in short: to distinguish aspirations-desires from expectations. It is only then that one can go beyond a mobilisation of the population to a genuine democratic participation. Does the so-called 'conscientisation' method contribute to such an objective?

Let us consider first of all the situation where, in order to create closer links between the school culture and the living culture, we examine how an educator can best adapt his activity to the population's needs which, in the case of formal education, will be predominately those of the parents. This specific point is dealt with in an excellent Brazilian study[2] which, in fact, attempts to define parents' aspirations whilst at the same time examining whether their 'conscientisation' could create an awareness of their real needs.

However, this study shows that 'conscientisation' leads nowhere because:
— there is no model in the Brazilian situation other than the one defined by the ruling classes. From the outset, therefore, aspirations are already limited to the level of what is possible (p. 49);
— the members of the 'lower' social strata are conditioned (pp. 49 and 172) to such an extent that their only alternative is to aspire to the ruling-class concept (pp. 147 and 171);
— 'conscientisation' does not contribute to social change, as was supposed by, among others, P. Chombart de Lauwe,[3] but creates a vision of something which will never happen. It leads to a resigned acceptance of the *status quo*.

Does this then mean that 'conscientisation' is worthless and that Paulo Freire

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1. Cf. the documents concerning the conference which was held in 1978 at Alma-Ata in the USSR.
2. S. Weber, op. cit.
3. P. Chombart de Lauwe, *Aspirations et transformations sociales*, Paris, 1970. In this collective work, see in particular D. Mandon's proposals on 'Milieu populaire et développement culturel', pp. 259-272.

is a great illusionist?[1] Yes and no. S. Weber would argue (see her preface which is a form of self-criticism) that in another objective situation these aspirations could become desires which would lead to action. Which is really a way of emphasising that an innovatory education project needs to be accompanied by a change in its context. Furthermore, a feature of this particular objective situation at present is the atmosphere not only of censure from the outside, but also of self-censure accentuated by the survey method which meant that parents were locked in a pre-determined framework which made it difficult for them to give freer expression to their opinions. This limitation is reflected in the regional consciousness: are we going to emphasise and recognise what *these* populations *want* to say, or simply to verify what *we* want them to say? The realism of these parents may simply be a sign of their political maturity. When they suggest only what they know will be accepted, they are acting out their role in a stage-managed and expurgated version of participation within a context of repression and censorship. They know that their opinions will only serve to sanction what the school is already doing and, as a result, they reckon that it is not worth while talking about alternatives—which however does not stop them dreaming about them, and this is what S. Weber completely underestimates. She is too quick to admit that the dream cannot be fulfilled. In the last analysis, is this not a case of a researcher starting out with a pessimistic preconception? The relationship between 'conscientisation' and participation will also be assessed in the light of the researcher's presuppositions with regard to the probability of change. Paulo Freire, unlike S. Weber, believes in the coming of an era of justice.[2] As F. Bonacina pointed out with regard to lifelong education,[3] all that is needed for the situation to become explosive once again is for one to be convinced that the control and repression could be relaxed, because the researcher's expectations *can* provoke reactions other than passivity or resignation.

This dialectic between what is latent and what is expressed is one of the permanent features in this part of Brazil. The North-East region is in fact marked by explosions which nobody seems able to foresee. Although it is true that 'conscientisation' does not necessarily result in change and still less in the creation of a paradise on earth, one has to beware of theories that claim that nothing will change. In our view, the power of these aspirations, particularly in the area of education, is clearly apparent in the growing social demand for education. The current situation in Brazil plainly demonstrates that not only is this demand uncontrollable but that it creates serious problems whenever the capacity of private education is unable to absorb the surplus.[1] There are in fact three possible solutions: authoritarian selection, satisfaction of the demand by private initiative, and manipulation of the aspirations. It is this third solution which is chiefly used, as evidenced by the interesting case of secondary education's being made vocational in character.[2]

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[1] See E. de Kadt's clear and uncompromising analysis of the political impotence of 'conscientisation' in *Catholic radicals*, op. cit., not only following the *coup d'état* of 1964, but even prior to this. His analysis agrees with that of P.L. Berger (op. cit., pp. 135 et seq.).

[2] P. Freire, *Pedagogy of the oppressed*, Sheed & Ward, London, 1970. This is particularly apparent when he identifies his pedagogy with the struggle for independence and the development of the former Portuguese colonies. Cf. P. Freire, *Cartas à Guiné-Bissau : registros de una experiência em processo*, Rio, 1977, Fr. transl., Paris, 1978.

[3] F. Bonacina, 'Sociological motivations and cultural prospects of permanent education' in *Permanent education*, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1971, pp. 431-451.

If this analysis is correct, the main objective of 'conscientisation' would be not so much to increase the level of aspirations and, as a result, their pressure on social demand as a whole, but to *clarify* these aspirations. And, based on the above argument, we can state what the specific objectives of such a clarification are: firstly, to establish links between the community—local or regional—and its context—national *and* international—so that the dynamic element is placed within its conditioning environment; secondly, to assess more accurately the real coherence of a unity, however restricted, which is neither unanimous nor homogeneous. Here again, it is not by limiting a phenomenon that one will simplify it, nor will one create solidarity by reducing the number of actors involved.

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[1] B. Freitag, 'Bildungsreformen und Bildungsrealität in Brasilien: eine sociologis[illegible]nalyse der letzten 10 Jahren' in *Lateinamerika Studien*, Munich, 1977, No. 31, pp. 71-99.

[2] Cf. our report in *Prospects*, Paris, 1976, 139-144, on the subject of recent Brazilian research which supports this interpretation.

Thesis VII

Whilst it is difficult to find a common framework for interpreting regional protest movements in Europe, it seems to me that it would be premature to propose such a framework for countries whose only common characteristic is the fact that they form part of the 'periphery'. However, it may be useful to clarify some of the questions which need to be examined with respect to the importance to be assigned to events which are familiar to everyone, but whose extraordinary gravity no one appears to realise.

A

So far, we have focused our attention primarily on situations in Europe and we have been mainly concerned with regionalist phenomena closest to us and about which there is sufficient information available. None the less, we have endeavoured as far as possible to call attention to research work, experiments or quite simply such facts as demonstrate that what we see happening in Europe is not completely unknown elsewhere. In order to take this a stage further, we need to find answers to a certain number of questions which are not only of a technical kind. To be quite frank, what has in fact struck us most forcibly is the difference in the psychological and political climate in which such problems are discussed when one compares the north and the south of our planet. Although the press, radio and television will highlight every detail of the horror of the mass killing of a minority group, the elimination of an opposing faction or the repression of a separatist movement scarcely receives a mention and, although the world today is full of the sound and fury caused by such flagrant, bloody and outrageous events, there would seem to be a feeling that such things should not be spoken of. Why this taboo?

Firstly, through fear of reprisals. Here again, Spain is a striking example of a country where the army has *never* tolerated this form of challenge to the established order.[1] It is difficult in fact to imagine 'regional' armies which would not immediately become subversive forces. The slightest deviation from centralised command, monolithic unity, the hierarchical structure, etc., is regarded by the army as an intolerable offence. The growing number of military régimes throughout the world is certainly not conducive to a discussion of the regional question. Secondly, there are the 'easy' solutions. As J. Bugnicourt[2] has repeatedly said, it is not only the 'force of events' which explains regional inequalities—in addition, there are often pressures from groups who have a certain interest in maintaining inequalities of treatment which work in their favour, who have adjusted or got used to certain conditions which often have long remained unchanged, and who have inherited not only the structural distortions created by the colonial or neo-colonial powers but also their tendency to choose the easiest, the most expedient and the simplest solutions. Finding a real solution for such problems often means going against the tide—so, let it be. We will take action only when things really become intolerable. This passive attitude is all the more disturbing when we remember the cumulative effect of regional inequalities. Lastly, there is the cynicism of those who claim that these distortions are only the errors of youth because, after all, these states are so young, so new that they must be given time to adjust to their internal situation. An interesting point to note and even to emphasise is that, however cynical such a conception may be, however irresponsible it may seem today, it was nevertheless at the root of the theory of regional planning. In fact, some one like J. Friedmann, for example, in his linear model of national development comprising successive stages through which a country would pass, had envisaged a phase of regionalism.[1] Such an attitude becomes all the more open to question when one realises that the author is not necessarily referring to 'young' states. This kind of analysis is however somewhat too prone to overlook the experience accumulated by states in Latin America or Asia because these are viewed only in relation to what are in fact fairly new situations which have arisen in black Africa.[2]

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[1] See the rôle of the Spanish army in the conflicts in Catalonia as analysed by Brenan in *Le labyrinthe espagnol*, Fr. transl., Paris, 1962.

[2] J. Bugnicourt, op. cit.

B

As a result, it becomes apparent that a number of variables have to be introduced to explain the presence or absence of a regional issue and the tolerance or intolerance of the centre with regard to its periphery. Amongst these variables one needs to take into account the existence, which is always possible, of a 'historic community', i.e. 'a cultural unit without a state'.[3] This is always important in explaining the presence or absence of a civilising and an educational tradition. Another variable is the state's effective control of a territory considered as 'national', particularly when the population is scattered or concentrated to an excessive degree, i.e. sparsely or unevenly spread throughout the territory, or the long-established tradition, legitimacy or

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1. As is shown in the linear model which he proposes in *Regional development policy—the case study of Venezuela*, Cambridge, Mass., 1966.
2. An astonishing example of this short-sightedness is J. Ziegler who, in our opinion, mistakenly draws general conclusions from his findings with regard to Africa. Cf. for instance his largely unfounded assertions in *Les espaces du prince*, Cahiers de l'UED, Geneva, 1977, p. 229.
3. A concept used by J. Ziegler, op. cit., p. 22; C. Bataillon however is more in favour of the concept of a 'local community' in *Etat, pouvoir et espace dans le Tiers Monde*, Paris, PUF, 1977, pp. 29-117.

acceptance of a more or less sovereign state or authority. It is true to say in fact that a state whose legitimacy is strongly contested will probably find it more difficult to tolerate centrifugal regionalist forces.[1] Lastly, the presence of external forces—economic, political or military—which threaten or seem to threaten what is considered as belonging to a national territory may also influence the willingness to come to grips with the regional issue.[2] One of the merits of J. Bugnicourt's pioneering research on black Africa has been the emphasis it has placed on the dynamic force of these variables and its warning concerning the dangers of adopting a dogmatic attitude.[3] However, some are of the opinion that all these trees merely prevent us from seeing the wood, i.e. the problem is not the multiplicity of these factors but the setting up, by transnational companies or with their assistance, of a 'state system of production'[4] which precludes the regional question.

Although many well-known authorities support this thesis, we do not find it very convincing. In the first place, it makes no allowance for the creation of a 'super-region', as with the Andean Pact. These are perhaps vain demonstrations of opposition to the transnationals but they cannot however be ignored.[5] Secondly, this theory is weakened by a basic inconsistency because it asserts that 'transnational power' relies on individual states being weakened by a form of Balkanisation, whilst at the same time arguing that the only means of counteracting this is to organise resistance on a regional basis. Lastly, the theory underestimates the ambiguity of the economic relationships between the centre and the periphery, as is clearly evidenced in the case of Catalonia. Whenever Madrid has introduced protective measures to shield Catalan industry, regionalism in Catalonia has reverted to a cultural movement, with the Catalan bourgeoisie rejoicing in its newly-acquired privileges—which indeed explains why its capital equipment has become increasingly out-of-date and uncompetitive.[6] However, as soon as Madrid attempts to put the country on a European footing or exposes Catalan industry to outside influences, opposition from the vital forces in Catalonia becomes explosive and dangerous.

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[1] This is why, in the words of C. Bataillon, op. cit., p. 25, 'The ideology which is transmitted, among other things, by formal education, regards national identity and the State's legitimacy as accepted facts whereas these authoritarian States, these unstable States, lack full control over their territory and over those population groups which are impervious to the desires of the central political authority'.

[2] This is what is claimed for example by the so-called ideology of 'national security'. Cf. J. Comblin, *Le pouvoir militaire en Amérique Latine, l'idéologie de la sécurité nationale*, Paris, 1977.

[3] J. Bugnicourt, op. cit., C. Bataillon, op. cit., p. 279 and the dramatic situation of Venezuela in P. Furter, *L'INCE*, op. cit., p. 5 et seq.

[4] This is the argument put forward by authors such as Lefebvre in *Les espaces du prince*, op. cit., pp. 174 et seq. and A. Meister, *L'inflation créatrice*, op. cit.

[5] Particularly since they could have considerable repercussions not only as far as a policy of human resources is concerned (e.g., the influence of the equivalence of qualifications on migrations) but also with regard to the co-ordination of educational policies (cf. Traité Andrés Bello).

[6] 'Madrid: capital del capital' in *La banca*, special issue *Cuadernos para el dialogo*, Madrid, 1968, pp. 33-38.

The controversy concerning the role of a 'transnational power' can only be settled on the basis of empirical studies[1] which would show:

- whether the population as such has any say in the matter;
- whether their bargaining power depends on the size of the territory, their numbers in relation to the country's total population or, on the contrary, on the strength of popular support or the quality of the human resources involved;
- whether much or little should be expected of the transnational undertaking itself: how far should one go and what is the minimum which should be included in its investment costs so that it does not become a factor of 'dis-economy' as in the case of the Swiss Jura?[2]

The answers to such questions cannot be reduced to a mere series of dogmatic assertions; they should take into account the specific factors in a region's historical evolution as well as its relative strength compared with that of transnational undertakings.

C

Does not the real problem therefore lie in another area and, in particular, in the *fragility* of most of the dependent countries? This is the argument put forward by A. Touraine with regard to the Latin American countries.[3] He is struck by their restricted scope for manœuvre, their weakness *vis-à-vis* the demands of a populism to which their only answer is repression and their inability to resist the foreign pressure to which they are subjected, even those which have been in existence for centuries. According to this hypothesis, what is important is not the power of the transnationals but the real critical mass which these states represent. It is therefore seen as fortunate for these states that most of these transnational groups are not co-ordinated and that their action is dispersed—otherwise such states would cease to exist.

The trend we are witnessing today is for this type of state to become a 'development agency' which, in the name of progress, acts upon the local communities. Its intervention is primarily of a sectoral kind directed from urban centres which ignore the individual characteristics of the different spaces and their populations. It sets up decentralised services which are no more than 'techno-structures' which are incapable of coping with the complex implications of a genuine form of development. In Latin America the state is becoming an inevitable link in the chain of dependence, particularly since the administrative structures which it has inherited from the colonial period lend themselves to such a function. This is what a French research team was able to demonstrate in a comparative fashion by an analysis of twelve specific cases, several of which concerned Latin American countries.[1] These studies revealed that the following traditional functions had been retained, although they had apparently been modernised:

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[1] Which could be conducted either in the Valencia region in Spain where transnational automobile manufacturers have set up operations or in the Cumaná region in Venezuela where an industrial complex has been set up under the terms of the Andean Pact.

[2] Cf. the discussion in 'Du terroir au territoire', special issue, *Zomar*, Biel, 1976, No. 4.

[3] A. Touraine, op. cit., pp. 149-174.

— the maintenance of a territory which these states had either conquered or inherited but which was not really inhabited by the population;
— the occupation of empty spaces, without colonising them;
— the supervision of populations whose allegiance is doubtful and who refuse to forfeit their individualism as the price for national integration;
— the control of regionalist movements, without succeeding in subduing or eliminating them.

These functions, which previously had served primarily to maintain the *status quo*, are now being actively directed to the task of 'development'. The state is no longer merely an inevitable link; it has become one of the main instruments of capitalist penetration. Amongst all of the administrative tasks which this promotion of progress entails, that of informing and educating the various population groups is far from being the least important. The main, but not the only, means used to accomplish this will be the school. One can therefore put forward the hypothesis that, in Latin America, the prime purpose of *formal* education is not to educate or achieve literacy, but to strengthen the central government's administrative control over the country as a whole. This would explain why the Mexican Republic's *misiones culturales* were one of the factors which sparked off the Cristeros civil war at the beginning of this century,[2] as well as the ambiguous role of teachers who often constitute an important trade-unionist force, either as 'electoral leaders' or as local trade-union leaders. These implicit tasks of the educational institutions explain why the educational systems are often 'dualist'.[3] What we have in fact is, on the one hand, an educational system as we know it in the developed countries, i.e. generally private or very élitist and confined to the training of managers: directly integrated and linked to the international system, it is 'regionalised' only when there is a need to prospect a region to find new clients, as in any marketing operation. This form of top-class education exists in practically every Latin-American country. Aside from its functions of selecting, reproducing and training élites—and sometimes counter-élites—this system also has important cultural functions.

All of the features are not present in the other system, and for a very good reason. First of all, this other parallel and secondary system, although often official, has as its prime—and perhaps sole—function to be present everywhere in order that each village may have its teachers who act as its leaders, in order that the authorities can rely upon it for various administrative tasks and, above all, in order to contain popular demand for education. It is in fact the state system which is obliged to solve the social problems of selection because, in the private system, one only needs to pay to obtain admission. It is the state system which has to persuade the people to accept the *status quo*, accept their ignorance and their place in society, and learn that wisdom consists in obedience to one's leaders.

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[1] C. Bataillon, op. cit.

[2] C. Meyer, *La Cristiada*, Mexico, three volumes, 1973 and 1974.

[3] A concept first introduced by A. Teixeira & S. Weber, op. cit., pp. 30 *et seq.* It would also seem to have an application to the African scene, according to Y. Person in *Les espaces du prince*, op. cit., p. 202.

This twin structure, which is present to a varying degree in every part of the educational system, is a source of inextricable difficulties. For example, the state system of education has to be supported, subsidised and above all expanded *ad infinitum* because it constitutes the backbone of the country's national and state administration; nevertheless, its expansion in no way serves to increase its 'cultural' role—which results in manifestly paradoxical situations: the state systems of education expand without improving; they become rational but bureaucratic at the same time, and administratively they become increasingly useful whereas culturally they become less and less so!

D

What is the answer?

The team led by C. Bataillon suggests three possible scenarios:[1]

1. That of a dependent capitalism which breaks up the traditional communities or the emerging regions without giving them the chance to organise themselves in the form of a genuine regional or local authority. In which case, there will be the enormous danger of a paternalist and 'social' state which provides for the needs of the majority of the population . . .just as long as the oil lasts.[2] And then what? No one knows what will happen.
2. That of a liberal bureaucracy which strives to be tolerable and alleviate human suffering.[3] This is the middle way which involves a constantly renegotiated pact with the people. It has need of regions but these will never be given any real degree of autonomy—as in the case of Mexico.
3. That of another development model—revolutionary this time—which would involve a tacit agreement between a central national programme and the support of local population groups whose allegiance has been won.

What basically concerns us in the context of this work is the role assigned to education in each of these scenarios. In the first one, education intervenes only as an instrument of administrative control. There is no provision for the training of human resources which are to be found much more cheaply abroad—whence the astonishing paradox of those countries with high unemployment who import their skilled and semi-skilled labour from abroad. In the second scenario, education plays a partial role whenever regionalisation is desired and whenever it needs to offset certain of the faults or excesses of the system. Out-of-school education in particular will play an important part in this. The third scenario holds out the prospect of a different division of responsibilities between formal education, out-of-school education and nonformal education.

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[1] Op. cit., pp. 278-280.

[2] Cf. *El desastre* by J. Pérez Alfonzo and D.A. Rangel, Valencia, 1976.

[3] With, in this case, an obvious parallel with the viewpoints of P.L. Berger, op. cit., pp. 163 et seq.

None the less, all of this is no more than hypotheses and questions. But we feel that we are justified in not going beyond these questions because the regional problem has been raised not in order to find a new panacea, but to stimulate reflection about some of the aspects which are often overlooked in all of our societies.

Planning the equality of educational opportunity between regions

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Contents

Introduction 117

I. Which equality strategy and at what cost? 119

II. Which resources to equalize? 129

III. Regional inequality: what to do? 159

References 163

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Introduction

Interest in educational quality has been generated in the midst of unprecedented increases in formal schooling. This is true in both industrialized and less industrialized societies. Out of the United Nations agreements following World War II emerged a new, internationally-accepted, definition of 'basic human needs'.[1] Suddenly education was transformed from a scarce privilege, distributed parallel to economic development, to a human right.

Parents have always thought of schools as instruments to provide occupational life chances; and in Africa and Asia the examples of mobility through education have been dramatic indeed. This mobility has been widely noticed by the general population. Parental demand for such opportunity, coupled with the moral obligation on the central political authority to supply it, accounts for the recent expansion of formal schooling at levels unprecedented in human history.

Most areas of the world are experiencing universal access to schooling for the first time. Yet even when every child has the opportunity, pronounced differences remain in what is found when they enter the classroom. Conscientious authorities now frequently attempt to ensure that children in every region have a similar level of classroom quality. They soon find, however, that providing quality is more complex than providing enough first-level places.

This essay attempts to explore what we have learned about the philosophical and administrative complexities of equalizing opportunity, and to serve as a guide to the lesser industrialized societies, laying stress on the options ahead.[2] The evidence on how to achieve equal educational opportunity is not all in; nor are the choices without contradictions and caveats. But there are some promising alternatives which do suggest that the equality of educational opportunity between regions can be achieved without impoverishing an education sector, and without diverting the nation from pursuing other equally pressing priorities.

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[1] It might be helpful to remind ourselves of what was agreed to when the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December, 1946. Article 26: 'Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages... and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.'

[2] This discussion is confined to formal schooling and to children of formal school age. Non-formal education for adults may involve divergent assumptions and be justified on the basis of different objectives.

I. Which equality strategy and at what cost?

Considerable experience in fighting educational disparities has been accumulating over the last several decades; enough experience in fact to enable us to classify the various strategies, and to discuss their pros and cons. There are two basic groups: one which takes as its goal the provision of equal educational opportunity; a second which, as its goal, attempts to distribute the results of that opportunity.

The concept of equal educational opportunity is both radical and ancient. Contrary to the practice of deciding opportunity on the basis of one's family, Plato first proposed that occupational preparation be renewed with each generation and be based upon what each individual was able to achieve for himself.

Implementation of this 'footrace' remained relatively dormant until the industrial revolution. Before that time, when families were the primary economic unit, the appropriate function of education was to maintain the productivity of the family. Until children were not expected to remain within the family economic unit, educational opportunity, much less the equality of opportunity, was hardly relevant. (Coleman, 1968: 13). Today occupational choice is less determined by the family than at any time in human history. And one reason why schooling is seen as *so* essential in less-industrial societies is because this change in occupational selection is now universal. This makes the equality of schooling a universal question.

Though equal educational opportunity is widely accepted, many feel that it is not enough. They cannot accept the fact that some inequality remains when individuals and social groups utilize opportunities differently. Their goal is the equality of results. Many believe, for example, that past inequality deserves reparations, and that individuals or groups who have been exposed to less resources in the past, now deserve more than their proportional share of current resources.

Others feel that academic achievement and other selection tests are not fair measures for talent because privileged children tend to perform better than less-privileged children—even when school resources are equally distributed. They say these tests are 'biased'. Lastly, there are some who feel that the philosophy of equal opportunity places too much burden on the individual, and too little on the society. Under the philosophy of equal opportunity, society has a responsibility to deliver the mechanisms of education to individuals equally, but the burden of responsibility to use those mechanisms is on the individual, or the social group responsible for this behaviour—family, church, etc. Coleman puts it this way:

> The most interesting point about the [equality of educational opportunity] assumption is the relatively passive role of the school and community, relative to the child's role. The school's obligation is to 'provide an opportunity' by being available, within easy geographic access of the child, free of cost (beyond the child's time), and with a curriculum that would not exclude him from higher education. The obligation to 'use the opportunity' is on the child or the family, so that his role is defined as the active one: the responsibility for achievement rests with him. (Coleman, 1968: 12)

Those who hold to an equality of results strategy would reject this. They would place the entire burden of individual performance on society—the school, and by extension, the state. Precedent for relieving individual responsibility began with compulsory schooling. But today the principle has been extended to where the burden for having group X or group Y achieve a given level of mathematics, acquire a particular level of occupational aspirations, or attain placement in medical school, is considered to be the responsibility of society, not of individuals in those groups. And this may be true despite the fact that school quality is already distributed equally.

Distribution of results: four strategies

There are many strategies for distributing the results of equal educational opportunity. Four of the more basic ones are as follows:

(a) enough educational resources to allow every child to reach his 'potential';
(b) unlimited subsidy of higher education;
(c) a minimum amount of 'achievement mastery' by every person;
(d) a parity of 'achievement' by disadvantaged social groups.

Strategy a: Having all children 'reach their potential' can initially be a welcome strategy because it excludes nothing; it establishes no cost limitation, and provides no precise definition for the word 'potential'. This strategy has been attempted in several American states which have passed legislation requiring that all emotionally disturbed children be educated up to their 'potential'. In some instances the effect has been fiscal chaos. All communities, like individuals, have to function in an environment of competing demands for attention and resources; no society successfully functions without a budget. Making the state responsible for having every child (without exception) reach his educational 'potential' without cost constraints will not be discussed further, for it is not practical, and except perhaps as an aspiration, it has no relevance to non-industrial environments.

Strategy b: Providing places at institutions of higher learning is a necessity. All societies require a small proportion of highly trained individuals to staff new public and private agencies (Anderson and Foster, 1975: 19). Only with this cadre assured can new nations ensure their scientific and intellectual independence. In all societies, furthermore, the structure of education is more narrow at the top than at the bottom; and there are no exceptions to this. But providing less places at the top also means that results of previous educational opportunity will be distributed unequally; some individuals will be allowed to continue and others will not. Allowing only some to continue is difficult to justify. More training for some inevitably creates leaders, i.e., élites, and though all societies need them, their selection creates tension.

One way to attack this selection problem is to follow the precedent set by the city of New York. New York constructed enough post-secondary institutions so that everyone could attend, and opened up their most prestigious and intellectually demanding institutions to virtually anyone who wished to go—irrespective of ability. Unlike universal primary or secondary education, however, unlimited university expansion is an equity failure. Policy can ignore costs only up to a point. When costs become pressing, planners are forced to create new and different degree programmes. Inevitably these will differ in quality—and therefore in value. Unless a community is much wealthier than New York, costs ultimately will prevent the extension of identical university places to everyone.

Also by abrogating their role of deciding who 'deserves' to attend, based upon an agreed-upon test of achievement, universities abrogate their authority over deciding who has done well within them. When universities become remedial (i.e., to get everyone through), as are primary schools, then higher education acquires another primary-school function: to prepare individuals for selection to further education in which specialized and vigorous training can finally take place. In New York this function is now performed by Ph.D. programmes. Thus highly demanding and selective training is inevitable, even in communities which have tried to offer university-level training to all. The irony is that by the time a candidate is aged 24 the competition for selective places is limited not to the most talented, but to those who have been the most patient and can still afford the opportunity cost. This is selection on a basis other than merit.

We have learned something from the New York experience and Tanzania should not feel compelled to offer university places to everyone in order to be true to its principles of fairness. If careful philosophically, societies can avoid assuming that an educational system with low retentivity is equivalent to an educational system with low equality of opportunity. They are not the same. As Anderson reminds us, the fact is that a system of low retentivity can still distribute opportunity fairly (IEA Survey: 277; 280).

Three elements distinguish a process of fair selectivity from one which is not: (i) the breadth of opportunity for those being considered for selection; (ii) the 'fairness' in the test of potential; and (iii) the spread of the cost so as not to proportionally burden some groups more than others. Providing university education to some but not all has been attacked on all three grounds. The first and second we will discuss in some detail in part II. The third, the question of educational finance, is primarily an issue of tax structure (Jallade: 1974; Levin *et al.*, 1972; Coons, Clune and Sugarman, 1970; Wise, 1967). It is important. But it is not an educational issue alone, for it applies to other public expenditures as well—roads, airports, armies and the like.[1]

Strategy c: Having all children master something at a given level is relevant to every nation which aspires to have its entire population literate. Fully-literate industrial societies continue to employ the strategy of including within its levels numeracy, national history, citizenship, medical emergency skills, driver's tests and the like. This is the concept of mastery learning. It has, on occasion, been included as an equity strategy because, as Platt says, 'it has an ethical base—one which advances democratic principle by promoting not only equality of access to education, but equality of success in education'' (Platt, 1974: 1).

The philosophy of mastery learning is comparatively straightforward. The learning period in any subject differs between one child and the next. If the same instruction is given to all children equally, they will end up learning different amounts, governed by their differing aptitudes and attitudes. What mastery learning proposes is to provide every child with as much instruction, in as high a quality and for as long an amount of time as may be necessary, so that all students can achieve the same (minimum) level of 'mastery' (Kim, 1975: 3; Bloom, 1968; Carroll, 1968; Block, 1963).

As with wanting all children to reach their 'potential', opinion is divided over whether mastery learning is practical. The answer is governed by three principles: (i) The higher the chosen level of skill the higher will be the cost.[2] (ii) The higher the percentage of the population expected to achieve mastery, the higher the cost. (iii) Since under mastery learning the slowest children receive the most attention and the brightest receive the least, equality of results can be

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1. This essay has chosen to pass over those issues over which educational authorities have little or no control. One is the tax structure which distributes the burden of educational and all other public investments. Another is how individuals get placed in the economy. Regardless of which equality strategy is chosen, the equality of one's experience in the economy is a completely separate proposition, governed by completely separate assumptions, different institutions and a far wider number of people. The strategies for this very different arena of equality will remain a subject for a separate essay.
2. Levin argues that mastery learning would add three new types of costs to schooling: diagnosis and screening, allocation of fixed costs of treatments over fewer students, and time lost in moving from treatment to treatment (1976: 160).

acquired only if resources are distributed inequitably.[1] Even if some wealthy school districts in industrial societies judge the costs to be affordable, an impoverished society, one which has aspirations for industrialization, cannot afford to give the most resources to the least able.

Strategy d. Having particular groups attain parity in achievement is a very persuasive strategy. Its proponents claim that it will achieve something to which an equality of opportunity strategy can only aspire: the equality of utilization among groups.

Parity (in theory) can be obtained in two ways: through compensatory education or as a result of a quota declaration. Use of the first would imply that enough resources can be made available to low-performing groups so that they eventually achieve a parity of results on whatever examination is taken as the criterion of success.[2] This is not a simple task and this policy should never be chosen without some forethought. Financial costs are high, principally because the science of effecting academic and other kinds of achievement is imperfect. The science is not sufficiently exact to say with certainty that X amount of resources will raise performance by Y amount. Furthermore there is no universal agreement as to what constitutes good pedagogy. What was thought to be innovative ten years ago—'open' classrooms, curiosity-development, new math, individualized curricula—now appear to be less effective than the strategies which were abandoned (Anderson *et al.*, 1977; 1978; U.S. Office of Education, 1976; Smith and Tucker, 1977). Memorization and other highly structured strategies appear more effective than we had imagined (Bennett *et al.*, 1976).[3] Though contrary to the popular philosophy of the 1960s, the efficacy of parent-supported, authoritarian classroom methods is an inescapable lesson to be drawn from the Japanese superiority in academic achievement compared to other industrialized nations (Cummings, 1974).

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[1] It can be argued, as Levin (1976: 162) does, that mastery learning may add to the internal efficiency of a school system because those who have mastered a skill quickly can then just as quickly proceed to a higher and more complicated level. This is probably true. But this is an efficiency, not an equity strategy. If quick learners are given the chance to advance quickly or attain their *own* levels of mastery, then the spread in achievement attainment will parallel the individual's current learning speed—a spread which mirrors what is typically found in the traditional mixed-ability, single-pedagogy classrooms. This is what mastery learning, as an equity strategy, is supposed to ameliorate. The key difference between mastery learning as equity strategy and mastery learning as efficiency strategy is whether resources are to be spent on having speedy learners attain individual levels of mastery.

[2] There are two differences between mastery learning and compensatory education. The goal of mastery learning is minimum levels of achievement; the goal of compensatory education is maximum levels of achievement. Mastery learning strategies are designed for low achievers regardless of who they are; compensatory educational strategies are designed only for those who belong to a particular social group, e.g., the poor—and applies to them regardless of whether they are low achievers or not.

[3] Anderson *et al.* (1977; 1978) argue that a strict emphasis on 'basic skills' is more effective in compensatory education than all the less directive pedagogical styles. House *et al.* (1978a; 1978b) dispute this. However, all sides agree that the effectiveness of one or another pedagogical philosophy varies so widely from one school district to the next, and from one teacher to the next, that no single pedagogy is effective as policy, and no compensatory education effort will succeed if based upon a single pedagogical belief.

Raising the educational performance of disadvantaged groups is a complex, lengthy process. On this I agree with Carnoy (1976a): compensatory education will not succeed unless consistent with economic and other incentives outside of schools. Nevertheless, because there is no way to estimate how many resources it will take to raise the achievement of children educated through compensatory education to a level of parity, and no way to assure economic incentive changes in the economy, one can make no guarantee that compensatory education investments will not be placed down a hole which is impossible to fill.

The use of a quota declaration, in the short run, is a simpler answer. Individuals may be declared by fiat as having mastered the criterion of success better than they did in actuality because they represent some special group which deserves a reward for reasons other than achievement. In the United States military veterans and in some cases their spouses and mothers automatically receive between a 5- and 10-point advantage over all others when sitting for the Federal Civil Service Examination. Certain colleges attempt to obtain a balance of student representation between rural and urban states—to the disadvantage of urban candidates who have a higher number of qualified applicants.[1]

Because quota declarations are tempting as strategy their drawbacks should be mentioned right away. As with mastery learning, those groups which perform the worst get the most assistance. This has to be acceptable to others before it can effectively function as policy. If its acceptance is ambiguous then it could embitter those who already perform well. They might feel that their own aspirations had been sacrificed to right a past imbalance for which, as individuals, they were not responsible.

An additional drawback is its long-range economic effects. It is true that individuals can be artificially assigned to levels of achievement and so solve the dilemma of laggard sub-groups. But the more necessity for this strategy (i.e., the further behind the sub-group), the larger will be its economic effects. The more behind the sub-group, the more lacking in efficiency and experience will be those chosen for leadership. To choose the less able is not an inconsequential decision, and though effective as to who enters, a quota strategy is insufficient to insure equal productivity after entrance is obtained.

The final drawback is its conceptual weakness. Quotas are simple to apply if only one characteristic is at issue. But quotas become topics of importance in plural societies, those societies where there is more than one characteristic under-represented and therefore more than one in contention (Lehman and Lehman, 1974). There are many characteristics which should be criteria for advancement: sex, race, religion, ethnicity, and family poverty. But how should someone be classified who had rich parents but who now has no contact with them, and is poor? Should physical handicaps be included? Mental handicaps? Geographical origins? And where should individuals of 'mixed' parentage be classified? Should a female member of a quota group receive twice as much advantage as a male member of the same group? (Today, there are some who will argue 'yes'.) But what if she comes from a long-privileged family aristocracy—should her quota then be lowered? And by how much: by 50 per cent or 25 per cent? As quota characteristics increase arithmetically, the complexities for implementing them increase geometrically (Glazer, 1978; Gross, 1978).

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[1] There are two kinds of quotas: those based on characteristics set at birth (race, parental economic status, origin, sex, etc.) and those based on experiences which occur after birth. In Sweden, for example, access to higher education is based upon quotas of curriculum specialization, academic performance, and work experience. These are post-birth characteristics. In this essay we will confine our discussion entirely to quotas established on the basis of characteristics established at birth.

Two anecdotes illustrate this complexity: in 1976 the American federal civil service used the scores obtained from a 'PACE' examination to help determine who among the candidates should fill vacant governmental positions. After taking the test, military veterans comprised 19 per cent of the eligibles. But as a result of special preferences, veterans acquired 29 per cent of the civil service jobs—a 'gift' to them of 45 per cent more than their proportional share. Women, on the other hand, comprised 41 per cent of the eligibles as a result of doing well on the test, but as a result of special preferences for veterans, acquired only 31 per cent of the jobs. For women special preference for veterans was a 25 per cent 'punishment.' (Commissioner for the Civil Service, 1977: 1919). The lesson: quotas cannot be applied without adversely affecting other groups, including other groups who are under-represented.

In another case a 'Backwardness Commission' was established in 1964 in the Indian state of Mysore. Its task was to decide which among the many ethnic and caste groups deserved special quotas. Because of political pressure, however, the Commission decided to declare every group (except two) as officially 'backward'.' In that way all received 'backwardness' benefits (Seabury, 1972: 41). Thus a quota system allows vested political interests to enter into the heart of the process of achievement.

On the matter of quotas each nation needs to weigh its own priorities. Decisions will be based upon the political pressure of social aspirations versus the political pressure of economic aspirations. But it is clearly a political decision.

Distribution of equal opportunity: three strategies

Unlike strategies for equalizing results, an equal opportunity strategy accepts that as long as human beings differ, some will utilize resources more efficiently and more quickly. The purpose of all equal opportunity strategies is to assure that, as nearly as possible, all chances to utilize resources are equal. Key to the concept is the notion of equal *exposure* to something. Equal exposure assumes the equal distribution of that 'something'. This something we call 'resources.' Whether resources are equally utilized does not determine whether equal opportunity has been achieved. The philosophy of equal opportunity acknowledges that inequalities of utilization would not disappear.

Whether some inequality is morally acceptable in a just society is the subject of a current dialogue between sociology and moral philosophy (Rawls, 1958; 1971; Coleman, 1973; 1975; Nozick, 1975; Bane, 1974). In effect the arguments, pro and con, can be reduced to the following: if one is to accept an equal opportunity strategy, it means that one must accept the existence of 'appropriate' or 'proper' differences among people. These are differences which society must agree are just, and have been achieved fairly, e.g.: differences in sports, chess or physics.[1]

When faced with a demand for equalizing opportunity between regions, several requirements must first be met. As a practical matter, a policy could succeed if the resources to be distributed were to meet four checks proposed by Bell and Robinson (1978):

(1) that it be based upon something which can, in fact, be distributed;
(2) that a unit of analysis (neighbourhood, region, etc.) be specified;
(3) that the degree of distribution be measurable; and
(4) that the consumers agree that the item should be fairly distributed.

Equal educational opportunity also must assume that if the cost of taking advantage of educational opportunity differs, it does not differ so seriously that we can predict that large numbers of children will not be able to attend school. Even in wealthy countries, where school attendance is universal and the cost is free, a family may ask that a child stay at home to take care of an aunt suddenly taken ill. There will always be differences in opportunity costs. The chance of this occurring is less likely for children in the first grade than for children in the 12th grade; the lower the age-group the easier it is to assume that the opportunity cost will be equal. The question is whether opportunity costs are sufficiently equal to preclude any forecast of which families will keep their children away from school.[2] If they are relatively equal then the equality of opportunity is feasible and we can proceed with how to do it.

There are three distinct strategies for providing equal opportunity. They include the provision of: (a) equal access to school places; (b) proportional mixing of ability and background groups in school; and (c) equalization of school quality.

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1. One of the more surprising elements in this is how common it is to accept differences between individuals if societies, for whatever reason, believe that the differences are based on achievement. When individuals in Britain and the U.S. are asked if it would be a good thing were the government to distribute the wealth equally, 75 per cent of the British and 76 per cent of the Americans say no (Bell and Robinson, 1977: 18).
2. Opportunity cost is not the same as keeping children away from school for cultural reasons. Both are difficult to estimate, much less to explain (Mbilinyi, 1972). Furthermore there are opportunity costs for having children *not* attend school, not the least of which is the value of parental time which could be spent on tasks other than child care.

Strategy a: Providing equal access to school places is the most important step toward achieving equality, the *sine qua non* for meeting other criteria. If some children have no opportunity to enter school or no opportunity to continue, then the distribution of other educational elements can be neither equal nor fair.

Strategy b: The object of proportional mixing is to transfer effects between groups of students—either better understanding and a diminishment of prejudice, or better academic learning on the part of the disadvantaged group, or both. Racial integration in the United States has been brought about by proportional mixing and has taken both objects as its goal. Few societies have gone as far as have the Americans to 'mix' their schoolchildren and then scientifically monitor the effects. The results have been instructive.

In terms of diminishing prejudice, the results will not genuinely be in evidence for a generation. But at least an attitudinal goal treats prejudice as a problem equal to both sides. Not so with learning. It is one thing to move more equipment to a school because students with more equipment do better; but it is quite a different thing to move children from ethnic group B to an ethnic group A school because children of ethnic group B on an average perform poorly. Regardless of individual ability, this makes those who are moved to higher-status schools feel inferior because their group represents inferiority, and each individual knows it.

This is one reason why Gandhi forcefully argued *against* giving 'untouchables' preferential treatment. He felt that special treatment would heighten caste awareness and prejudice (Seabury, 1972: 41). The same issues are at stake in whether to provide special treatment for the Karamojong in Uganda and the Buraku (whose forefathers were tanners) in Japan.

One difficulty with proportional mixing lies in the confusion over what the word mixture means, and how 'far' it should be extended. This is particularly relevant since it is common to find academic achievement and occupational attainment associated with mixtures other than just the general school population—ability mixtures within classrooms, curriculum tracks, and patterns of friendship and living arrangements.[1] If one were to decide that the student body at a school should be proportionally mixed in order to provide an equality of opportunity, should the proportional 'mix' include these micro-environments as well? If they are ignored proportional mixing will not create the achievement effect hoped for. Yet if students are mixed according to a formula in each of these micro-environments, the sense of being in a 'school' may be lost, for the school would have been converted to a laboratory.

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[1] Simon (1975: 64) lists nine different methods of mixing students within schools: 1) random sampling; 2) balanced 'mixed ability', i.e., each class having the same proportion of different abilities; 3) friendship grouping; 4) neighbourhood grouping—keeping children from the same neighbourhood together; or 5) neighbourhood scattering (the opposite principle); 6) social class or parental occupation grouping, so as to ensure that each class has a 'social mix'; 7) personality grouping; 8) grouping for 'teachability'—matching teachers with specific pupils, as suggested by Herbert Thelan; 9) balanced sex groupings.

As a strategy to maximize academic achievement, proportional mixing stretches social science to its limits. Because group A and group B differ in achievement, it assumes that if mixed their performances will average out. The reality depends on other factors, including the micro-environments mentioned above. But at the very least the proportional mixing of student characteristics involves the restructuring of how and where children attend school. This works better at the post-secondary level, in urban areas, and among groups (such as males and females) which are distributed evenly around a school. As a way of mitigating prejudice I would highly recommend the proportional mixing of pupils; but would not recommend it as a way of achieving an equality of opportunity for academic achievement.

Strategy c: Equalizing school quality is less problematic. There is more agreement among consumers that school quality should be spread equally. Furthermore, it is not difficult to measure and distribute improvements in quality from the district level. Since the task here is to discuss geographical inequalities, Part II will be devoted to summarizing what is known about which resources influence school achievement so that administrators can decide what it is they might wish to equally distribute (Table 1).

TABLE 1. Educational equality strategies and their costs

Low cost	Medium cost	High cost
Universal access to first-level schooling[1]	Proportional mixing of pupil ability and background characteristics in schools[1]	Unlimited expansion of higher education[2]
Equal school quality: curricula, teachers and physical facilities[1]	Mastery learning (minimum achievement) on the part of every child[2]	Maximum levels of achievement from particular social groups by unlimited compensatory education and/or quotas[2]

1. Goal: distribution of educational resources: the equality of educational opportunity.
2. Goal: distribution of the effects of those resources: the equality of educational results.

II. Which resources to equalize?

A. Differences among pupils

It is universally recognized that the students constitue the school's most important resource. To understand how one school population is advantaged or disadvantaged in comparison to the next it is therefore necessary to learn something about the characteristics of pupils. In terms of regional planning, this is a three-step process. First the planner must learn which pupil characteristics are most closely associated with better learning; then he must learn which region or district has more pupils with those characteristics; and lastly, he must decide what there is that he can do about it. Some characteristics (such as ill-health) he might wish to ameliorate through an intervention; some (such as exam repetition) he might wish to alter administratively; and others (such as home background) he may decide, in terms of planning, that he cannot affect.

The first step, however, is the most important. It would be wasted effort to alter a characteristic which had nothing to do with achievement. So the first question, which characteristics influence achievement, must be dealt with before regional planning can be effective.

Age

It is not entirely clear whether districts with over-age pupils are at an academic advantage. It is true that older pupils can learn school material more quickly than younger children; maturity is good preparation. Older pupils tend to be drop-outs, however, which means that they have been away from school and can be seriously behind in school work. Being drop-outs also may mean that they had been sick.

Older pupils are also those who have repeated lessons and examinations. This advantages them—up to a point. Among Ugandan P7 pupils the statistical relationship between age and examination repeating is close indeed (r = .698); and repeating does affect scores. Those who repeat once scored an average of one-quarter of a standard deviation above those who say they had never repeated. But the advantage of repeating has diminishing returns. Children who repeat once (but who have not been sick or away for long periods of time) are at



FIGURE 1. *Ugandan primary leaving examination scores by pupil age and repetition.*

an advantage. Pupils who repeat twice (with the same characteristics) may or may not be at an advantage. But pupils who repeat three, four, or more times are no more likely to perform better than those who are sitting for their examinations for the first time.

Where older pupils may also be behind, or sick, or intellectually slow by virtue of not having passed an examination on previous attempts, the relationship between age and examination performance is hardly linear (see Figure 1).

Among those sitting for the Ugandan Primary Leaving Examinations in 1972 for example, the mean for 12-year-olds (156) was higher than that of 11-year-olds (150) and 10-year-olds (147); but the scores of the 13, 14, and 15-year-olds differed only slightly (150.1 to 150.6), and though the mean for 17-year-olds was significantly higher (154), those of the 16 and 18-year-olds were the lowest of all age-groups (144 and 142). If achievements vary by district and planners are searching for an equality strategy, what this implies is that equalizing the average age of pupils would not be a very effective means of equalizing exam scores.

Sex

In less-industrialized societies, no characteristic is more consistently associated with school performance than an individual's sex (e.g., Soriyan and Awuwoloye, 1973; Odefor, 1977). The origin of the difference is social, not biological. The gap narrows in more industrial societies, particularly in language. The difference between Ugandan male and female academic performance is publicly recognized; the government lowered the standards for secondary-school admission and liberalized examination repetition to allow more proportional female representation.[1]

For the 2,293 primary-school students sitting for Uganda's national Primary Leaving Examinations in 1972, sex was by far the most powerful predictor of examination achievement. Of the variation in examination performances accounted for by all of the variables in the Ugandan study taken together, a child's sex accounted for approximately 42 per cent (Heyneman, 1976a: 203). Among Japanese students sitting for their university entrance examination in 1970, sex was the most important of the measured background characteristics, even more influential than parental education or income (Cummings, 1974: 15). The fact that males have higher test performances in Uganda, El Salvador (ODEPOR, 1977b), Nigeria (Soriyan and Awuwoloye, 1973), and Japan is not entirely an accident. One key to understanding higher test performance is a child's attitudes, and differences between male and female feelings of self-confidence are as pronounced in El Salvador as they are in Uganda; and perhaps in most societies to one degree or another.

In dealing with the differences in male and female school performance, regional planners are faced with a dilemma: not only are there less females in school, but females are frequently most under-represented in those districts which have the lowest examination results. Planners may fear that equalizing opportunity for females might further lower a region's already low performance record. The fears are understandable. Solutions are complicated by the fact that female students cannot realistically be expected to perform at a parity with males unless post-school occupational opportunities exist on a level of parity. As difficult as this dilemma may appear, in theory it is no different from whether planners would wish to encourage proportional school attendance of other under-represented groups. And on this I will make a few suggestions.[2]

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[1] Y.Y. Okot, Senior Examination Secretary, Ministry of Education (Kampala), Circular A 283 IV, 12 January 1972.

[2] There are a few societies whose legal structure prevents female equality of opportunity. This we will not discuss, since it is a matter of religion. Far more common, and therefore more serious, are those barriers which are informal. In changing this, the school can play a very central role.

Ethnicity

There are few societies, if any, which are genuinely mono-ethnic. Even monolinguistic Somalia contains ethnic sub-populations. And since, like individuals, ethnic groups differ in terms of school performance, no society is without the problems which occur as a result.

Unfortunately most empirical studies predicting school performance from ethnicity derive from the U.S. and are plagued with American biases. This limits their applicability elsewhere. In the U.S. the term 'ethnic group' is synonymous with 'minority'; and minorities are assumed to perform less well, on the average, than the 'majority'. This assumption deserves to be reconsidered. First of all it is not even true in the U.S.—from which the assumption is derived. Average Oriental-American performance (on tasks of mathematics and spatial abilities) and average Jewish-American performance (on tasks of verbal reasoning) are found to be higher than those of majority-ethnic groups (Caudill and DeVos, 1966; Stodolsky and Lesser, 1967). Elsewhere too one can uncover situations in which the ethnic group in the majority may perform less well than others in the minority. Malaysia is one example of this (Wang, 1977). In sum there is no rule as to whether ethnic minorities perform less well or better than majority groups; or whether their performance in one skill is consistent (relative to other groups) with their performance in other skills. In fact, we really do not know why one ethnic group's average performance might be higher. This is evident by data from both Uganda and Malawi. There, contrary to expectations, the highest performing ethnic groups are those most isolated from urban centres; those furthest away from centres of industrialization, capital-intensive agriculture, government administration; and those (in Uganda) who are independent of traditional central authority or early missionary activity (Heyneman, 1974 and 1977). Also contrary to expectations, Malay primary-school students, on an average, do better than Indian (Malay) students in science and history (as well as Bahasa Malaysia) and just as well in math (Haron, 1977).

Alone, ethnic groups are poor predictors of examination performance. When comparing more than two groups it is virtually impossible to establish a consistent linear relationship. It is unlike the influence of social status, which is linear. There is no comparable hierarchy of ethnic groups. There is no way in which ethnic groups can be arrayed along a continuum of high to low, of cognitively privileged to under-privileged.

On the other hand there is an active and valuable line of research which has linked certain 'cognitive styles' of learning with particular ethnic group samples (Dawson, 1967; Witkin, 1967; Gay and Cole, 1967; Stodolsky and Lesser, 1967; Gladwin, 1970). The point which this research has clarified is that all cognitive skills are essentially like those of language; specialized cognitive skills can develop if environmental factors exist in a co-terminal relationship with ethnicity. Cattle-keepers in East Africa have a plethora of vocabulary to describe cattle; Canadian Eskimos have many words to describe different kinds of snow; and American Navahos to describe rain. Thus Gay and Cole, not surprisingly, find (1967), that by marking distance with various sizes of rock piles are the Liberian Kpelle able to develop keen techniques of spatial conservation. The question is whether these discoveries are of practical importance for the design of an equity policy in education. My feeling is that they are not.[1]

Even if it were possible to establish that every single ethnic group which fell under a planner's geographical jurisdiction had a completely distinct cognitive learning style, and even if it were possible to isolate the impact of each style on all the subjects taught in schools, and at all grade levels, the planner would still be faced with an inescapable dilemma in how to interpret this knowledge. If ethnic group A is found to be more adept in spatial abilities, and group B more adept in verbal abilities, should Groups A and B then be separated so that teachers could specialize their instruction? Or should the groups be integrated so children might learn from the others? Should ethnic groups receive more instruction in the areas of their cognitive expertise and so capitalize on their advantage; or should the opposite prevail—should they receive special instruction in the areas where they are judged to be deficient? Whichever is chosen, clearly pedagogical specialization by ethnic or cultural identity runs the danger of negatively affecting the implementation of other social aspirations—such as a joint sense of nationhood.

Thus although some data would suggest that ethnic groups do not all learn in the same pattern, and a considerable amount of data show that ethnic groups perform differently in school, no theory explaining ethnic group differences is sound enough to confidently base a policy of educational equity. Nevertheless we do know that ethnic differences in school performance are linked with other factors—factors which are equally universal but are better understood. For example, ethnic examination performance differences are linked with differences in the proportion of an age-cohort in school (Heyneman, 1977), to occupational expectations and feelings of personal efficacy (Cohen, 1973; Elder, 1973), to sex (i.e., attitudes toward female competition in school), and especially to ethnic differences in socio-economic status. These characteristics are more potent empirically because they are linear; with these there is a range from high to low. Therefore, unlike a range of ethnic groups, these characteristics are more relevant for equality policy.

Socio-economic status

It would be tempting to assume that school children of low social status were particularly at an educational disadvantage in less-industrial societies. This would be true if it could be shown that: (i) proportionally low-status children in less-industrial societies continue less far in school than they do in industrial societies; and (ii) that within less-industrial societies low-status children learn less in school and do worse on examinations. Both of these assumptions are open to question.

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[1] This is not to say that this research has no applicability to pedagogy; in fact it has. If we know that individuals from group A tend to 'see' spatial relationships in a particular fashion, we *might* be able to devise a pedagogy which could utilize that skill specialization to see new relationships. Good pedagogy always incorporates facts about students which can be used to improve the process of classroom learning. This is a good strategy; but it would be a poor strategy were it to be used in trying to improve equality for large numbers of pupils.

Patterns of educational attainment (how far children go in school) in less-industrial societies do indeed parallel findings from the U.S. and Western Europe; children from better-educated and wealthier parents are over-represented in universities and secondary schools in comparison to their proportion of the population (Foster, 1965; Foster and Clignet, 1966; Anderson, Bowman and Olson, 1969; Currie, 1974). But what does this mean? Does this mean that schools in Africa or Latin America or Asia oppress the poor? This is what Illich would have us believe. The peasants' 'fascination in favor of school', he says, 'makes it possible to exploit them doubly: it permits increasing allocation of public funds for the education of a few and increasing acceptance of social control by the many' (Illich, 1972: 10).

We would agree with Dore (1976) and Cummings (1977), and Foster (1971), that this is simply not the case. There is, first of all, no evidence which would suggest that children from less-privileged backgrounds are more seriously under-represented in the less-industrial societies than they are anywhere else—including the Soviet Union (Whyte, 1974; Dobson, 1975); or that conscientious intervention against it can mitigate the process of stratification incurred with the rise of economic specialization (Larzeg, 1976a; 1976b). Secondly, there is no evidence to assure us that other institutional mechanisms—such as armies, co-operative societies, factories—promote talent more fairly than do schools, or receive any wider public acceptance in how they promote talent.

Thirdly, and contrary to the fears of some (Bowles, Gintis, Simmons, 1976; Rahrema, 1976; Simmons, 1974), the pattern of school recruitment does not constitute a clear barrier to economic development. If that were the case then the more industrial the society the weaker would be the link between educational attainment and social origin. But the fact is that the connection between economic development and proportional educational attainment is highly idosyncratic (Foster, 1971: 57); less-privileged children are just as under-represented in wealthy societies as in poor societies. In sum, schools in lesser-industrial societies do not oppress the poor; nor does representation in them on the part of the lesser-privileged constitute a pattern systematically different from industrial societies, or constitute a barrier to economic development.

This does not mean that attention should not be paid to equalizing the educational attainment of differing socio-economic groups. What it does mean is that no planner should expect school systems in the less-industrial societies to accomplish socially what they have accomplished in no society.

Exactly why children from lower socio-economic-status backgrounds should be proportionally under-represented in schools (in all countries) is not known. But there are four possibilities: (i) because of differential spatial diffusion of schools (Gould, 1973; Mbilinyi, 1972; Anderson, 1966); (ii) because schooling is expensive in both direct and opportunity costs—with wealthier families being able to afford more school; (iii) because children from more prominent social backgrounds tend to do better on the selection examinations; and (iv) because, separate from economic problems, children of the less-privileged (at least in industrialized countries) feel less ambitious about education, less confident in themselves generally, and leave school earlier than others (Elder, 1973; Cohen, 1973; Atkinson *et al.*, 1976).

There is ample evidence from industrial societies which would lead us to expect that children of lower socio-economic status would perform less well on tests of academic selection (Mosteller and Moynihan, 1972; Coleman *et al.*, 1966; Bowles and Levin, 1968; Husén, 1968; Jencks *et al.*, 1972; Peaker, 1971; Rossi, 1961). But the evidence from less-industrialized societies is more equivocal (Heyneman, 1979b). The Ugandan relationships between both intelligence and academic achievement scores and socio-economic status have been discussed in other contexts (Heyneman, 1976a). Briefly, there is a weak relationship between socio-economic background and academic achievement scores on the Primary Leaving Examination. The correlation between achievement and paternal schooling was only .07; maternal schooling, .02; the number of modern possessions in the home, .03; paternal occupation, .06; and the summary measure of the four SES variables, only .05. Selecting only males with low, medium or high intelligence also yielded consistently low relationships between all five SES measures and PLE performance.

The absence of the expected relationships might be questioned on grounds either of insufficient socio-economic variance or of varied proportion of a community's children in school. But each SES measure contained cases which fell across a full range (between five and eight categories). For example, some children came from homes with no modern possessions, while others came from homes with all of them; the mean was very close to owning half. Of the four SES measures, the least variance was found for mother's schooling, yet 57 per cent of the pupils reported that their mothers had attended school, ranging from a few years to university. Since less than 10 per cent of the age-cohort reaches grade seven in the Karamoja Districts, as contrasted to more than 80 per cent in the capital of Kampala, one might wonder if selectivity in attendance influenced the findings. But no relationships between performance and SES emerge either within Karamoja or within Kampala.

The 'deviant' Ugandan findings, we now know, agree with other recent evidence from Papua New Guinea (Pope and Jones, 1974), India (Bulcock *et al.*, 1976; Heyneman, 1978c; Kifer, 1977) and Chile (Schiefelbein and Farrell, 1975). But the evidence is particularly conclusive from sub-Saharan Africa. Silvey (1972) finds that parental economic status is not related to academic achievement 'in any meaningful way'. Currie (1974) has concluded that there is little or no connection between parental education and Cambridge School Certificate examination performance for Ugandan secondary-school students in 1954, 1959, and 1964; and Olson (1975) has reported low or random correlations between socio-economic status and Kenyan Cambridge School Certificate performance. Perhaps even more startling is Murphree's (1973) finding that (African) children from illiterate homes in Zimbabwe did better in secondary school than children from homes where parents were literate.

Findings for performance on primary-school examinations are consistent with those just given for secondary schools. K. Mwaniki (1973) found correlations of only .09, —.03, and .01 between mother's education and the achievement scores of children in tests of English, math, and general knowledge in four Kenyan primary schools. Another study of Kenyan primary schools found no relationship between these variables (D. Mwaniki, 1973). And lastly, Peil (1974: 412) said recently that her data for Ghana show that 'examination success is by no means all due to social advantages and, in the case of parental education, the differential is the reverse of what was expected'.

Furthermore, when the data on Ugandan primary-school children are linked with the IEA (science) findings on the same age-group, it appears that out-of-school influences diminish in lesser-industrial societies.[1] The strength of the relationships appears in Table 2.

The data in Table 2 point to a single conclusion: the more industrialized a society, the more achievement in school is apt to be affected by a pupil's socio-economic environment and other out-of-school influences. For example, when the percentage of children who are in secondary school is plotted against the achievement effects of out-of-school influences, there is a definitely positive relationship: the higher the percentage of a nation's age-cohort in secondary school, the greater the percentage of achievement variance explained. The correlation between out-of-school influences and *per capita* income is .67 ($p < .002$); with the percentage in secondary school .71 ($p < .002$); and with growth in GNP, .04. Thus with at least three of the four indicators, in wealthy nations the national level of achievement is strongly associated with the out-of-school social milieu.

To generalize with confidence from these correlations, information is also

TABLE 2. Correlations between the explanatory power of age, sex and SES on academic achievement and four measures of economic development[1] (N = 18).

Per capita income[2]	.67 ($p < .002$)
Percentage GNP growth rate[2] (1965-1971)	.04 (N.S.)
Percentage of age-cohort in primary school[3]	.51 ($p < .002$)
Percentage of age-cohort in secondary school[3]	.71 ($p < .001$)

1. Source: L.C. Coomer and John P. Keeves, *Science education in 19 countries: an empirical study* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1973); and S. Heyneman, 'Influences on academic achievement in Uganda: a 'Coleman Report' from a non-industrialized society,' unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, June 1975. The countries included are the following: Australia, Belgium (Fr.), Chile, England, Finland, Germany (Fed. Rep.), Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Scotland, Sweden, Thailand, Uganda, and U.S.A.
2. Source: World Bank, *Atlas of population, per capita product, and growth rates* (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1973).
3. Source: United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *Statistical yearbook* (Paris: Unesco, 1970).

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[1] Out-of-school influences consist of age, sex and socio-economic status.

needed for socialist nations (where stated policy has been to minimize the educational effects of social status) and for a larger number of less-developed nations. But the thrust of these recent findings, and especially those from sub-Saharan Africa, indicates that the strength of the relationship found in industrial countries between academic performance and socio-economic status may not prevail in societies at the other end of the industrial spectrum.

I would not interpret this line of exploration as suggesting that there is no link at all between social status and school performance in lesser-industrial societies. It exists to one extent or another (Soutelle, 1977).[1] The question is why it appears to be less strong.

Others have noticed that the influence of a child's social status on his school performance seems to be less in the less-industrial societies (Platt, 1974; Anderson, 1974). But we are just beginning to develop theories which might explain it. After comparing the performance of schoolchildren in India and England, Bulcock (with Clifton and Beebe) summarize their analysis by simply rejecting the argument that a child's progress through school was determined by the internal socializing effects of social status rather than by ability and individual motivation (1976: 26). Recent arguments presented by Kifer (1977) on the basis of IEA data would support this view.

Perhaps Anderson (1974b: 274-5) is correct when he suggests that differences in school attainment are not due to the physical advantages associated with wealthy parents. This is supported by recent data from East Africa. There the children from the less-privileged sectors of the society (who are in school) do not appear to hold any lower opinions of themselves or their futures as a result of their family's lower economic status (Mwaniki, 1973; Heyneman, 1976c, 1979). This stands in direct contrast to more-industrial societies where children from families of lower economic status tend to have lower opinions of themselves (Coleman, 1966; Peaker, 1971). Children from less-privileged families in East Africa want to do well in school and believe that doing well in school will strongly affect their occupational futures. Moreover they are right—for in contrast to what pertains in an industrial context (Jencks *et al.*, 1972), the strongest predictor of occupational attainment in East Africa is not social status, but how children do in school (Currie, 1977). In sum, the lower out-of-school influence found in less-industrial societies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, may stem from a lack of build-up of school-based social-class effects. What this implies is that regional planners will find low-status children outside of industrialized countries to be under-represented in school because they don't have a school near to them, or they can't afford the cost, and not because they are lower in capacity or desire to perform well on selection examinations.

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[1] Even in Uganda, when achievement is broken down into its component parts, weak (though statistically significant) relationships emerge between a child's socio-economic status and his performance on the English language section of the examination (Heyneman, 1976b: 47).

Physical health

There is one characteristic of a school population which can place it at a disadvantage and can account for regional disparity in achievement, and that is the status of the children's health. Even in countries with medium *per capita* incomes, impoverished districts contain children suffering from frequent diarrhoea, recurring headaches, stomach pains, and untended wounds. Parasites and fever are common; levels of fatigue and hunger, abnormal for children in wealthy societies, are in actuality, normal; and levels of classroom energy can be a fraction of what one can expect from healthier children.

This is not a draconian view; it is simply fact. Grade-seven children in Uganda, for example, were asked to state whether they had ever suffered from specific health problems. Each problem was explained to them in English and six other languages. Personal assistance was given to each child who wasn't sure. If, after receiving assistance, a child was still uncertain, he was asked to check 'No'. Thirty-seven per cent reported that they had been confined to a hospital at least once for 'more than a few days'. Seventy-five per cent claimed to have had malaria; 12 per cent had seen 'blood with their stool'. Ten per cent have had trachoma; 8 per cent have had hookworm; 5 per cent claimed to have been treated for malnutrition when they had been babies. When they were asked what they had been given to eat today before coming to school, 18.5 per cent said that they had had nothing either to eat or to drink.

Data from laboratory, control-group studies would indicate a definite link between health and performance on intellectual tasks (Stock and Smyth, 1968; Richardson, 1968; Coursin, 1968; Monckeberg, 1968). But these studies analyze severe cases—those which present themselves for medical treatment. When attempts are made to explore the same linkages between health and intellectual performance on national populations of school children, the connection is less clear. In their pioneering St. Lucia study Epstein and Weisbrod report that neither bilharzia nor other parasitic diseases exert an important impact on the performance of school children measured either by reading achievement or by class rank (Epstein and Weisbrod, 1974: 566; Epstein and Weisbrod, 1973).

The St. Lucia study also reported that the family's socio-economic status had a pronounced effect on achievement. This was not the case in East Africa, where socio-economic status has little or no effect at all. By comparison to east Africa, St. Lucia also differs in the prevalence of disease. The island completely rid itself of malaria in the 1950s. Thus there is no way to adequately compare health's impact on performance of the children in St. Lucia with the seventh-grade children in Uganda, 75 per cent of whom claim to have malaria. Even if the Ugandan 75 per cent figure is grossly exaggerated, it is not at all unlikely that those children who claim to have a disease may indeed be sick—whether or not the disease is diagnosed precisely. Perhaps this is the reason why the 5 per cent who claimed to have suffered from 'malnutrition when young', performed 25 per cent of a standard deviation below all others on the Raven's Progressive Matrices test of spatial and perceptual abilities, and a full standard deviation below the mean in academic achievement. Those reporting that they had hookworm also performed significantly worse. When malaria, hookworm, trachoma, tuberculosis, malnutrition and hospitalization are placed together in a single scale, called 'pupil health', this variable elicits the fourth strongest beta coefficient when compared with 29 other influences on Ugandan academic achievement (Heyneman, Mintz and Jamison, 1978d).

This raises the question of how important a barrier to schooling ill-health is in other developing societies. One recent study conducted in Paraguay approached this by adding the question, 'Why did your child drop out of school?' to the census enumerator's list. Ten per cent of the parents of drop-outs said that it was because of the child's ill-health (Wrinkler, 1977).[1] This is not inconsiderable; and there is reason to expect similar levels of influence to emerge elsewhere.

It is surprising how few intervention experiments there have been. American children in impoverished school districts do receive free milk and low-cost lunches, but the subject of health is rarely raised with respect to improving school efficiency for children in less-industrial countries. International assistance agencies are far more likely to sponsor the distribution of electric stoves so that girls in secondary school can learn 'domestic science' than they are likely to sponsor the distribution of food or medical assistance to children in primary schools with no electricity.

Some might argue that children, if they are in school, are already privileged and that other categories of the population are more deserving of health assistance. But this objection is misdirected. When there is universal schooling, then it is of course irrelevant. But even if schooling is not universal, there is reason to experiment with health interventions among school children. In the first place, making improvements on the state of health serves as an excellent through indirect mechanism for mitigating the tendency for under-privileged children to drop out of school. Hot lunches succeed in keeping children in school; 'more relevant' curricula do not. Schooling is a long-term investment, and any technique which can facilitate a higher return can be estimated for cost and for benefit. This includes the impact of health intervention on the propensity to finish school and to learn more when in school. It must also be remembered that health is a necessary ingredient of human capital, and that the *principal* barrier to implementing better standards of health care is the expense of delivery.

Schools offer an efficient mechanism for delivering certain kinds of health care. In no other location does any section of the population congregate in such large numbers so predictably. Given scarce resources, delivering innoculations and parasitic cures to children who come to school is more attainable than delivering the same medicine to children at any other location. To be sure, there are limits on the quantity of health care to be considered. Some diseases recur with re-infections; for other diseases a single treatment provides long-term cure. Some illnesses require professional assistance; others do not. Regardless of a nation's wealth, the costs of these same delivery parameters always have to be considered. Nevertheless in searching for a strategy to equalize regional educational opportunity—which would not sacrifice educational efficiency—one prime candidate should be to improve the health of those children who live in particularly low-scoring school districts.

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[1] Other percentages of parental response were reported in the paper; the ten per cent figure is derived from private communication with the author.

B. Differences among schools

Techniques of estimating the impact of school resources on learning

The ability to empirically assess the 'weight' of 'school influences' is less than twenty years old. Before the 1960s proof was limited to the results from experimental/control groups, zero-order correlations, and personal observations. These are not irrelevant sources, but the perfection of the computer revolutionized our capacity to observe, and has led to a quantum leap in the sophistication of statistical models. Not only were we suddenly capable of considering thousands, even hundreds of thousands of simultaneous observations, but at our finger-tips for control and experimentation were *all* of the earlier foci of experimental/control efforts (e.g., TV instruction, team teaching, more homework/less homework, etc., etc.), plus many more latitudes of control and experimentation also simultaneously: parental discipline, socio-economic status, physical health, experience in nursery school, and the like. We can now identify, measure, control, and analyze literally hundreds of influences at the same time. And we now do this as a matter of routine.

We have learned something during the course of this two-decade-old, somewhat hot/cold statistical love affair. Within industrial countries we have learned that more influence on academic achievement originates from outside the school than from within the school (Coleman and others, 1966). And though the statistical challenges to this finding have indeed been sophisticated (Bowles and Levin, 1968), within industrialized countries this first conclusion has never yet been seriously challenged.

This finding has generated both positive and negative effects. Its virtue has been to mute the extravagant expectations held by statesmen and (sometimes) planners as to what the school can accomplish. Even if educators have been uncomfortable when some of their innovations have appeared impotent in comparison to out-of-school influences, they have ultimately benefited from the empirical evidence that schools were not responsible for broad social problems—problems such as urban migration, unemployment, 'prejudice' against manual labour, and others. Educators are now armed with solid evidence as to how unjustified and perhaps irresponsible it would be to expect schools to solve these problems. In sum, the introduction of regression-modelling techniques to education has made it possible to considerably clarify the discussion of what schools can be expected to accomplish, and this clarity of proof definitely represents an improvement.

The negative element has been how the results of low school impact have been interpreted. In industrial societies, it is true, children from backgrounds of lower socio-economic statuses *on an average* perform worse than children from higher socio-economic statuses, and the differences in the mean performances of the social strata are more powerful predictors of performance than are school variables, as distributed and measured. But these findings have led some to conclude: (i) that children from environments of poverty do not benefit from schools; (ii) that societies do not benefit from schools; and (iii) that schools themselves are ineffectual. These conclusions are false.

Schooling of course has many functions, and serves children of all citizens, not just the children of the poor.[1] But even if the only reason for schooling was to serve the interests of the poor, these three conclusions would still be false.

There is no denying that schools play a role in sorting individuals occupationally and socially. This is true in every society, under every political ideology. To expect schools to do otherwise is unrealistic and irresponsible. Nevertheless, though schools select individuals for leadership roles, nowhere does schooling exclusively benefit the rich. Less-privileged children do benefit from schools and large portions of them (though rarely a majority) perform better and go further in them than do rich children. Regression analysis concentrates on differences in mean averages and interpretations tend to ignore the 'overlaps'—the children of the poor who excel and extract more benefits from schools than children of the rich. But the fact is that this is a universal occurrence.

There is no evidence to suggest that the amount of harm done by unfair teachers or hard intellectual competition is more than the harm done by unfair work supervisors or competition in sports, drama, and employment. Yet schools are frequently singled out as though, as institutions, they can be more easily transformed. This idealized view of what schools ought to be has placed a burden on them and the teachers who work in them—an unjustified burden. This is naive. As organizations, schools are no less complex than other industries which engage hundreds of thousands of individuals. Since all schools, legitimately, are expected to teach cognitive skills, the question of whether all children do equally well is a separate question from whether schools perform this service well. Even if children of category X, on an average, do not do as well as children in category Y, there is no reason to conclude that children in category X did not benefit or would have been better off without education. If differences in group performance never disappear there is no reason to conclude that the society does not benefit from its educational investment.

In discussing which school resources are effective in producing achievement, we need to review some technical assumptions. Regression analyses have indeed expanded our analytic capabilities. But aside from their statistical idosyncracies, the assumptions behind the measures mean that we gain accuracy in one way but *give up* accuracy in quite another way (for example see: Barr and Dreeben, 1977).

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[1] Among the functions which all schools are expected to perform are the following: (a) to prepare individuals for quickly learning new and more complex information either in the market-place or in further schooling; (b) to select and train leaders; (c) to expose individuals to universal knowledge (geography, etc.) which will expand their 'horizons'; and (d) to transmit the culture and values of those who sponsor the school (e.g., the state, the church, the party, etc.). School functions are always contradictory, and can be summarized as follows: to educate children 'up', but not 'away'.

All surveys collect data by means of an instrument—a questionnaire, an interview schedule, etc. The larger the survey, the broader will be the instrument's applicability requirements; questionnaires to primary-school children need to be phrased differently from questionnaires to college graduates. Because of these requirements, certain influences can be measured and others have to be overlooked. A survey can ask teachers about their qualifications, length of experience and salaries because this kind of information is broadly applicable to all teachers; a survey cannot measure a teacher's anger at John, the class bully. What get overlooked are the characteristics of the individual and the individual classroom; what get measured are the characteristics of the group.

Survey analyses take the distribution of a characteristic as given. This is important because school characteristics frequently are *already* distributed evenly. When they are, when there is little or no variance, little effect is often interpreted as no effect; and this is wrong. It is particularly relevant to between-school analyses of teachers and equipment when countries have differing policies of distribution (Heyneman, 1976a; 1976d; 1977b; Schiefelbein and Farrell, 1975).

With large groups of schools and students, survey analyses provide the most accurate estimates of school effectiveness yet available. But we must learn to temper our interpretations to match both the assumptions and limitations of surveys. Over the last decade we have learned that school characteristics have *varying* degrees of effectiveness, not none (Stallings, 1974; USOE, 1976; McPartland and Epstein, 1975). We have learned that generalizations which pertain to the U.S. and Western Europe do not necessarily pertain elsewhere (Heyneman, 1976a). About schooling in the U.S. Jencks *et al.* (1972) have said that 'there is no evidence that school reform can substantially reduce the extent of cognitive inequality... [nor] be expected to bring about significant social changes outside of the schools'. But on the other hand, after his four-year study of Japanese schools, Cummings concludes exactly the opposite. He says: 'The Japanese experience totally contradicts these [Jencks'] conclusions' (Cummings, 1977a; 1977b; 1977c).

So far the amount of survey evidence from non-industrial societies is meagre. In a search of the published literature, Husén *et al.* (1978) find only 24 studies relating teacher training to academic achievement over the last 15 years in less-industrialized societies; in the United States alone, 388 were published in the year 1976. Farrell, Mintz and Heyneman (1978) find 18 studies relating textbooks to achievement in the less-industrialized societies; 339 were published in the U.S. in 1976. Given the attention that it deserves (Castro, 1976) these studies in LDC's can be expected to double or treble in the next half decade. Current findings are bound to change. What follows then is a brief attempt to summarize what we know as of now about school characteristics which can be used to equalize regional equality of educational opportunity.

Regional access to schools

Regions with low portions of their school-age populations in school are frequently those which are: (i) poor, geographically isolated, and (ii) at a disadvantage in the distribution of books, teachers and equipment. But it would be a mistake to assume that schools in these districts were inevitably at an academic disadvantage. Contrary to expectations, rural schools and rural children in El Salvador, Nigeria and Uganda out-perform those from urban areas (ODEPOR, 1977; Axtell and Bowers, 1972; Heyneman, 1977a).[1] The question is why.

In districts where the opportunity for schooling is scarce, the kind of children who do enter and who remain in school can be expected to be unique in one way or another by comparison to the rest of their general age-cohort. Where schooling is not free, impoverished families are forced to carefully select which child should have the first opportunity (Mbilinyi, 1972). For them a drop-out or an examination failure would result in a loss of investment more serious than in communities where schooling is the norm. In more isolated and impoverished districts, the few children in school may be there because their families feel that they are the wisest investment.[2] In Uganda this original selectivity had a pronounced effect on mean academic achievement, so much in fact that the regions with the highest performances on the national selection examination were precisely those areas which had the lowest proportion of their school-age children sitting for the exam. The correlation between the percentage of children in school in each county and academic achievement was $r = —.251$ ($p < .05$); between each district's selectivity and achievement $r = —.516$ ($p < .001$) (Heyneman, 1977a). Thus, in Uganda at least, this selectivity seemed to create a strong tendency for schools and pupils in the most isolated communities, away from paved roads, in areas of low population density and low *per capita* community tax revenues, to outperform others more fortunately situated and endowed with more school resources.

This suggests that when a higher proportion of an age-cohort can attend school, one might expect the average academic level to diminish by some amount. However in no way does this imply that schools have diminished the quality of education which they transmit, because the less select the in-school population, the more difficult the task of transferring knowledge. What this means for providing equal educational opportunity is that planners should not assume because a school is isolated and impoverished that it automatically leads to low school performance on selection examinations; quite the contrary, by having to educate a smaller percentage of the community's children, isolated schools may in fact have been given a higher quality of pupil-material with which to work.

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1. The findings of Axtell and Bowers, however, are contradicted by those of Soriyan and Awuwoloye (1973).
2. The Ugandan children who, on an average, scored the highest on the Raven's Progressive Matrices test of perceptual and spatial abilities were those from the most isolated and impoverished groups in the nation (Heyneman, 1977a).

What this means in terms of regional equality is that when trying to raise a district's level of school attendance, planners have also to raise that district's level of school quality. If school attendance is raised and school quality is low then that district's school achievement can be expected to deteriorate relative to national levels.

The distance from a child's home to his school

Even for those children who are already in school, the distance they must travel is a consideration in their achievement. Length of travel affects study time, energy for chores at home and, especially in wet seasons, health. The question is whether distance, in itself, affects learning; and on this there is some preliminary evidence to indicate that it does not. Figure 2 compares the mean academic achievement performance of pupils in two countries with how far they have to



1. El Salvadorian scores have been trebled to correspond with those of Uganda. Samples' means are 50 (e.g., 150) and 151.4 for El Salvador and Uganda respectively.
2. Differences among means are not statistically significant.

Source: ODEFOR, *The relations of social, economics and cultural factors and national achievement exam result* (washington, D.C.: USAID), February 1977, p. 38; Stephen P. Heyneman. "Influence on academic achievement in Uganda: a 'Coleman report' from a non-industrial society", Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, June 1975.

FIGURE 2. *Distance to school and academic achievement in El Salvador and Uganda.*

travel to school. The Salvadorian results are the opposite from what we might expect—with students who have to travel more than five kilometres performing better (though not significantly better) than those who travel less than one kilometre. Performances of Ugandan children are equally idiosyncratic. The highest achievement means are displayed for those children who had only a quarter of a mile to walk to school;[1] but the lowest performance means emerge from those children who only have to travel half a mile. None of the differences in means in either country is statistically significant.

Thus, although the distance a child travels to school may affect drop-outs, it is not clear whether a longer distance depresses learning. There is no universally accepted optimum distance. Therefore if a district *already* has universal schooling, shortening the distance which children have to travel will not necessarily improve the amount that they learn.

Curriculum

There is no topic more important for equal educational opportunity. Even if students in the best-equipped, most 'innovative' schools are asked to learn something silly, their time and society's investment will be wasted. The question is, what knowledge is most useful and most important for them to know and how can this be equalized between districts?

In terms of equity, the answer is simple and straightforward: the curriculum must not teach knowledge which will place the individual or a district at a disadvantage for having learned it. Curricular equity is exactly the opposite of what some have suggested, that '...children for whom primary education is 'terminal' should be taught different things from children who will continue their schooling' (Najiman, 1972: 58). Coleman puts it this way:

> 'The problem with diversifying curriculum is that it takes as given what should be problematic... It is one thing to take as given that approximately 70 per cent of a ... class will not attend [the next level]; but to assign *a particular child* to a curriculum designed for that [lower] 70 per cent, closes off for that child the opportunity...' (Coleman, 1968: 13).

Thus from the question of what constitutes an equitable curriculum there emerges a clear and unambiguous answer. But the question of whether an equitable curriculum is *also* economic (e.i., a productive curriculum) is a subject of some debate. Is it economic to have children study a curriculum which will be used by the small fraction of them who are given a chance to pursue schooling at the next level? The answer is no only if one can prove that the curriculum is impractical for those who do not continue.

The single most common error among educational planners is to assume that a curriculum in science, math, history and language which prepares those to continue in school is impractical for those who don't continue. Their reasoning assumes that a curriculum which prepares them for more education is too

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[1] Boarding students are not included.

'theoretical'; that a theoretical curriculum is impractical; and that a curriculum which teaches skills specific to vocations is more practical than a curriculum which doesn't. This assumes that for those who do not continue, carpentry is more practical than mathematics. This is questionable; and when it is wrong, it is a very expensive mistake.[1]

The belief that vocational curricula are more 'fitted' to society is a seductive notion; it is too bad that it is not true (Foster, 1966; Anderson and Foster, 1975: 22). But this is not to deny that vocational skill training should be a central component in educational systems. From some institutions, third-level technical schools and the like, the economic returns are so high that it would be only prudent to argue for more, not less. But as an assumption, the belief that vocational curriculum is therefore practical, is simply tacit. The value of 'literary' schooling has played a prominent role in the economic development of the (now) industrial societies (Anderson and Bowman, 1976: 11; Boody and Watt, 1968). It is also clear that parents (who, too, are investors) are a good barometer of how forcefully children are sent to and kept in school—and parental interests have a long history of conflicting with the manual-skill curricular emphasis believed by planners to be for their children's 'benefit'. This conflict, and all its attendant consequences, can be traced through different colonial administrations in Africa (Portuguese, French, Belgian and British—Heyneman, 1971) and continues to emerge today in arguments over 'career education' in the United States (Heyneman, 1978b) and school farming in Tanzania. In the latter case, according to Court, parents believe primary-school farms are a 'waste of time' (Court, 1975: 24). This *naïveté* in curriculum, long evident in educational planning, has led Colclough and Hallak to comment that

> 'It is precisely because the aims of planners and administrators ... have been different from the aims of the parents and children who use the schools (and different also from the purposes that the school successfully serves) that such attempts [to make curriculum 'relevant'] in the past have generally failed.' (1975: 15).

What then should the planner do? By what means can a curriculum be identified which would serve the aims of equity but at the same time instil the knowledge most effective for productivity on the part of all those who attend school? For example, if a planner wishes to justify the teaching of agriculture in

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1. The origin of this error can be traced to educational reformers in the 19th century who were struggling with the remnants of medieval curricular requirements in the grammar schools and gymnasia of the United Kingdom and Western Europe—requirements of Latin and Greek established before the scientific revolution. In the 20th Century these same arguments were transferred to Africa and Asia via colonial and missionary specialists, irrespective of the fact that the requirements for further education were not necessarily Latin and Greek, but by that time science, history, modern languages, and mathematics. This same assumption—that subjects which prepare for movement up are irrelevant for those who don't—continues to be made in the post-colonial era and is common to all development organizations, both bilateral and multilateral. What is worse is that a paternalistic tone frequently accompanies comments about the 'practical' skills 'poor children' need to know.

primary school there are four sources from which he should draw his evidence.

The first is whether or not the complexity of the skill can be successfully adapted for use in a primary-school classroom.[1] Many cannot. Regardless of ambitions for 'individualized instruction', all curricula require that the skills be standardized, despite the difference in school location. Children growing up in the middle of a tea plantation know a different agriculture from those who grow up near a desert. The same is true of fishing, metalwork and carpentry. Nevertheless, if 'geared' to a specific school environment, curriculum runs the danger of being redundant to what children already know or will soon learn. This is wasteful. Teaching local agriculture skills in primary school assumes that adults will remain geographically immobile; nevertheless it is common for planners to call for this in rural primary-school curricula. The planner therefore needs to gather evidence that the skills to be taught in a curriculum can indeed be standardized for classroom use, and will not duplicate what the child already knows or can learn more efficiently out of school.

The second source of evidence is the nature of public demand for particular curricula. Parents are the most important source of demand. Children are sent to school for many reasons, but one of them is *always* economic (Koff, 1966; Conroy, 1970; Jayasuriya, 1960). At the very least, rural parents aspire to have their children learn the skills necessary for them to leave their level within the agricultural sector. Schools cannot change parental aspirations. Schools can, however, use parental aspirations to help motivate learning; but to do that the curriculum must parallel those aspirations. At the primary level this implies that educational goals between town and country be absolutely identical and that no group nor region be singled out for goals particular to them and not to others.[2] At the secondary or tertiary levels specialization of goals should occur, and be decided on the basis of maximum economic benefit. Access to specializations, however, should not be regionally specific. Agriculture should not be offered only to those who come from region X, or commerce only to those who come from region Y. Were this to be the case, specialization would constitute exclusion.

The third source of evidence is cost. Two costs are involved: (i) financial and (ii) cognitive. Financial costs are calculated by adding up all equipment and facilities needed, the consumable supplies to run them (wood, electricity, etc.), and the costs of teacher training and teacher salaries necessary to implement a new curriculum. In the end the sum of these various costs for teaching a pre-vocational curriculum, for example, should be compared with the cost of improving the teaching of one of its competitors, such as a mathematics curriculum. In the United States, a pre-vocational curriculum is approximately

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[1] Sometimes we forget that the first requirement of a school curriculum is that it teach that which cannot be learned more efficiently elsewhere. If it doesn't meet this requirement it will be a waste of time.

[2] This has nothing to do with pedagogy. Good teaching in all subjects requires examples and techniques as individually specific as possible. To use the familiar makes good teaching sense and is more efficient.

40 per cent more expensive to implement (Heyneman, 1978b). In a less industrialized country the cost difference would be greater. Before deciding what to teach, the planner has to know which curriculum costs more and by how much. Not only are pre-vocational subjects higher in cost but where secondary-school graduates are in short supply and their skills of numerical and organizational competency are in high demand the value of learning domestic science, metal-shop, wood-shop and fishing is economically ambiguous. When females in secondary school aspire to use science in their future professions, requiring them to study domestic science is a particularly sore issue. In this respect many countries are finding themselves in the same position as Somalia. In the 1960s Somalia depended heavily upon what international experts said was necessary for a secondary-school education and bought the idea that all general secondary-school students had to have pre-vocational subjects. Now the results are in and the costs and benefits are under serious scrutiny. All the above reasons apply. Furthermore, phasing out pre-vocational subjects would allow Somalia to increase the number of general secondary-school students by over 25 per cent. Since Somalia can afford to educate only three per cent of her secondary-school-age children, deciding to teach pre-vocational subjects in all secondary schools became a decision with serious and quite unforeseen economic and social consequences.

Also to be considered is cognitive cost. This is calculated by estimating the cost as a result of taking time away from some subjects. Time spent on domestic science or metal-shop, by definition, is time away from history and language. The question is whether the amount learned in subject X is affected by introducing a new curricular diversification. There is preliminary evidence that it is affected; time spent in metal-shop can negatively affect the amount learned in science and reading.

Economic benefits are a fourth source of evidence to justify a curriculum. It is argued that learning skills specific to an occupation—say auto-mechanics—will lead to greater post-school productivity and greater economic returns. The planner can conclude that this is true if, all things being equal, the economic returns from learning auto-mechanics are higher than those, say, from learning physics. This is likely when the student of auto-mechanics emerges with a licence to practice, such as in public accountancy or teaching, and when there are jobs available for auto-mechanics. When it is not a few, but the full cohort of students who would learn the occupational skill, the economic returns will likely be the other way way around. Having secondary-school students learn a physics curriculum—in which auto-mechanics may be used for pedagogical reasons—is likely to be a better investment than having all secondary-school students learn auto-mechanics. This is not to suggest that knowing how to fix minor problems in an automobile is not important. But if individuals are familiar with science they can more easily learn how an automobile runs, than can individuals taught how to fix a car, later learn the principles of science (Anderson, 1973 : 35). This translates to economic returns. If individual social status and personality factors are equal, those who understand science will be more employable than individuals who understand auto-mechanics. If this is the case, then science is the more 'practical' subject.

In sum, to justify the implementation of a curriculum specific to a vocation, planners should be assured that it doesn't duplicate out-of-school knowledge; that it is consistent with parental aspiration; that it is affordable in both comparative financial costs and cognitive cost; and that the benefits are higher than its rivals'.

Math, science and language, which do not teach skills specific to vocations, are economically competitive to vocational curricula. When equalizing educational opportunities between regions, there are good reasons in all primary schools and in most secondary schools to concentrate assistance in mathematics, science, and language, for four reasons:

(i) Because these particular subjects are valued at the national level, excellence in them is required before a child can enter post-primary institutions. Special intervention in these subjects increases the chance for less-privileged children to continue beyond the next selection examination. Any assistance in these subjects is consistent with local aspirations and is supported by parents and by local educational officials, without reservation.

(ii) Because the quality of teaching in these particular subjects is distributed inequitably, disadvantaged regions can be identified by their lack of highly educated teachers, their paucity of facilities, and by their low test performances. The improvement of disadvantaged regions can be monitored for the same reasons.

(iii) Math and science have international value and political priority. General competence in these subjects creates a population which can adjust quickly to the *coming* era of rapid technological change in the LDC's. Planners, I suspect, are only too aware of what Inkeles (1977) and Bloom (1974) discover after looking at the results of the IEA academic achievement surveys in four of the developing countries: that children in less-industrialized societies learn less than half the amount of science and math that children learn in industrialized societies (Heyneman, 1978c). This difference in knowledge can only exacerbate the technological gap between rich and poor countries, and between rich and poor districts within countries.

Planners are receptive to amelioration efforts in math and science. Nations aspire to be internationally competitive, to develop their *own* technology, have their own citizens available who can keep up with the pace of technological change.[1] More than anything else this depends upon the intellectual adaptability of the nation's labour force, and this, in turn, has implications for priorities in curriculum.

(iv) It may be the case for those rural children who do *not* go to secondary school, who stay in rural areas, and who participate in agriculture, that over the next four or five decades of their life-span their exposure to high-quality math, science and language will help them to learn more quickly and to be more economically productive as farmers than would exposure to a simplified curriculum in farm skills adapted to a primary-school classroom. Even for these children, generalizable subjects make the best investment in the long run. Before planners decide that rural children should have 'rural skills training' they should carefully add up these economic costs and returns. If no effort is made to gather the necessary facts, deciding to teach rural children less science, math and language (particularly an international language) will eventually be a very expensive decision, both for the nation and rural children. The latter would be disadvantaged by two standards: equity and long-term economic efficiency.

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[1] When Nobel prizes in science are granted to individuals native to and working in lesser-industrial societies, the event will be of some importance; more significant, we suspect, than the same level of achievement in dance or sport.

Teachers and teaching

All of us can look back upon our experience and recollect a teacher who had helped us to learn something of value. Individual teachers have pronounced impacts on particular students, especially in the crystallization of attitudes (Pedersen *et al.*, 1978). Jackson has observed the influence of teachers intimately—by observing a single classroom over a period of two years. As a result he has contributed a profoundly valuable method of gaining insight. 'With very young students,' he says,

> classrooms are the settings in which impersonal authority is first encountered. There, in the company of his age peers, the child learns to make his way in a network of do's and don'ts and to operate under a set of implicit and explicit standards that apply equally to all. As he helps students come to grips with these facts of institutional life, the teacher becomes an arbiter from whom important notions of fairness and of social justice are first derived.
>
> Often the teacher is also the first adult outside the family to express genuine concern for the child's well-being and to care demonstrably about his progress or lack of it. Teachers who succeed in communicating that concern are surely contributing something to the education of their students that can never be supplied through any other means. Whether or not such a contribution is ever reflected in a heightened level of achievement we probably will never know, but to imagine that such is the only measure of its worth is to labor under an unnecessarily limited notion of what education can and should be about.
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> With older students teachers have the additional opportunity of personifying the virtue of intellectual honesty and the value of impartially seeking the truth. Perhaps few of them succeed in accomplishing such a noble end, but those who do often become more memorable than the facts they teach. Even those who fail may leave a residue of influence that lingers long after the dismissal bell rings (Jackson, 1971: 25).

But here I am not pursuing the occurrence of an individual relationship between teacher and pupil. I am acting in the role of a planner, and therefore am interested in the prediction of relationships which occur in a pattern. Nor am I primarily concerned with the influence of teachers on personality development and behaviour. These are equally important, but subjects for a different essay. I am concerned solely with the prediction and regional distribution of academic achievement.

Judging from surveys of education in industrial societies over the last several decades, I would be somewhat surprised to find a consistently positive or sizeable relationship between the measured characteristics of teachers (frequently averaged by school) and the academic achievement of their pupils. In one summary, for example, Rossi reported that

> Perhaps the strongest impression these researchers make is that the teacher's contributions to his students' achievement, in the short run, are minimal. Thus we find that indices of teaching experience correlated with student achievement around +.2 at the maximum and are often zero or slightly negative. Similar small correlations are obtained with measures of the quality and the amount of teacher training. In sum, no clear pattern of findings emerges from the research on this topic. We may conclude that the teacher's contributions to his students' achievement do not arise directly out of his background, training, sex, or marital status (Rossi, 1961: 270).

Ten years after Rossi's summary, the prognosis appeared no more encouraging. With respect to the Coleman Report findings on teacher effects, Mosteller and Moynihan commented that 'the results are unimpressive at best, and demoralizing at worst' (1972: 20). And Davies, the Acting Deputy Commissioner in the U.S. Office of Education, seems to agree. In his introduction to a volume of articles by experts entitled *How teachers make a difference* and sponsored by his agency, he remarked that the 'state of research and development activities regarding the influence of teaching in the learning process is primitive' (U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, 1971: iii).

But I would disagree. The state of the art is not primitive. The results, however, for both industrial and less-industrial societies, are certainly equivocal. Let us look at some findings from the less-industrial societies.[1]

Schiefelbein and Farrell (1974) and Husén (1977) report that a teacher's age is positively related to achievement. But others (Fuller and Chantavanich, 1977, and Klees, 1974) find either negative or no statistically significant relationship between the two. Beebout (1972), Klees (1974), Schmelkes (1972) and Izquierdo and Gusman (1971) all report positive relationships between achievement and a teacher's experience. But Carnoy (1971) finds this true only at the primary level; and in Uganda I could not find this to be the case at all (Heyneman, 1976d). The same divergence is reflected with respect to level of teacher training: Fuller and Chantavanich (1977) and Beebout (1972) report positive relationships; Husén (1977) reports some positive (reading), some not positive (math), as does Carnoy (1971) (secondary *vs.* primary); while I (1976d) find achievement to be negatively related to years of teacher schooling ($r = -.112$, though not significant statistically) and not related at all to teacher pedagogical qualification ($r = .09$). Similarly inconsistent results are reported with respect to teacher economic status, teacher salary, and teaching method.

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[1] This review of teacher characteristics and achievement has benefited from a similar and more detailed exercise performed by Husén *et al.* (1978).

The most pronounced relationship between a teacher characteristic and academic achievement in the Uganda study was that of teacher cognitive ability ($r = .307, p < .01$). This particular characteristic was stronger than all other teacher characteristics combined.[1] Ryan (1972) reports similarly strong relationship between achievement and teacher cognitive ability in Iran. But in Thailand, Fuller and Chantavanich (1976) could find no parallel connection.

Teacher expectations of their students seem to hold more consistency. Of the three studies which measured the relationship of this characteristic to achievement, at least all were reported as positive (Durojaiye, 1974; Dept. of Ed. & Culture, Philippines, 1976; Fuller and Chantavanich (1976).

Yet finding that some teacher attitudes have an effect is one thing; raising pupil achievement *indirectly* by trying to make teachers adopt those attitudes is quite another thing. Judging by the lack of success from past efforts, I would suggest that selecting trainees who *already had* the particular attitudes would be a much sounder strategy than trying to implant those attitudes while they were undergoing training or upgrading.

The inconsistency from studies of teacher 'quality' leads back to the question of distribution. There is good reason to suspect that the low 'effect' of teachers in survey research is because the statistic is suppressed by a lack of teacher variance when averaged by school (Heyneman, 1976d; Anderson, IEA: 274; Husén, 1978). There are minimum qualifications to be a teacher and the economy inflicts an unwritten but none the less realistic maximum level of qualification as well. In the United States the requirements (within districts) for entry into the teaching profession are exactly the same for every grade between one and twelve, and even though Ugandan teachers were dramatically different in their English ability, their range of training was not. Moreover because a central authority controlled the distribution of Ugandan teachers, it was possible to evenly distribute better-educated teachers by giving each school no more than one until every school (in the districts surveyed) had received one. If teacher qualifications do make a difference, there doesn't seem to be any clear way of finding out—short of loading up a poor-performing school with the highest-quality teachers available, making no other improvements, and monitoring the results.

Books and other school equipment

It would not be unreasonable to assume an abundance of reliable information on so basic an educational implement as textbooks. But the fact is that the data are exceedingly poor. This appears to be so for two reasons. The ability to

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1. Performance in the English language was measured by asking that Ugandan teachers respond to seven multiple-choice questions. It is worth noting that their responses on these seven questions had such a vivid connection to achievement, even when teacher experience, teacher school attainment and pedagogical training did not. We would not interpret this finding to suggest that planners go out and recruit better English (or French or Spanish) speakers. We interpret this English-language performance statistic as being an indication of verbal ability, applicable to all languages, and hypothetically correlated with many types of 'intelligence' tests.

empirically assess the influence of representative samples of schools has been perfected in industrialized societies where relatively low-cost, widely distributed items such as blackboards, playground equipment and textbooks were not considered to be as important as science laboratories, classroom TV, and access to a school psychologist. The latter were measured carefully; the former were not. Furthermore, it was fashionable in the 1960s to philosophically downplay styles of pedagogy which lent themselves to predetermined form and structure. Books definitely do that. In fact the term 'textbook teaching' was commonly interpreted as pejorative. Investigators therefore tended to ignore textbooks, not only because books were believed to be less influential statistically, but also because increasing their availability was not considered an acceptable strategy of pedagogy. This attitude is changing (Farrell, Stuardo and Heyneman, 1978).

In the meantime, from the small amount of information which is available, by comparison with the evidence on teacher training, there is some reason to be optimistic about textbooks. As mentioned above, in the recent review on teacher training Torsten Husén *et al.* (1978) display somewhat equivocal results: out of 24 studies in lesser-industrialized societies, 13 (54 per cent) report positive relationships of varying magnitudes; but 9 (37 per cent) report null relationships; and two report negative relationships. Books are more consistent and their relationship with achievement more clear. There have been 18 studies from 12 countries (Table 3). Though the type of statistic may vary between a measure of association and a measure of variance explained, 15 out of the 18 studies (83 per cent) report positive relationships (Heyneman, 1976a; Schiefelbein and Farrell, 1977; Fuller and Chantavanich, 1977; Coomber and Keeves, 1973; Smart 1978; Wolff, 1970; Purves, 1973; Haron, 1977: and ODEPOR, 1977a). One study reports a null relationship (Lynch, 1974), and two report negative relationships. The two negative cases, however, may be spurious (Farrell, Stuardo and Heyneman, 1978).

Schiefelbein and Farrell have also discovered that the relationship between school books and (i) mathematics, language and (ii) survival to the end of secondary school is stronger for students who come from less-privileged socio-economic environments (Schiefelbein and Farrell, 1977).[1] Similar discoveries are reported by Haron (1977) for less-privileged Chinese and Indian children; and by Wolff I1970) and by Fuller and Chantavanish (1977) for the children of peasants in Brazil and Thailand. Furthermore, three studies report similarly positive relationships between academic achievement and the availability of a library, the use of reading material in a child's home, or the number of hours a child is able to read for pleasure (Beebout, 1972; Thorndike, 1973; Simmons and Askoy, 1972).

More detailed information is needed before one would be safe in concluding that more textbooks would raise school performance by a certain amount, or in

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[1] Coleman *et al.* found this to be the case in the U.S. with respect to less-privileged pupils and the impact of science laboratories (1966: 22).

TABLE 3. Availability of reading material and its relationship to student achievement

Country	School level	Criterion variable	Relationships		
			+	0	—
Brazil	Random selection of 5% of the first-grade students in Rio Grande do Sul (N = 20 thousand).	Language competence in Portuguese as assessed by grade one teacher.	+[1]		
Chile	Primary 6-8	Mathematics and language	+[1]		
		Educational aspirations	+		
		Type of secondary school entered	+		
		Survival to end of secondary	+[1]		
Chile	Primary (11 years old)	Science	+		
Chile	Primary (14 years old)	Literature	+		
Ecuador	88 randomly selected first-grade classrooms.	Pre- and post-tests over a one-year period in maths, reading and science.		0	
El Salvador	Grades 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9.	Spanish, mathematics, social and natural science.	+		
Ghana	40 rural schools at grades 8 and 9.	Pre- and post-tests over a two-year period in reading comprehension.	+		
India	Primary (11 years old)	Science	+		
Iran	Primary (11 years old)	Science			—
Iran	Primary (14 years old)	Literature			—
Malaysia	National probability sample of 6,000 12-13 year old youths.	Bahasa Malaysia, English, maths, science, history and geography.	+[1]		
Malaysia	7,674 students grades 10-11; random sample of 89 schools.	Amount learned between secondary entrance and secondary leaving examinations.	+		
Thailand	Primary G 3	Language and arithmetic	+[1]		

1. Stronger in students with low SES.
SOURCES See accompanying text (p. 153).

every environment. And because most of the evidence is cross-sectional and not experimental, one cannot be certain that investments in textbooks would be more productive than investments in their alternatives, such as instructional radio.[1] But of all the educational items on which we do have survey data, the amount and quality of books to which a child has access, particularly those children in more compromising social milieus, appears to be a particularly good choice for experimentation.

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[1] This lack of experimental evidence may soon be remedied when new data from World Bank-sponsored textbook experiments arrive from projects in the Philippines and Nicaragua.

A lack of comparability in measured items prevents us from thoroughly exploring which facility works where, much less why. The school facility which emerged as having the strongest relationship with Ugandan school achievement (a duplicating machine; r = .33) has, to the best of my knowledge, never been measured elsewhere (Heyneman, 1977b).[1]

The amount of money spent per pupil for teachers and school facilities might be expected to be positively related to academic performance. But three studies report that it is not (Beebout, 1972; Levy, 1971; Thias and Carnoy, 1969). Class size (pupil-teacher ratio) is also unrevealing. Carnoy (1973), and Beebout report that the smaller the class the higher the performance—as we might expect. But in another study, Thias and Carnoy (1969) report no effect, as do Levy (1971), Shiefelbein and Farrell (1973), Comber and Keeves (1973), and Thorndike (1973). In his review Haddad (1978) concludes that lower class sizes should not be assumed to increase school quality. I personally would agree and would advise planners concerned with equity to give priority to other characteristics.

Centralized school control: normative and practical questions

Few planners stop to ask themselves to what extent central authorities ought to make decisions for local consumers. In East Africa central governments quickly acquired control over teachers, school inspections, curriculum, examinations, selection, the contracting, purchasing and distribution of school furnishings, the purchase of classroom supplies, and the handling of school monies. The same level of central decision-making of course is not universal. National monopolies over these matters is certainly not the rule in India or Brazil. Nevertheless it is probably not unfair to say that the latitude of choice available to the individual headmaster or classroom teacher has universally diminished by some amount over the last two decades. From this monopoly over decisions come costs of two kinds. One is normative, the other is practical.

The normative cost is never measured by economists, but is real none the less. A teacher throws up his hands at having to teach something designed by 'experts' he has never seen—it doesn't make sense and he feels that children learn the material just as well taught in the old, more proven way. Or a parent complains. As a member of the planning committee his permission used to be required before the school could make a purchase. Now the school is told by someone in the capital that it has to buy a new pump. In his opinion the school should have a duplicating machine first, but no one asked him his opinion. A headmaster feels hurt—he no longer has the authority to do the school's banking. He feels that the government doesn't trust him and that he has lost prestige with the parents and fellow-villagers. He can feel his importance diminishing.

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[1] When a facility does emerge as important, we cannot, without further investigation, be certain whether it does so because of its pedagogical contribution, or because of the process of how and why it got there. This was the dilemma uncovered by the zero-order statistic on duplicators. The relationship was strengthened by approximately 30 per cent when schools which had not acquired the machine through their own resources were excluded from the computation. In other words, schools which had duplicators, but who had had those duplicators given to them, were depressing the statistic, thus leading us to conclude that there was more behind the impact of a duplicating machine than its pedagogical value alone (Heyneman, 1977b).

To this issue there is no simple response. The tendency toward monopolistic control is universal, and the motivations for it are understandable. Any discussion of regional equality would be incomplete were it to ignore what everyone knows who understands schools and schoolteachers as individuals—to augment central authority and to make decisions on an inter-regional basis means that authority will be extracted from somewhere else, and those from whom it was withdrawn are deeply affected.

Ten years ago Anderson and Bowman (1968) argued that the effort to augment differences in equity would, to one extent or another, be offset by a diminution of efficiency. Central planning and central distribution of resources, to be sure, can spread schools and facilities more evenly and thereby limit the advantages of those who are born in the more advanced regions. But, the authors theorize, this same process could also obstruct the efficient utilization of resources, since the pattern of distribution always reflects local interest in education and people's efforts to acquire it.

There are other trade-offs too. For example, teachers: if teacher quality is distributed through a monopoly, it leaves less room for individual schools or local authorities to hire better quality teachers if they really want them. It means in essence that parents and communities who wish to make a special effort and attract a better than average teacher to their schools, cannot.

From the teacher's point of view, a central decision-making monopoly limits the likelihood of having one's salary increased to match superior performance. Officials far away from the classroom of teacher X find it impossible to distinguish better teaching, so salaries and promotions become based on past 'qualifications' and seniority. The more standard the salary and the more frequently promotions are based on seniority, the less the individual teacher will be guided by personal incentives to teach well.

School furnishings, supplies and equipment: here centralization of authority has an effect similar to that of using a survey instrument—as opposed to observing one classroom. Gains are made in estimating tendencies among a large population; but losses are incurred in specification to the individual. In some ways each school consists of an environment unlike any other school. Each has its own interests, and its own needs. If central decisions are made on what equipment each school should have, on how each school should be furnished, and on where each should receive supplies, the effect will be to over-supply some schools with what they don't need, and to under-supply other schools with what they do need. It may open a new source of supply and choice to schools in isolated and impoverished milieus, but it will close off the variety of sources and choices to schools in areas with access to commerce and industry. Nor, to my knowledge, is there any perfect plan or formula which will eliminate the possibility of this occurring.

Losses in equity too? Despite these trade-offs with efficiency, central decision-making makes it possible to achieve more equity; but it does not guarantee it. In fact as a result of centralizing decisions it is possible to have both less efficiency and less equity.

To increase equity, the central authority has to perform better than local or individual authority in two different ways. First it has to decide more intelligently. This is possible since central authorities have wider experience and more scientific information on what works and why. But second, they have to *actually deliver* the resources more equitably than the resources had been delivered in the past. If resources are delivered in a less equitable fashion, then the centralization of authority can be said to have worked against both efficiency and equal educational opportunity.

This can occur because homogenizing per-student expenditures between districts does not have consistently equalizing effects. For example, privileged students in districts levelled up will receive more benefits, and under-privileged students in districts levelled down may receive less. This 'Serrano Paradox', according to Anderson, must be watched for in LDCs (Anderson, 1975: 8).[1]

Less equitable delivery of resources can also occur as a result of mismanagement. This appears to have happened between 1967 and 1972 in three areas of Ugandan primary-school centralization: school furniture, school accounts, and school textbooks. Central distribution of school furniture diminished equity because every school was forced to order its desks and chairs from a single source in the district capital. Schools far away from the district capital were placed at a disadvantage because they suddenly had to pay transportation costs; before they had hired local carpenters to attend to their furniture needs. Nor were the products from the central supplier any improvement in quality or lower in manufacturing cost. The decision to centrally manage school accounts diminished equity because concentrating the authority to authorize expenditures in the hands of the District Education Officer allowed personal privilege to exercise more control than did the old system of having each school's management committee managing its own budget (Heyneman, 1975a).[2]

The decline in equity as a result of centrally distributing textbooks can be illustrated by the figures in Table 4. Two groups of correlations are displayed: (1) The number of textbooks for each grade-seven student accumulated by schools prior to 1972 and (2) percentage of each school's (approved and prepaid) textbook order which actually arrived at the school from the central distribution agency. Both of these figures are correlated with two measures of school

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[1] The 'Serrano paradox' refers to a 1971 decision of the California supreme court which held the state system of financing schools to be unconstitutional on the grounds that educational quality was a function of the local district's taxable wealth, despite the fact that an equalization of school quality would negatively affect children of the poor in high-tax districts and benefit children of the rich in low-tax districts.

[2] In one of the nation's largest and most advanced districts (Toro), 50 per cent of the schools had never been able to obtain a statement of their financial account from the District Education Office since the time the government had taken over monopoly responsibilities for financial management—five years earlier.

TABLE 4. Correlations in Uganda between access to school textbooks and socio-economic status (N =36)[1]

	Number of textbooks per Grade 7 child accumulated before 1972	Percentage of textbooks ordered from central authority which actually arrived[2]
Father's educational attainment	.125	.535 ($p < .001$)
Home possessions scale[3]	.285	.638 ($p < .001$)

1. Extracted from Heyneman. 'Changes in efficiency and equity accruing from government involvement in Ugandan primary school education.' *African studies review* (April, 1975).
2. Range = 0 to 229%.
3. Bed, newspaper, bicycle, radio, clock, car, television.

socio-economic status: the average paternal educational attainment and the average number of consumer possessions to be found in pupils' homes. It is not surprising to discover that the number of textbooks/child tends to be higher in the schools with pupils from more privileged social backgrounds—this inequity, after all, was the original justification for having a central authority distribute school textbooks equally. What is surprising is to discover that the relationships between pupil background and access to school textbooks were *strengthened* rather than diminished as a result of centralization of school textbook distribution. The relationship between access to textbooks and paternal education increased from $r = .125$ to $r = .535$; between access to textbooks and home possessions from $r = .285$ to $r = .638$ (Heyneman, 1975: 55-60).

The lesson to be drawn is not that decision-making by local consumers is always a more efficient allocation device, or that the *status quo* is not worth mending. The lesson to be drawn is that the criterion of success is not a planner's intentions. The only way to accept the assertion that equity has in fact, been improved would be to visit schools and actually measure whether what was supposed to arrive, did; whether those who were supposed to do a better job, actually do; and whether pupils whose educations were supposed to have benefited, actually had.

III. Regional inequality: what to do?

There is more certainty to equalization strategies than would appear from pursuing the literature on production functions. Some strategies are more certain to achieve the goals established for them than are others. We know, for example, that by equalizing proportions of the age-cohort actually in school, by equalizing the disadvantages of regional famines or bilharzia among school children, by distributing equipment, facilities, and teachers equally, and by designing an equally valuable curriculum, we can expect to reasonably satisfy our goal of equal access to educational opportunity.

Furthermore, we can meet this equal-access criterion by constantly evaluating our choice of techniques and by choosing to do what appears most effective, i.e., more treatment of schoolchildren's parasites or more textbooks; better teacher attitudes or more radio, etc.

The first priority should be to spread equal access to first-level schooling. Nevertheless, simply having equal access to a school place may not be adequate to ensure an equality of opportunity. Planners should use the four sources of evidence discussed in Part II to make sure that a curriculum is provided on which no child or district is at a comparative disadvantage for having learned it. A curriculum which provides equal educational opportunity is just as important as an equality of access to school places.

Beyond this there is the question of equally distributing educational equipment, facilities and teachers. Today over half of the LDCs have more than 70 per cent of their children between age six and 13 in primary school. This includes 14 out of the 37 African countries, nine out of 10 countries in South America, 14 of the 22 in the Middle East and Asia, and six of the 10 in Central America. Basic education is far from universal. Nevertheless, the task of putting new children in primary school will not be the highest priority in those countries where the primary school experience is approaching universality.

For both economic and social reasons, the next priority is to improve the level of school quality, and to equalize it between regions. Even though significant advances have been made in establishing new classrooms, gross differences remain in what children can expect to find in them when they enter.

To do this, I would suggest that planners adopt the goal of equality of opportunity. An equality of opportunity strategy is obtainable and realistic even in impoverished countries. It would not sacrifice efficiency; and compared to an equality of results strategy, it would be low in cost. I would suggest the following:

First, a school survey should be designed which would give the planner a reasonably good idea of: (i) what amount of facilities, equipment and teacher quality schools already had at their disposal, and (ii) how much children in each school currently learned. Techniques for doing this are comparatively simple and are not expensive.

Second, assuming equal access and equal curriculum had already been obtained, school districts which had the lowest performance and the lowest level of school resources should be marked for priority assistance. Districts should not be given special assistance unless they had both lower school performance and a lower level of resources. How to identify these districts and how long special assistance should continue to them is portrayed in Figures 3a and 3b.[1]

Assume that region B has a lower level of physical facilities and teacher quality than has region A. Assume also that its examination results are significantly lower. When a planner decides to equalize educational opportunity, he should add new resources to region B (but not region A) until one of two events occurred. One event is illustrated by Figure 3a. In this circumstance the level of resources (on all measures) becomes equal to the level of resources of regions elsewhere (point Z). Under the pre-requisites for an equality of opportunity strategy, even if differences remain in academic performance, if point Z is reached, then special assistance to region B should be terminated.

The second circumstance is illustrated by Figure 3b. Here the achievement of the area receiving assistance (region B) reaches that of region A—even though its facilities remain unequal. In either case, the criterion for the equality of opportunity would have been met at point Z, and special assistance could cease.

The point is that two criteria should be met before a district should be considered for special assistance with school quality: material disadvantage and low performance. This would mean that a country would not be required to bear the fiscal burden of supplying assistance to a region which did not have less resources but whose performance, for some other reason, was low; or supplying unnecessary financial assistance to a region with a low level of materials but a

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[1] The question of *which* resources to equalize is left open deliberately. On this the evidence is too sparse to speak with certainty. There is a vast array of milieus in which equalizing regional disparities is being considered here. Each situation requires its own evidence: experimentation, evaluation and re-experimentation. But what little we do know would suggest that planners give highest priority to those resources which can be easily identified, distributed and maintained. First on our list at the moment would be textbooks; second would be teacher quality measured by teacher cognitive ability; third would be food and other means of assisting a child's alertness and learning.



FIGURE 3. *Planning for the equality of educational opportunity between regions.*

high level of performance.[1] This strategy ensures that the goal of the special assistance would be specific, and easily measured. If employed, its function would be to allow the society a chance to pursue an equality of educational opportunity policy without having to impoverish its chances for pursuing other priorities. In either case the special assistance to region B can cease at point Z, and the society could then turn its attention to needs other than regional disparities in education.

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[1] Special assistance to one region should not be confused with general assistance to all regions. In contemplating an equity strategy the planner consciously decides to aid one area but not another. In a separate context he may believe that school quality is low generally and decide to assist all districts. A general deficiency of school quality is not at issue here; and the circumstances portrayed in Figures 3a and 3b would not apply to it.

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Regional disparities and educational development in Hungary

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Contents

I. Regional disparities: the historical background 177

II. The Hungarian educational system 190

III. The regional aspects of educational development 201

IV. The cumulative effect of regional and social disadvantages 221

V. Some concluding remarks 230

Appendix 233

I. Regional disparities: the historical background

A. A brief review of the situation before the liberation of the country in 1945

Hungary is a relatively small country, covering a total area of 100,000 square kilometres. The population of this area numbered about six million at the end of the 19th century, had risen to nine million by World War II, and now numbers ten million. Hungary's history has been extremely turbulent and the impact of certain historical events is still apparent. During the 16th and 17th centuries the central part of the country was part of the Turkish Empire and the unoccupied territories were also engaged in constant struggles with the Turks. For 150 years economic and cultural development was disturbed and normal regional development was prevented, with villages deserted and towns impoverished. The defeat of the Turks was followed by the real, if not entirely formal, domination of the Hapsburgs, which was reinforced after the failure of the Hungarian war for independence, led by Ferenc Rákóczi, in 1711.

The rebirth of nationalist feelings, together with the impact of the French Revolution, revived a movement for independence and reform at the end of the 18th century, which culminated in the Revolution of 1848. This movement, though, was defeated by the allied reactionary forces of Europe and was followed by almost two decades of oppression by Austria. However, some of the legal measures of the Revolution could not be revoked. Of these measures, the abolition of serfdom was the most important, although—since it was not accompanied by a radical land reform—it did not really mean the end of feudalism.

The post-revolutionary turmoil in the country and the strong Austrian oppression were by and large dealt with by the so-called Compromise of 1867, when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was created. It was only then that peaceful and fairly normal development could begin.

The last decades of the 19th century were marked by a vigorous capitalist take-off. Some industrial sectors and the infrastructure of a modern economy, beginning with railways, developed rapidly. In this climate, some of the social and cultural goals envisaged by reformers at the beginning of the century also made some headway. In fact, the laws introduced between 1870 and 1890 dealing with social affairs, such as public education and the health services, were among the most progressive in Europe. However, the strong feudal tradition presented an obstacle and the far-sighted legislation was only slowly and partially implemented, owing to lack of funds.

No doubt, capitalist development was somewhat uneven because of strong feudal interests. The utilisation of capital was concentrated in some regions and some industries, starting with the food industry. Capitalist development was concentrated in towns, and in huge factories. Plants of a medium size were rare, while many needs in rural areas, and even in towns, were catered for by small-scale industry, manned by artisans.

As usual, urbanisation was by and large a corollary of industrialisation. Buda[1] and Pest, two small towns at the beginning of the 19th century, were unified after the Compromise of 1867 and became the capital. The growth of Budapest was especially rapid, that of the other towns not too spectacular. After World War I, when the Trianon Treaty left Hungary with only one-third of her former territory and 40 per cent of her former population, the imbalance between Budapest, the other towns and the rural areas became particularly strong (cf. Table 1).

In the capital were concentrated not just population, but practically all the 'modern' phenomena. In 1910 28 per cent of industrial production was in Budapest; by 1941 this proportion had increased to 50 per cent. The major part of 'official' cultural and scientific life was also located in Budapest. In fact, after the Trianon Treaty Budapest remained the only important town, the only one which had an impact on the whole country.[2]

The period from 1920 to 1940, between the two wars, was characterised, politically, by the aftermath of the bourgeois and proletarian revolutions of 1918 and 1919. These instilled, despite their defeat, a lasting fear in the ruling classes. From the 1930s on, fascism also progressed rapidly. Economically, the main

TABLE 1. Regional distribution of population.

	Population in thousands[1]			Percentage distribution		
	1869	1900	1941	1869	1900	1941
Budapest	302.1	861.4	1 712.8	6.0	12.6	18.4
Other towns	923.6	1 322.6	1 858.4	18.4	19.3	19.9
Rural areas	3 785.6	4 670.4	5 744.9	75.6	68.1	61.7
Total	5 011.3	6 854.4	9 316.1	100.0	100.0	100.0

1. Population data are estimated for the territory defined by the Trianon Treaty only.

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[1] Buda was one of the towns which had played a central role throughout the history of the country.

[2] Berend T. Iván: *Fordulopónt és ellentmondások as urbanizácoióban*. (Turning-point and contradictions in urbanisation). Valóság. 1971. No. 12.

elements were the post-war difficulties, the world depression of the 1930s, and very slow economic and industrial growth, in which the national income increased by an average of only 1.5 per cent annually throughout the whole period. Massive unemployment and urban poverty were the corollaries of these difficulties.

The capitalist mode of production hardly touched agriculture which remained, until 1945, the main economic sector of the country. It was mainly based on the system of big estates, run by traditional methods and using the labour of journeymen, farmhands and peasants. In 1941 half of the population still earned their living from agriculture; the proportion of the population in agriculture was 57 per cent in 1910 and had only dropped to 50 per cent in 1941. Although there was a considerable decrease in the population of very small villages of under 2,000 inhabitants, the isolated farms remained almost untouched until 1945.

The development of the infrastructure, rapid as it was, followed the interests of the rulers and the demand of those who had financial resources. Therefore, villages in general—and especially the isolated farms—hardly profited from the capitalist boom at the end of the 19th century and during the first decades of the 20th century. The gap between towns and rural areas began to widen. To give an idea of this gap, it may be mentioned that before 1945 only 39 per cent[1] of villages possessed electricity—and the less prosperous layers of the population could not afford to have it even in these villages. It is also worth mentioning that social insurance schemes, which were slowly spreading in industry, transport, etc., were not extended to cover agricultural workers, and peasants could not even avail themselves of means-tested services; although the majority of agricultural workers were really indigenous, they were disqualified because they might have been home-owners. Massive under-nourishment and the lack of medical care and health services resulted in a high infant-mortality rate; even during the 1930s 130 to 160 infants out of every 1000 died before their first birthday. Tuberculosis was also widespread, with around 15,000 deaths a year. Both of these problems affected the rural areas more strongly than the towns.

The urban-rural gap was paralleled by another type of regional differentiation: despite the relatively small size of the country, its different regions were very unevenly developed. It was in the western part, Transdanubia, that early urbanisation went farthest, because of its geographical situation and natural assets. At the same time, this region suffered less from the various historical adversities than the southern or eastern parts of the country.

As the urban and industrial roots had not been destroyed in the west of the country, capitalism at the end of the 19th century continued to favour this region. The northern region was, historically, less advanced, but its wealth of natural resources in coal, iron ore, etc. meant that capitalistic investment was worthwhile there, so that the north—together with Budapest—became the most advanced industrial area. However, while in Budapest industrial and urban development went together, and in the western region urbanisation even preceded industrialisation, the majority of 'towns' in the north remained poor and overcrowded workers' settlements, lacking the real characteristics of cities in services, in infrastructure, in cultural or other opportunities, and even in 'design'.

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[1] *Statistical Yearbook, 1949-55.*

The eastern and southern regions were the most deprived areas. Landed estates were strongest and agricultural work was practically the only means of livelihood. Poverty, illiteracy and general backwardness were more prevalent than elsewhere. These areas had also suffered the most from historical misfortunes, and so their towns rarely had strong and visible historical roots.

On the whole, Hungarian society before 1945 was characterised by a capitalism, the normal development of which was hindered by many factors: there was the feudal tradition; there were strong class divisions in which feudal and capitalist structures were intermingled (and both having some specific consequences); there were extreme inequalities in wealth, income, education and living conditions in general; and there was an underdeveloped, Bismarckian social policy which centred its efforts on imminent problems of poverty and on appeasing the requirements of the workers' movement, but which never envisaged public intervention on more all-encompassing issues. Among other things, even the idea of regional planning or development was non-existent. The fascist tendencies from the 1930s on, and then the heavy losses caused by World War II, aggravated all these problems.

B. The main trends of development since 1945

The bases of a new, socialist system were laid down between 1945 and 1949. The first major steps included, in 1945, a far-reaching land reform, whereby the big estates were distributed among the peasants. It was followed by the nationalisation of banks, mines, factories and other private enterprises and also by the nationalisation and secularisation of schools. These steps radically changed the country's class-profile.

In 1948 central planning was introduced; targets of economic development were defined by the plan, and the processes involved were also governed by central regulations. From about 1949 social leadership followed the path of the 'cult of personality', which resulted not only in well-known political problems, but in unrealistic 'voluntarism' in the definition of social and economic targets. Thus, economic development was artificially speeded up by increasing the amount of investments (at the expense of the level of consumption) and by extending employment. This period—despite the problems of forced industrialisation—altered the whole economic structure of the country. Industry and other non-agricultural sectors grew in importance. Agriculture, although continuing to expand, employed fewer and fewer people (see Table 2).

After the first period of accelerated growth, i.e. after about 1955, industrialisation continued, but the targets became more realistic. As a consequence, the living conditions of the population have continued to improve since the end of the fifties (see Table 3). More precisely, from the second half of

TABLE 2. The distribution of actively employed persons among economic sectors.

	1949	1960	1975
Total actively employed persons (in '000s)	3 910.0	4 709.9	5 085.5
Index (1949 = 100)	100.0	123.0	130.1
Percentage distribution			
Industry	19.2	27.4	35.7
Construction	1.8	5.4	8.2
Agriculture	54.7	40.9	20.4
Transport	4.1	6.0	7.7
Trade	5.3	6.4	9.0
Other branches	14.9	13.9	19.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 3. The increase in real incomes.

	Per capita personal real incomes of the population belonging to households of	
	workers and employees	peasants
Index (1950 = 100)		
1949	97	89
1950	100	100
1952	85	95
1953	89	106
1955	118	116
1960	168	131
1965	198	161
1970	263	220
1975[1]	330	280
Yearly average rate of change		
1950-1953	− 4.0	+1,8
1953-1959	+10.7	+3.6
1959-1965	+ 3.2	+3.4
1965-1971	+ 5.5	+7.2
1971-1975	+ 5.0	+5.2

1. Estimate.
SOURCE Hungarian statistical yearbooks and authors' computations.

the 1950s the one-sided 'economism' and 'voluntarism' of the former period were replaced by a more realistic and more complex approach to social development. It was realised, among other things, that economic growth in itself would not automatically promote the realisation of all the social goals of socialism and that much more deliberate social action was needed to promote some specifically social targets. That is why former economic planning was slowly transformed into socio-economic planning, and why many social goals were explicitly spelt out and incorporated in the plans.

C. Regional development

Regional development is one of the examples which illustrate the switch to greater social awareness. It is true that the abolition of the urban-rural gap had been recognized since 1945, at a theoretical level, as an important socialist goal, but up to the end of the 1950s few real steps had been taken to achieve it. Even in aims which were frequently evoked as basic, such as the electrification of the country, progress was slow. (Out of the 3,200 villages 1,258, that is 39 per cent, had electricity before 1945. Between 1945 and 1955 only 1,092 more, that is 34 per cent, received it, which still left more than 800 settlements without electricity. In addition, electrification did not mean that all households were connected up. In 1955, only about two-thirds of families possessed electricity.) Besides electrification, some other services—mainly education and health—were also improved, but the infrastructure of rural life remained almost untouched.

Up to the end of the 1950s industrial development was concentrated in the regions which already had some industrial traditions *and* the necessary infrastructure (railways, roads, electricity, etc.). This meant that besides Budapest, two other older towns (Pécs and Miskolc) and some newly built socialist towns showed spectacular progress, while the majority of other towns and villages had a decreasing population and stagnation in their local life.

The rapid evolution of sectors outside agriculture in some towns—starting with Budapest—exerted a powerful pull on the rural population, but investments were almost exclusively concentrated on productive assets such as factory buildings and means of production. Therefore, towns could accommodate the newcomers only with great difficulty. In order to avoid the further deterioration of urban standards, the solution which was adopted from the early 1950s was to limit urban immigration in Budapest. Later, some 'overcrowded' towns also introduced this type of limitation, and this meant that a rural exodus could go only 'half-way'. Many former peasants left agriculture, but did not or could not move to towns; they became commuters instead. The census of 1930 showed that there were 141,500 commuters (3.5 per cent of the active population of that date), while the number of commuters had grown to 612,900 in 1960 (12.5 per cent of the increased active population). Another solution was to settle on the outskirts of Budapest—where villages then became as overcrowded as Budapest itself.

At the end of the 1950s the former 'voluntaristic' outlook of the country's leadership changed very significantly. There was a growing awareness of social problems and of the necessity of central action, using adequate means of intervention and taking into account the real possibilities of development. It was realized at that time that the lack of a deliberate regional policy harmed social and economic interests alike. Regional variations, for example, in incomes, or in the availability of different services, created or strengthened a number of social tensions. Agricultural development also posed a threat to the industrially under-developed regions because, among other things, of the potential danger of unemployment following the mechanisation of agriculture. It became clear that local resources could not be used adequately, and were indeed often wasted in the absence of local manufacturing industries.

In the first years of the 1960s—during the second five-year plan (1961-65)—the former haphazard elements of regional development were gradually replaced by regional planning. In about 1960, as a first step, a plan of regional development was worked out within the framework of the long-term, 20-year national plan. At this time emphasis was placed on the development of whole regions which because of the uneven development of the fifties had maintained, or even increased, their historical lag.

This five-year period produced certain results. The regional distribution of the industrial labour force changed somewhat: the share of the most backward regions increased from 17 to 20 per cent and that of Budapest decreased from 44.6 to 40.7 per cent. Nevertheless, the rural exodus and the increase in the number of commuters still continued.

The third five-year plan, from 1966 to 1970, emphasised even more the importance of regional development. At that time, the resources used for the rather *extensive* development of the economy were practically exhausted and further economic growth could be assured only by modernisation and the development of new technologies. In order to promote this evolution, an economic reform was introduced in 1968. It meant essentially that indirect regulation of economic processes gained ground, and the role of strict central regulations and direct intervention lessened. Crucial decisions affecting the general development of the country are still made centrally, and the main targets are still defined by the national plans; but enterprises are now able to become more autonomous in defining their own targets and in choosing their methods.

This policy gave a new impetus to regional development and special funds have been allocated to this aim from budgetary resources. One use of these funds has been to ease the situation in Budapest by encouraging enterprises to leave and establish themselves in rural areas. (This may not be an entirely voluntary decision. Some enterprises are requested to leave the capital mainly because of pollution problems.) Enterprises may also receive grants from funds to set up new branches in backward regions.

Concepts and methods of regional planning have been under constant revision ever since the early 1960s, resulting in the elaboration of the 'Concept of regional development for 1971-1985'. The most important of these measures is the government decree No. 1007/1971 defining the main categories of settlements, taking into account the size of the population, the economic assets, the existing facilities, the regional role and the development potential of the settlements. Five main categories of settlement are distinguished: the national capital; regional centres of high importance; regional centres of less importance; local centres with a neighbourhood role; other settlements without any specific role.

TABLE 4. Relation between urban status and the size of settlements, 1970.

Size of the settlement	Number of settlements			Villages as percentage of total
	Towns	Villages	Total	
Over 50 000	15	—	15	0
20 - 49 000	38	1	39	2
10 - 19 999	28	48	76	63
5 - 9 999	2	152	154	99
Under 5 000	—	2 899	2 899	100
Total	83	3 100	3 183	97

TABLE 5. Relation between regional role, the urban status and size of settlements, 1975.

	No. of settlements			Villages as percentage of total	Average size of settlements ('000s)		
	Towns	Villages	Total		Towns	Villages	Total
Budapest	1	—	1	0	2 071.0	—	2 071.0
Conurbation around Budapest	2	42	44	95	15.0	7.7	9.0
Regional centres of high importance	23	—	23	0	84.6	—	84.6
Regional centres of middle importance	57	49	106	46	22.4	9.5	16.4
Local centres	—	972	972	100	—	2.8	2.8
Other settlements	—	2 037	2 037	100	—	0.8	0.8
Total	83	3 100	3 183	97	64.2	1.7	3.3

Apart from these, there are settlements which belong to a small separate group in the suburbs of Budapest, called the Budapest conurbation (see Tables 4 and 5).

The policy of regional development defines two main targets. *One is to promote a regionally more even, but economically effective, overall development by a better utilisation of local economic (natural) resources. The other is to narrow the gap between the living conditions of the population of various settlements*, by creating adequate local conditions, or at least by making various facilities and services readily available. The hierarchically organised categories of settlements, as defined by the government decree, serve as a framework for these two targets, especially for the second one.

The future development plans use the current situation as a starting-point. Despite a slow movement towards concentration of the extremely scattered rural population, it was still true in 1970 that about one quarter of the villages had less than 500 inhabitants and another quarter of the villages between 500 and 1000 inhabitants. The majority of these small villages and hamlets have been traditionally badly equipped. Given the limited economic resources of the country, it was, and is, unrealistic to provide all the settlements with all the necessary services, facilities and equipment; therefore, a *minimum programme was defined* for the local development of the small communes. This programme includes the creation of adequate housing conditions, of electricity and water, of adequate reception of radio and TV programmes, of a telephone service, and the provision of public transport at least twice a day to the nearest larger settlement. It also includes the availability of local primary education and local general medical services. Various 'norms' are defined for each category of settlement. The norms include, besides the facilities serving the local population, the services and equipments which have to be put at the disposal, not only of inhabitants but also of those communes which belong to the 'catchment area' of the local or regional centre. These norms endeavour to assure the provision of various services if not exactly on the spot, then at least within easy reach.

The new categorisation of settlements did not, however, abolish the former basic administrative categorisation, namely the breakdown into towns and villages.[1] Towns belong only to the three higher categories, but not all settlements in those categories are necessarily 'towns' in the administrative sense. Growing settlements, usually over 10,000 inhabitants, still continue to strive for the urban status—the official recognition of their being a 'town'—because this represents some additional advantages in rights or in financial arrangements. The formal administrative distinction between 'towns' and 'villages' goes back to the Middle Ages, when some settlements obtained the title of 'Royal Free City' which exempted them from some forms of feudal obligations. Later on, the prerogatives of 'towns' obviously changed, but even today they still retain some advantages. To give just one example, each settlement has its own local council, or is at least attached to one, and these local councils have several ways of raising funds. However, compared with other settlements, the council of a town has more formal rights and more means at its disposal to increase its funds and has more autonomy in deciding the redistribution and reinvestment of its incomes.

The targets of regional development plans are defined for settlements classified on the basis of their central or local roles. Data about the fulfilment of plans concerning the reduction of regional gaps are more informative if presented according to this classification, although they are also available for settlements classified according to size.

[1] For the sake of clarity, it should be explained that settlements may be—and in fact are—classified according to different criteria, e.g. their size, their industrial development level, their social composition, their degree of urbanisation, their administrative status etc. Of these variables, three seem to have relevance for our present purpose, namely a simplified categorisation by administrative status (Budapest, other towns, villages); the size of the settlement; and the newly defined regional role of the settlement. Obviously there is a partial overlap even among these variables, in that 'towns' usually have over 10,000 inhabitants and there is in fact only one village with over 20,000 inhabitants (located in the Budapest conurbation). There is also a strong correlation between the size of the settlement, its regional role and its administrative status. Because of these interdependences, all three categorisations yield similar results as far as the trends of development are concerned. Therefore, we usually apply only one, at most two of them.

It has to be added that the process of regional planning is not free from difficulties and contradictions, due partly to the occasional inadequacy of the new techniques, and partly (and more importantly) to the inherent problem of the dual target mentioned before. The growing autonomy of regional centres certainly means a decentralisation of decision-making, allocating more power to local centres, which are in a better position to know their own needs. At the same time, the settlements which have no specific regional role do not have, as yet, adequate means of safeguarding their *own* interests as against the local centres. There is also, at least for the time being, while the economic needs of the country are extremely pressing, a tension between the 'economic' and the 'social' goals of regional development (i.e. the improved use of local resources at *some* places and the levelling-up of the conditions of *all* the settlements). Both targets require considerable funds but economic development yields direct economic results, while improving living conditions of all the settlements is—at least on the face of it—only consuming these funds. Therefore, it will be easier to obtain results in the first than in the second sphere, and this may slow down the improvement of the conditions of small settlements.

D. The decrease in regional gaps

1. Regions

We do not possess reliable regional data relating to the 1940s or the 1950s. Most readily available comparative information covers only the decade between 1965 and 1975. However, the situation in 1965 already showed an improvement compared with the starting-point in the 1950s. Therefore the difference between figures in 1965 and 1975 is less than the total differences over the three last decades and even since the late 1950s. None the less, even this shorter period characterises the main tendencies (see Table 6).

Progress was fairly significant in the field of employment opportunities outside agriculture. This may be characterised by *industrial* employment (we do not possess data relating to other productive sectors or services, but they by and large paralleled industrial development.) In 1965 there was still a nearly fivefold difference in the rates of industrial employment, which went down to a less than twofold disparity in 1975. True, the former pattern of commuting persisted, and even the number of commuters increased further between 1960 and 1975. But—because of the more even spread of job opportunities—commuting distances became somewhat shorter.

More widespread employment opportunities, together with a rapid increase in agricultural incomes, equalised somewhat further the *per capita* income among the regions—although the pre-war discrepancies were already significantly diminished by the 1960s. Partly because of higher and less differentiated incomes, partly because of a more even spread of commercial services, and partly because of the decreasing self-sufficiency of the agricultural population, the amount of purchases in the retail trade also became regionally less diversified, while their level considerably increased. *Per capita* incomes

TABLE 6. Industrial wage-earners by economic regions (per 10,000 inhabitants).

Economic region[1]	1965	1975	1975 as % of 1965 (1965 = 100)	Regional average as compared to the national average (National average = 1)	
				1965	1975
Central region[2]	2 473	2 028	82	1.93	1.25
Northern Hungary	542	1 087	201	0.38	0.67
Northern Transdanubia[3]	1 419	1 793	126	1.00	1.10
Southern Transdanubia[3]	863	1 302	151	0.61	0.80
Southern Hungarian Plain[4]	1 429	1 755	123	1.01	1.08
Northern Hungarian Plain[4]	870	1 347	155	0.61	0.83
Average	1 419	1 626	115	1.00	1.00

1. The economic regions are shown in Map 2 in the Appendix.
2. Comprises Budapest and the Department of Pest (in which Budapest is situated).
3. Transdanubia covers the whole western part of the country.
4. The Hungarian Plain occupies the whole south-eastern part of the country, starting from Budapest.

doubled between 1962 and 1972,[1] increasing from 822 forints to 1645 forints. The highest level was attained in both years in the central region (988 and 1849 forints) but this represented 146 per cent of the minimum level in 1962, and 131 per cent in 1972. The extreme levels of *per capita* purchases in the retail trade changed even more significantly; the central region reached 190 per cent of the minimum in 1965 and 146 per cent in 1975.

The process of 'levelling-up' has been characteristic of all elements of public services and of the infrastructure of 'everyday life'. Electrification covered the whole country and practically all the dwellings were connected up by 1975, with the exception of some of the isolated farms or houses, perhaps 1 or 2 per cent.

The water system was extended to 26 per cent of households in 1965 and to 57 per cent by 1975, with a nine-fold difference in 1965 between the best-provided central region and the worst-off north-east of the Hungarian Plain, and a 2.2-fold difference between the same extremes in 1975. In the case of the sewage system there was less progress, but still the former 13-fold difference went down to 4.8 between the two extreme regions, which were, again, the centre and the north-east of the Plain. Health and educational services were already fairly advanced in 1975, but there was some further improvement. (For more details, see the tables in the Appendix).

2. *Settlements*

The various social and economic processes of the last three decades altered quite significantly the network of settlements. The smallest villages of up to 500 inhabitants show a very rapid decline: their population has decreased by more

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[1] Income data are derived from special income surveys.

TABLE 7. Distribution of population among settlements of various sizes (in percentages).

Number of inhabitants	1941	1960	1975
Under 500	2.1	2.1	1.8
500- 999	7.0	6.0	5.0
1 000- 2 999	23.9	22.0	17.5
3 000- 4 999	11.4	12.0	8.9
5 000- 9 999	10.1	11.1	10.2
10 000-19 999	9.4	9.3	10.2
20 000 and over	17.7	19.3	26.8
Budapest	18.4	18.2	19.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
All towns excluding Budapest	19.9	21.6	30.8
All villages	61.7	60.3	49.6

than one-third in the last ten years. The population of communes of between 500 and 3,000 inhabitants has also decreased fairly heavily and that of communes between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants is diminishing slowly. The population increase is considerable at the other end of the scale, but is especially high in the case of towns of over 30,000 inhabitants. In order to fully understand Table 7 it has to be added that the rapid change in the rates of urban and rural population was due not only to effective losses and gains, but also to changes in the 'status' of some settlements, already referred to. In fact, more than twenty former villages have acceded in the last three decades to the 'rank' of towns, and even now one or two settlements are usually promoted each year.

The overall tendencies are similar to those shown in the case of regions; relative inequalities lessened in practically all spheres, except some in which the development of small villages is deliberately limited. However, the disparities between more and less 'important' settlements continue to be usually much greater than those between regions. There are some phenomena where the urban-rural difference is slowly disappearing, partly due to constant efforts since 1945, partly due to very recent progress. On the other hand, public amenities which are expensive, such as sewage or nurseries, and a number of services continue to show very marked differences between towns and villages (see Table 8 for some examples).

To sum up: before World War II Hungary was marked by deep divisions between urban and rural areas. During the last three decades many of the former disparities have lessened. *From 1945 to about 1960* central levelling efforts were directed only at some regional inequalities (electricity and provision of some basic services). The 1960s brought to the fore the importance of regional policy and marked the beginnings of regional planning. The targets at that time consisted mainly of solving the congestion in Budapest by the regional decentralisation of the productive forces, and emphasis was placed on the rapid development of the industrially most backward regions. *From the seventies on* a

TABLE 8. The multiplier between some indicators relating to Budapest (maximum) and to the settlements with no special role (minimum) in 1965 and 1975.

	1965	1975
Number of earners in industry, per inhabitant	15.4	8.5
Purchases of food in retail trade, per inhabitant	3.6	2.5
Purchases of manufactured goods, per inhabitant	8.0	8.2
Purchases in public catering, per inhabitant	3.0	1.9
Number of newly constructed flats, per inhabitant	1.3	1.8
Rate of flats having water system	32.9	6.4
Rate of flats having telephone	21.6	20.3
Per capita consumption of electricity	5.8	3.3
Per capita consumption of water	18.2	9.5
Rate of wireless subscribers	1.6	1.4
Rate of TV subscribers	4.6	1.5
Number of medical doctors, per inhabitant	13.3	12.5
Number of hospital beds, per inhabitant	11.8	9.7
Number of places in nurseries, per inhabitant	16.3	13.5
Numbers of places in kindergartens, per inhabitant	1.1	1.0
The pupil/teacher ratio in primary schools	0.9	0.9

SOURCE *Településhálózat* (Settlements), Vol. II, Budapest, CSO, 1977.

more thorough and more complex regional planning system took effect. It has the dual aim of using resources in an efficient way and of narrowing the gap between the living conditions of the various settlements. This inevitably means that some basic needs are being supplied locally in a more equitable way than before, but in the case of many others disparity is growing, at least as far as immediate, local provision is concerned. In fact, there are many services and facilities which cannot be spread evenly in all localities. If the number of users is too small, these facilities cannot function efficiently, not to mention costs which may easily be prohibitive.

In all these cases—post-primary education, clinics or hospitals, stores, etc.—*it is the customer then who has to go to the service*. This presupposes that the service in question is located at a place which is easily accessible, that is, that *accessibility itself is assured*. Educational services—which we have not yet discussed—belong in the main to this category.

The educational system before World War II was deeply marked by all kinds of social and regional inequalities. We turn now to the educational structure and to the trends characterising its recent development.

II. The Hungarian educational system

A. Historical background—the situation before 1945

In Hungary, as everywhere in Europe, schooling began in the early Middle Ages when parish and monastic schools taught the rudiments of reading, writing and Latin, mainly to the future lower clergy. Later on, the guilds and towns also created schools contributing to the formation of 'citizens'. Though a University was founded in the 14th century, it could not function continuously because of historical events. Therefore the majority of students studied abroad at various European universities from Prague to Paris or Göttingen. This pattern was maintained even after the creation of some new institutions of higher education in the 17th century.

The first attempt to create a countrywide network of elementary education was made under the rule of Enlightened Absolutism. Maria Theresa passed the first education act, the *Ratio Educationis* in 1777, and some other reform proposals were enacted by the two subsequent Habsburg emperors, Joseph II and Francis I. The *Ratio Educationis* stipulated that all communes had to create 'folkschools' for the children of the less affluent classes of the population. Schools had to have one, two or three classes, according to the size and character of the commune. In more important towns, some industrial training had even to be offered. Unfortunately, the original act, as well as its reformed versions, neglected to assure *funds* for the creation of schools. Therefore the law was implemented only partially and sluggishly. There was also strong local resistance to its implementation, because it forced Germanisation on the pupils through, for example, prescribing German as the language of teaching.

The 'era of reforms' marked by the revival of Hungarian nationalism and the impact of French Enlightenment made a central issue of education. The leaders of the reform movement were convinced that the future of the country depended on the abolition of feudal bonds and the modernisation of the economy, based on the educational improvement of the people. One of the most brilliant thinkers of the period, Jozsef Eötvös, who later, after the Compromise of 1867, became Minister of Education and the creator of the Public Education Act, wrote in 1846: 'It may seem paradoxical, but we are convinced that the major and surest method of promoting our material interests is public education . . . All tyrants of the world realise the close bond between culture and freedom. Maintaining people in stupidity—this has been the most powerful instrument of tyranny since earliest times. Bringing instruction and enlightenment to people—this is the strongest weapon of freedom. The creation of a Constitution is less well assured by the most glorious revolution than by well-ordered methods of public education. An essential part of these methods is formed by the school-system.'[1]

The realisation of these ideas had to await the Compromise of 1867. The Public Education Act (the 38th Law) was passed in 1868, at a relatively early date if compared with other European countries. It decreed compulsory daily attendance in primary schools for children from 6 to 11 years, and the attendance in remedial schools (attached to primary schools) for children between 12 and 15 years. The Act also had provisions for the training of teachers and for their salaries, and in 1875 legislation was extended to the pensions of teachers.

The law made it the task of communes to create and finance the schools (with some central help), but Churches were left every opportunity to create schools, too. Although the issue was strongly debated in Parliament, in reality Churches were much more active than the communes in the establishment of schools. In 1868/69 95 per cent of all schools were denominational, and this proportion was still around 70 per cent in 1944. In smaller settlements with several denominations the multiplicity of bodies maintaining schools created continuous tensions and often harmed education itself. The Roman Catholic Church was the most active in this field and its influence was extended to teacher training and to the curricula in general.[2]

The 1868 law underwent some modifications in the next 80 years, though its main outlines remained unchanged. The most important alterations affected the post-primary level. It was soon realised that the remedial classes were useless and in 1870 they were therefore replaced by various training courses. These courses had to have an agricultural character in villages, and had to orient towards industry and trade elsewhere.

The original, traditional type of secondary school was the grammar school (gimnázium). It followed the fourth form of the primary school, lasted 8 years, and ended with graduation. Only the completion of a grammar-school course qualified students to enter higher education. Later on, from the end of the 19th century, other, more vocationally or technically oriented secondary schools were introduced (teacher-training schools for kindergarten or primary-school teachers, technical secondaries preparing for lower white-collar jobs in trade or industry, etc.). One of these types, offering a half-completed secondary course to children of lower middle-class origin, was the so-called 'bourgeois school' (for

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1. Eötvös, Jozsef, *Kultura és nevelés/Culture and Education*, Magyar Helikon, 1976.
2. In 1934/35, according to a sample survey, 21 per cent of teachers worked in state schools, 19 per cent in schools maintained by the communes, 45 per cent in schools of the Catholic Church, and 16 per cent in reformed schools. (*Magyarország óvó - és oktatószemélyzetének statisztikája*, 1934/45, CSO).

children of 11 to 14 years), leading practically nowhere, but fulfilling some of the cultural aspirations of the middle classes.

The revolutions of 1918 and 1919 tried to democratise the school system by the nationalisation of schools, by rendering education free, by creating a unified primary school of eight classes and by upgrading vocational training, etc., but all these endeavours ended with the defeat of the revolutions.

Although a law was passed to create an 8-year elementary-school course in 1940, it remained almost entirely only on paper. In 1944 90 per cent of primary schools were still of the 6-year type. It should be added that the 8-year elementary school was not intended to affect the whole educational structure; its aim, even if fully implemented, was mainly to assure village children of at least 8 years of education, but it did not give professional qualifications, and it was a dead-end course inasmuch as there was no possibility of transfer to the normal secondary schools.

Thus, up to 1945, there was a multiplicity of educational channels, but the main educational courses were the following:

- — 4 or at most 6 years of the primary 'folkschool', and nothing else. This was the fate of about 70 to 80 per cent of children, but of more than 90 per cent of children in villages.
- — 4 years of the primary school and 4 years of the 'bourgeois' school. This was the route followed by 17 per cent of children in 1937/38.
- — 4 years of primary and 8 years of secondary school. Only about 6 per cent of children attended the grammar school up to graduation, and only about 1 or 2 per cent of the 18-year-olds entered higher education.

Social selection was extremely powerful. It affected the whole working class, and most strongly the peasants. According to the computations of F. Földes,[1] practically all the children of the bourgeoisie went to secondary school, but only 1.3 per cent of the children of peasants and farm-hands. (Table 9 presents the overall data on social composition for 1930/31 and gives also approximately comparable data for 1963.)

The low rate of educational mobility was mainly due to the extreme rigidity of the class structure. But the low standards of teaching, ill-equipped and under-staffed schools in almost all villages and even in the suburbs of towns, also helped to cut off the majority of people from the chance of continued studies, without mentioning the tuition fees which were often prohibitively high in almost all secondary schools.

To give at least a general idea of the quality of schools, some data may be helpful. At the introduction of the Public Education Act, in 1870, about one third (31.5 per cent) of children of compulsory school age (6-11 years) did not attend school. The average teacher-pupil ratio was 70 : 1, but in many villages it reached 150 or 200 : 1. The vast majority of schools were ungraded and the buildings were, on the whole, in a very bad state, often unhealthy and filthy.

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[1] Földes, Ference: *Munkassag és parasztag kulturalis helyzete Magyarorszagon.* (The cultural situation of workers and peasants in Hungary). Cserepfalvi. 1941.

Table 9. Social composition of the population and of students.

	Percentage distribution of		
	total population	secondary school students	students in higher education
1930/31			
Bourgeoisie			
(entrepreneurs, professionals, employees)	26.8	82.7	83.3
Landowners (including small-holders)	16.8	12.2	11.3
Workers	21.4	3.8	3.9
Peasants, farm-hands	35.0	1.3	1.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
1963			
Non-manuals	17.7	39.2	56.2
Workers (except in agriculture)	56.3	44.2	33.0
Workers in agriculture, peasants	26.0	16.6	10.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCES Földes, F., op. cit., for 1930.
Social Stratification in Hungary/CSO for 1963.

Three decades later, in 1907/1908, two-thirds of elementary schools were ungraded, so that one teacher taught simultaneously all the four or six classes. The average pupil-teacher ratio was 60 : 1, but in 24 per cent of schools (mostly village schools) one teacher had 80 pupils or more. At that time, 21 per cent of those in the compulsory school age (6-11 years) did not attend school.

In 1937/38 out of the 7,300 schools only 14 per cent were fully graded, 41 per cent were totally ungraded, and 45 per cent were partially ungraded. The pupil-teacher ratio was 42 : 1. 290,000 of the children between 6 and 13 years, that is 21 per cent, did not attend school. Ungraded schools and overcrowded classes were usually located in villages, and early school-leaving was also more frequent in rural areas than in towns.

On the whole, this pre-war school-system showed to the full all the characteristics of what is usually called a 'dual' school system.[1] It consisted of one major stream leading through the elementary school (with perhaps some vocational training) directly to the world of work. The second stream led through the grammar schools to higher education, and hence to high social positions, or to the 'élite'.

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[1] See in more detail, e.g., Zs. Ferge: 'The Janus faces of education', *Prospects*, Vol. VI, N° 1, 1976.

The two streams had a different history: the first was built up only from about the 18th century, while the 'Royal Road to Culture' goes back to the Middle Ages. They also had a different clientèle in terms of the social background of children, the second stream being the quasi-monopoly of the upper classes. Each stream envisaged a totally different way of life and career structure for its pupils; there was almost no way of moving from the 'lower' to the 'upper' stream. This duality was apparent not only in the organisational aspects, although this was a main feature, but also in the explicit and implicit contents of the curriculum and in the whole atmosphere of the institutions.

B. A review of the educational reforms since 1945

In very general terms, two main targets seem to have governed the educational policy since 1945. The first and main concern relates to the *democratisation* of education—the equalisation of educational opportunities, the elimination of the barriers to social mobility in the case of individuals as well as of social groups, or, in short, 'cultural uplifting', i.e. a general rise in the educational standards of the population. The second concern has been linked to the problem of economic growth and the role of education in this field. The concern led to attempts to *co-ordinate* the demands of the national economy and the output of the school-system in terms of the level and type of school qualifications.

1. Democratisation

The first concern—democratisation—has been present ever since 1945, although the amount of emphasis laid on it has fluctuated and it has had different implications in different periods. In the first decade or so after 1945 it involved mainly structural or organisational changes. Later on, the search for adequate methods and techniques came to the fore. The main aspects of democratisation are described below.

(a). Structural or organisational aspects

(i). The abolition of early selection and the replacement of the former dual system of education by a unified primary school of eight classes (lasting from 6 to 14 years). The idea had already been launched by educational reformers of the 19th century and the proletarian revolution of 1919. It was put into effect by the first post-war government in August 1945 (governmental decree No. 6650/1945.) The implementation of the new system was, however, slowed down by the fragmentation of the schools, since the majority belonged to churches. Therefore the nationalisation of schools in 1948 (by the XXXIIIrd Act of 1948) was instrumental in building up the really unified system of elementary education. Since then, innumerable government measures have affected the educational system, but up to now the 1945 Decree and the 1948 Law have certainly been the most important pieces of legislation affecting education.

(ii). The speeding up of social mobility by means of various measures such as:

1. The creation of a nationwide network of so-called 'people's colleges' in 1946. These were the outcome of a genuine popular movement offering learning opportunities to about 10,000 young people each year. In 1949 these colleges were merged with state boarding schools to form a unified network. More than half of the students at the colleges attended secondary schools, about one third were university students, and there were some colleges for younger children and marginal institutions for others. These colleges represent, up to now, a unique educational experiment in Hungary. Their organisation was based on self-government and on community life. They combined traditional studies with self-education, with collective undertakings and with political work.
2. The abolition of formal entrance requisites to higher education. Before the war, only grammar-school graduates had access to higher education. Therefore, from 1948 until 1954/55, special one-year courses were organised for all those who had had no opportunity to follow the 'normal' educational pattern.
3. The creation in 1945 of a full system of adult education, parallel to all stages of education—from primary to higher (Decree No. 11130/1945 of the Council of Ministers). At first, only evening courses were organized; correspondence courses were added to the system in 1951/52.
4. The gradual abolition of all financial barriers (enacted by the 1948 Law) and a gradual extension of financial help to all levels of education. A number of new facilities or institutions were also created (canteens, hostels, etc.) giving priority to young people of worker and peasant origin or coming from villages.
5. The introduction in 1949 of 'quotas' in higher education prescribing a minimum proportion of students of worker and peasant origin. The quota system gradually diminished towards 1960. More recently, however, some of its elements have been introduced under the form of preferential treatment for students with a working-class background. Special preparatory courses are held for these students and when there is a case of judging between students with equal or similar results in school, priority is given to those coming from culturally disadvantaged surroundings.
6. The more direct measures of democratisation were completed by the considerable broadening of the supply of pre-primary, secondary and higher education. This was a continuous process from about 1948 on, which will be described in Chapter 3.
7. One of the most important steps in the democratisation of education was the complete transformation of vocational training, upgrading it so that it formed an integral part of secondary education. This process had three main components:

   First, from 1947 on, vocational schools already existing before the war were brought closer to the 'grammar-school' standards.[1] This development took a new turn with the second most important educational act, the 3rd Act of 1961, which transformed all these schools into 'vocational secondary schools' offering a skilled worker's qualification and graduation, that is the right to continue studies. The Act also stipulated that schools of this type were to be organised on a large scale.

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[1] An act of 1938 already recognised the existence of 'economic secondary schools' which had to provide skilled manpower for intermediary positions 'between workers and engineers'. The

Secondly, industrial apprenticeship was also reorganised. Before the war it was rather loosely organised under the responsibility of various enterprises, and the educational standards were usually fairly low—at the level of a kind of 'Sunday-schooling'. From 1949 on a network of real schools was created to upgrade the educational standards of industrial apprenticeship. These schools were in a way experimental, and are still affected by various changes. In order to fulfil the aims of cultural uplifting, there has been a constant attempt to improve the standards of teaching of 'general' subjects, with major changes in their curriculum in both 1961 and 1976. It is only since this last reform that 'general' subjects have been taught in a similar proportion in all courses throughout the three years. Before that, they practically disappeared in the third year.

The third main component in the development of vocational schools was the gradual elimination of their 'dead-end' character—i.e. that they did not offer institutional opportunities to go on to higher education. The first step was the organisation of two 'streams' in 1964, where those choosing the 'high' stream were encouraged to continue their studies in evening courses. The second, more important step was the organisation of a special branch of secondary vocational schools which offer, since 1972, an opportunity to complete secondary school, with graduation, in a three-year evening course, after having completed vocational training. They are called the workers' secondary schools.

The theoretical commitments and the practical uncertainties of this whole development can be illustrated by the fact that vocational training schools were declared to be an integral part of secondary education by an act of 1969—even before the special complementary secondary schools were introduced.

(b). Non-organisational aspects

After 1945 the curricula were constantly revised and remodelled, with major changes in 1962 and 1976. From the point of view of the democratisation of education, the most important aim consisted of a dual attempt to bring the curriculum closer to the needs, interests and experiences of ordinary people,

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transformation of these schools began in 1947 (Decree 13070/1947), by organising 'technical secondary schools'. In 1949 they were transformed to 'grammar schools with an industrial, agricultural, commercial or economic profile'. Again, in 1950, so-called 'technological schools' took the place of these specialised grammar schools', which aimed originally at producing technicians. In some years the needs for technicians were amply filled, so that the aim of the schools had to be re-defined. After many experiments and hesitations, this type of school was itself transformed after 1961.

and to leave out those elements which served, openly or unobtrusively, the interests of the former ruling classes of the pre-war period.

This process meant, on the one hand, the exclusion from the curriculum of the former artificial barriers which helped to maintain the class character of the school, such as the importance accorded to the teaching of Latin in grammar schools, and, on the other hand, the inclusion in the activity of the school of a number of areas which had previously been left to the family to provide, such as various types of 'everyday knowledge' as well as the introduction to cultural activities. One of the most significant steps in this area was the introduction of a new method of teaching music from about 1954 onwards, the method worked out by Z. Kodály.

Another element has been the slow transformation of the criteria of evaluation within the schools, whereby the exclusive value of some intellectual abilities has been somewhat challenged.

These attempts have not always been as explicit and as thorough as might have been desirable—so that despite fundamental changes and significant results, neither of the above processes can be considered as completed.

The other question which came to the fore in the mid-1960s is connected with the 'survival' of social and cultural disadvantages. It was realised about this time that despite organisational and administrative changes, the disadvantages of a bad 'start' were not overcome, as shown for instance by comparing the school results of children from various social backgrounds. Since then, there has been a constant search for ways and means to deal with this problem. Up to now no effective educational techniques have been found, so that the main method currently in use is to give extra attention to children who are educationally under-privileged. Since this means a kind of positive discrimination in their favour, with all the positive and negative aspects of such a selective policy, the issue is continuously under debate. It may be added that since about 1970 more emphasis has been given to the first period of organised learning, and the pre-school period especially is seen as important in overcoming initial difficulties. Hence the new emphasis on kindergartens.

Regional differences in educational opportunities, including variations between schools, have been recognised as high priority since about 1972. We shall come back to this problem.

2. *Co-ordination*

The second concern is to co-ordinate the needs of the economy and the 'output' of the educational system. This has entailed considerable changes in the organisation and content of post-primary studies. It has included, among other things, a complete transformation of the composition of higher studies, where the role of the humanities and law decreased and that of sciences and technology considerably increased as compared to the pre-war situation. Another aspect of this attempt is the adjustment in the curriculum of various secondary institutions to meet the needs of the labour market. The adjustment implies qualitative as well as quantitative aspects, taking into account the provisions of 'manpower-planning'. (One consequence of the quantitative adjustment has been the limitations of the intake of institutions of higher education.)

This, again, has been a *continuous* process with some more marked structural changes in 1949, when pre-war vocational training was reorganised, and in 1962, when the organisation of vocational secondary schools was undertaken on a large scale. Besides the constant transformation of the *types* of secondary institutions already described, there was a recurrent problem related to the courses offered by the schools. Every time the needs of industry were allowed to exercise a direct influence on vocational training (whether on vocational secondary schools or industrial apprenticeship), it resulted in the complete fragmentation of teaching, i.e. the schools were asked to prepare skilled people for very narrowly defined jobs. Therefore time and again the institutions of vocational training were reorganised in order to end 'over-specialisation' and to offer broader, more 'convertible' qualifications. (For example, the last such reorganisation in vocational training in 1969 reduced the number of specialities offered from 285 to 188).

Despite an overall improvement in the standards in vocational training, the fact that—especially in the training of apprentices—the narrowly defined economic interest takes precedence, presents a major problem. It means that the teaching and learning of general subjects becomes of less importance—which runs against the interests of the democratisation of education.

The above description leaves out, of necessity, a number of important or interesting developments such as, for example, the improvement of the relative situation of girls, which is now by and large similar to that of boys; the endeavours to create special institutions for special needs (especially for handicapped children, but also special schools for national minorities, too); the efforts to improve the quality of teaching by reorganising and upgrading the whole system of teacher training; and the efforts to provide all the schools with modern teaching aids (audio-visual and other equipment).

The development of the last three decades can also be described from other standpoints. On the whole it is true that for about two decades there was an *extensive*, essentially *quantitative* development with an emphasis, first, on primary education, then from about 1960, on secondary and higher, and, somewhat later, on pre-primary education. The problems related to the *quality or standards* of teaching, of methods and techniques of education in general, of the schools themselves (including regional and other differences between schools, etc.) have been more in the limelight since about the mid-1960s, but especially since an important session of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in 1972 dealt exclusively with the problems of education.

The results of the first 'extensive' period are certainly more spectacular and more easily illustrated by means of statistical data. The problems which have been recognised in the last decade or so are not less important, but their solutions are often more difficult to find, and they may require a rather long period—perhaps a long process of trial and error.

Nevertheless, the above review does not mean that the quantitative development is over. Apart from the future of the school system there is an urgent current problem which also has quantitative implications. That is the fact that although practically all children are beginning their primary studies at the right time, only about 90 per cent are completing them in 8 years; some are taking 10 years or longer and completing their studies by means of evening courses. The drop-out rate is extremely unevenly spread, with a concentration in the most under-privileged groups, where the parents are least well-educated, have no skill, have low or irregular incomes and where the family may be more or less disorganised. Since an unfinished primary education entails a lasting, practically life-long handicap, usually precluding the acquisition of other skills, the issue has been considered since 1972 to be a problem of major importance.

The quantitative aspect of future development is related to the length of compulsory schooling—its qualitative counterpart being the future structure of the educational system.

In fact, despite some refinements in the definition of compulsory schooling,[1] it is still the 1948 Act which essentially defines the length of compulsory schooling, that is the 8-form course. Similarly, despite a number of changes in the details, the structure of the system is also practically identical with that established at the end of the 1940s and completed by the second (and up to now the latest) Education Act in 1961. True, the reform of 1961, reorganising secondary education, was intended to be much more fundamental: it aimed to extend, in the decade following the Act, compulsory schooling up to the end of the secondary studies, that is 12 years of studies completed by the age of 18.

According to the Act, the grammar schools and the secondary vocational schools created by the Act were to become the only forms of secondary schools. The latter were meant to gradually absorb the whole of vocational training, and these two types were to be extended to cover the whole country. However, it was realized in the mid-1960s that this target was somewhat over-ambitious. The costs involved in raising the compulsory leaving age to 18 proved to be prohibitive, taking into account the costs of new teaching facilities and the losses in manpower caused by longer studies. The apparent needs of the economy were also changing at a slower pace than the educational plans, especially as far as the lower types of skills were concerned. To put it crudely, compulsory secondary schooling seemed to imply 'over-training' on a large scale, entailing economic losses and personal frustrations.

Thus the implementation of compulsory secondary schooling was postponed—more especially as it was soon realized that the present school

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1. In 1948, only 8 consecutive years—from age 6 to 14—of learning were required. This was slightly modified in 1951, 1959 and 1961. The latest law prescribed not only eight (calendar) years, but the eight grades—so that if these are not completed in due time, the compulsory leaving age is extended up to the age of 16.

structure itself (the 8 + 4 + higher pattern) has probably become obsolete, too. Since the original 1961 reform was revoked in 1965, the main task has been to work out gradually, and by means of extensive experimentation, the outlines of a new school system which should increase the length of compulsory schooling, but probably within a new structure.

For the time being, this future reform is at the centre of educational research and experiments,[1] although the more urgent problems of improving the present standards within the existing structure also absorb very considerable efforts.

In order to avoid repetitions, the data about the quantitative development of the various components of the school system will be presented in Chapter III.

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[1] The debates around this issue have been very lively for about the last five years. For the time being, there are at least six reform proposals which are under discussion in professional and official forums—but no final version has at yet been worked out or decided upon.

III. The regional aspects of educational development

The problem of regional disparities in education was, for a long time, a minor issue. It was assumed at first—as in the sphere of economic and social development in general—that the lessening of regional differences would be a natural corollary of the normal development of the whole system. Thus no special effort seemed to be warranted, or at least no great emphasis was placed on regionally oriented measures. Some such measures no doubt existed, but they were not exclusively seen from a 'regional' viewpoint. Thus, the closing-down of inadequate small schools was a general measure, which happened to affect mainly the rural areas. The aim in creating and extending the network of students' hostels was to promote the educational opportunities of young people of worker or peasant origin, and this incidentally benefited rural inhabitants, since peasants usually live in villages.

The issue of regionalism in education came to the fore after having made its appearance in economic policy. Thus, the principles of regional development were first laid down in about 1960, and the idea of the creation of district schools to centralise the pupils of the four upper forms from ungraded schools was accepted in 1961. This was followed about three years later by the creation of secondary schools in rural areas. The same decree introduced a graded salary scale for teachers, making provision for a supplement inversely proportional to the 'importance' of the settlement, or the distance from the nearest town. The detailed regulations for the creation of district schools were adopted in 1966.

The third and latest phase of the development of regional policy and planning has affected the educational system more quickly. The categorisation of settlements in 1971 was soon followed by a general project for the local development of educational institutions. Moreover, the educational decision of 1972, already referred to, emphasised that one of the most important short-term tasks was to bring the standards of rural and suburban schools closer to those of city schools.

In one way the hope that overall development would automatically reduce regional differences proved to be true, at least on a fairly general level.

Long-term statistical series, where they are available,[1] seem to illustrate the more rapid development of villages fairly convincingly. Nevertheless it is also fairly clear, on the basis of available evidence, that this progress was speeded up when deliberate action completed the spontaneous processes. And it has to be added that despite considerable, sometimes spectacular progress, we cannot speak about the disappearance of the regional gap. It is still true that rural standards—in equipment, in the quality of teaching and in the future opportunities of the children—remain below the urban level, though the difference varies. The following analysis will throw some light on the change and also the persistence of regional disparities at different levels of the educational system—the latter despite a considerable improvement of the whole system.

A. Pre-primary level

Two institutional facilities offer care to children under school age. One of them, the nurseries, cares for small children under 4. They cater now for about 12 per cent of this age-group, and serve only working mothers. Although it is not directly relevant for this study, it may be mentioned that the majority of children under 4, who are not in nurseries, are cared for at home. In 1961 Hungary introduced a special grant which allows mothers to stay at home for three years on about 50 per cent of their average salary. During this period they retain all their employment rights, so that they can return to their former job any time they wish. Since this measure has been passed there has been less pressure on nurseries. The child-care grant is offered to members of co-operatives too, so that women in villages can profit from it as well as town-dwellers. Nurseries are, of course, not essentially *educational* institutions. Their main aim is to help working mothers—so that we deal with them only marginally.

By contrast, pre-primary schools or kindergartens, open to children from 4 to 6, serve genuine educational aims. Kindergartens existed already, on a smaller scale, before World War II, but at that time they served mainly the children of poor working mothers. Many of the kindergartens worked on a half-day basis only; they were often overcrowded, and teachers and nurses working there were insufficient in number and often inadequately trained.

Kindergartens grew in importance from 1945 onwards (see Table 10). True, in the early years they were seen mainly as instrumental in helping working mothers, but their educational importance was always strongly emphasised. This is especially true from the late sixties on, when the problem of educational disadvantage came again to the fore. Since then there has been an emphasis not only on the overall educational value of kindergartens, but also on their potential role in preparing children for schools and especially in counteracting certain social and educational handicaps.

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1. Because *awareness* of the regional problem was inadequate, statistical data are scarce. The only regional breakdown used in Chapters III and IV is the Budapest-Towns-Villages classification. In some cases we had access to breakdowns according to the size of the settlement, but they did not yield new results so we omitted them. Other breakdowns were not available.

TABLE 10. Kindergartens.

Year	Number of kinder-gartens	Number of children in kindergartens (in '000s)	Number of teachers and nurses	Percentage of the 4-6 years age-group in kindergartens
1938	1 140	112.1	1 593	23.6
1950	1 773	106.4	2 423	23.5
1960	2 865	183.8	8 538	33.7
1970	3 457	227.3	12 481	57.7
1975	4 077	329.4	20 512	75.4

SOURCE Statistical Yearbooks.

Up till recently, however, the capacity of kindergartens was limited. Thus, for a long time, priority was given to children of working mothers, and it is only in the last few years that children of mothers not gainfully employed have been accepted at the age of five for at least one year before primary school. Since about 1970, when the question of educational disadvantage was again revived, significant efforts have been made to expand the kindergartens to all children. Because of lack of funds, however, most villages could organise pre-school courses only on a part-time basis for the period just before entering primary school, i.e. either daily during the summer term before the first form of primary school or twice a week throughout the last year before entering primary school. These 'preparatory' courses now cover practically the whole country.[1] Although they seem to have a positive effect on subsequent studies, they do not fully replace the three years spent in kindergartens—therefore the expansion of the network of kindergartens is still on the agenda of educational priorities.

The figures in Table 11 show that the rural-urban differentiation is fairly steep in the case of both nurseries and kindergartens. The main reason is obviously the historical gap between town and country, but there is an additional one in the former differential rate of the employment of women.[2] This rate was by 1977 quite similar in various settlements, but in villages it has increased rapidly over the last few years, and the creation of nurseries and kindergartens has been unable to keep pace with the rapid growth in the employment rate.

Table 11 also shows that in 1972 villages were far less disadvantaged in the case of kindergartens than in the case of nurseries. Efforts to develop the network of kindergartens in rural areas had already produced some results by 1972 (as seen from Tables 11 and 12).

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1. In 1976, out of all children entering the first form (156,600), 75.5 per cent had been in full-day kindergartens, 16.5 per cent had attended the preparatory courses and another 5 per cent were repeating the first form. Altogether 3 per cent of all children did not have any preparation.
2. According to the 1970 census, the percentage of women gainfully employed among the whole female population was 49.1 per cent in Budapest, 41.3 per cent in other towns and 33.6 per cent in villages.

TABLE 11. Percentage of children in nurseries and kindergartens.

	Children in nurseries and kindergartens as percentage of relevant age-group		
	Children under 4	Children aged between 4 and 6	
	1972[1]	1972[1]	1974[2]
Budapest	24	80	89
Other towns	16	71	85
Villages	4	53	65
All	11	62	75

1. Estimates based on the income survey of 1972.
2. Estimates based on official statistics about kindergartens and demographic data on the population.

TABLE 12. Number of children in kindergartens.

Year	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	Total
1. Children (in thousands)				
1965	34.0	52.5	102.9	189.4
1970	41.4	73.7	112.1	227.2
1972	50.9	92.5	126.8	270.2
1975	59.8	116.6	153.0	329.4
2. 1965 = 100				
1965	100	100	100	100
1970	122	140	109	120
1972	150	176	123	143
1975	176	222	149	174
3. 1972 = 100				
1972	100	100	100	100
1975	117	126	121	122

SOURCE *Ovodai intézmények*, 1974. dec. (Pre-primary Schools), Min. of Education, 1975 and Statistical Yearbook.

B. Primary level

After the introduction of the 8-year primary school the first task was to guarantee the education of all children—no matter under what conditions. This target was attained quite quickly; in 1949/50 96.1 per cent of children between 6 and 13 years were attending school, and as from the 1950s this rate has constantly been over 98 per cent. About 1.5 per cent of children are so physically or mentally handicapped that they cannot attend even special schools. It may be mentioned in this context that special schools and classes for children suffering from various handicaps have multiplied since 1937/38. There are now 11 types

TABLE 13. Completion of primary schooling.

	Percentage having completed at least 8 classes			
	among the whole population over 15 years		of the 15-18 age-group in 1972[2]	of the 19-24[3] age-group in 1972[2]
	in 1949	in 1970[1]		
Budapest	44.2	72.2	96.1	97.1
Other towns	26.4	56.0	92.7	94.7
Villages	11.1	37.6	88.3	89.3
All	20.6	48.2	90.6	92.4

1. Source: Census of 1949 and of 1970 (detailed results on the basis of 1% sub-sample). Central Statistical Office, 1971, p. 171.
2. Source: The income survey of 1972, special programme (unpublished data).
3. The percentage is slightly higher in the case of the older age-group because evening courses provide a second chance to complete primary schooling.

offering special education to about 30,000 children, instead of 5,000 children in 7 types in 1938.

Consequently, the educational level of the whole population, and, within it, of the various classes and strata of urban and rural population has been considerably raised. The former gaps have slowly been filled in the last three decades, so that among the younger generations the old differences are much less significant, even if they persist to a small extent. It seems, anyway, that in the case of primary schooling the current social objectives have been very nearly achieved, at least on a quantitative level (see Table 13).

The quantitative increase was not matched by adequate changes in the teaching conditions. A survey in 1954 showed that out of the 6,200 primary schools, 767 were built before 1850, and almost half of them before 1900. The majority of these old buildings were small village schools, rather inadequately maintained. Since then there has been a steady improvement in the pupil-teacher ratio, and in the level of qualification of teachers. The pupil-teacher ratio was already 33.4 to one by 1946/47, and dropped to 27.9 to one in 1953/54. It has continued to decrease ever since, stabilizing around 15-18 to one in the seventies. Teacher training was, before the war, carried out at the secondary level. From 1954 on it was gradually transformed, and from 1960 teachers have been trained only in institutions of higher education. These changes have meant that the very marked differences between urban and rural schools slowly diminished in this respect. Before the war there were only a few specialised 'subject' teachers; their proportion in 1937/38 was around 22 per cent of a total of over 26,000 teachers. This proportion had increased by 1970 to 50 per cent of a total of over 63,000 teachers.

However, subject teaching is possible only if schools are not overcrowded and if they are graded. Indeed, the most important trends since 1945 affected just this aspect of teaching. We have already mentioned the steady drop in the pupil-teacher ratio, but the reform of 1948 also closed down, or, rather, unified many small denominational schools, so that from 1948 to 1949 the number of schools dropped from 7,500 to 6,200. However, the former high proportion of entirely or partly ungraded schools was not radically altered. In 1937/38 14 per cent of primary schools were fully graded; in 1950 the proportion was 25 per cent, and in 1960 it had risen to only 34 per cent.

This slow process was speeded up from the mid-1960s, when more deliberate efforts were applied in order to bring the rural educational opportunities and standards closer to those prevailing in towns.

In 1966 a decree of the Ministry of Culture, also responsible for education, applied the principles of regional development to schools. It stipulated that the pupils of the four upper classes of the primary schools of small hamlets were to get subject teaching in the district schools of bigger settlements in the vicinity. Adequate means of transport had to be provided and children could not be asked to walk further than 3 kilometres to school.

It took several years to create the right conditions to implement this measure. Transport had to be organised and in some places, where daily transport presented difficulties, hostels were built. By 1970 96 hostels had been built, and another 33 during the 1970s, which means that about 10,500 children, coming mainly from very small hamlets or isolated farms, can be catered for. Some of these hostels have been specially built for gipsy children.

The new phase of regional planning, starting in 1971, eased the transformation of schools by defining which settlements were destined to play more than a local role. The educational session of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party of 1972 adopted a decision which defined as one of the main tasks the homogenisation of standards, that is the lessening of the differences between schools in general, and between rural and urban schools in particular. In subsequent years, it was decided where to organise 'district' schools and resources were concentrated on them. Thus, from 1966 to 1970, 500 small schools were closed down and the period from 1970 to 1976 saw the closure of a further 1,200.

TABLE 14. The main trends in primary schooling.

	Number of schools	Fully graded schools as percentage of total	Number of teachers in '000s	Number of pupils per teacher	Percentage of children in school among the 6-13 year olds
1937/38	7 296	14	26.0	42.1	78.8
1945/46	7 440	...	24.7	44.4	...
1949/50	6 205	25	35.0	34.3	96.1
1960/61	6 307	34	57.3	24.3	98.5
1970/71	5 480	43	63.1	17.7	98.4
1976/77	4 214	60	68.4	15.7	...

In 1976/77 there were 4,200 schools and 60 per cent of them were fully graded (Table 14). The majority of the schools in the sparsely populated outskirts and small hamlets (90 per cent of them, to be precise) functioned with the first four classes only. These small schools, with about 20 to 60 children, were, usually, not autonomous, but affiliated to a district school.

The future of the affiliated schools is somewhat uncertain. They are usually fully or partly ungraded—which is seen as a disadvantage. At the same time, the daily transport of small children presents difficulties. Moreover, new evidence about *small* ungraded schools shows that their educational standards and the results obtained are not worse, and may even be better, than the results of bigger, graded schools. Indeed, the constant personal contact between teacher and pupils and the presence of different age-groups seem to have tangible advantages.[1] Whether or not small ungraded schools present a viable solution for the future is still being debated. What is certain, however, is that while they exist, their physical conditions must be further improved.

Despite a very considerable overall improvement already, it is still true that village schools are less well equipped than city schools. Differences are more noticeable in the case of expensive facilities, less conspicuous in other spheres. Information relating to 1968 suggests that there was less modern educational equipment in village schools and some of it may well not have worked either: at that time, about 80 per cent of village schools had, for instance, no running water.

No doubt, village schools have also some advantages. Because of their rapid development and because of the rural exodus, they are at present less overcrowded, in terms of the space available per pupil, than city schools. Thus, for instance, even in 1976/77, 30 per cent of school classrooms were used in shifts in towns including Budapest, this proportion being 20 per cent in villages. Also, the more intimate personal contact between teachers and children has some advantages. On the whole, however, despite substantial progress, rural schools still work in less favourable conditions and have inferior standards to urban schools. Some typical data are given in Table 15.

How far this—together with all that is implied by the rural milieu—affects the mental development and the level of acquired knowledge of the children is rather hard to ascertain. The school marks do not reflect the real achievement of children because there are no absolute standards for assessing the pupils. Theoretically, in the formal instructions for teachers, the standards exist, but they are almost never applied in practice. There is, no doubt, a slight difference in the average marks between urban and rural schools:[2] the average mark of

[1] According to a survey measuring the achievement of pupils in graded and ungraded schools, in the first four years, pupils in ungraded schools obtained higher scores, while the reverse was true from the 6th form on. Dr. Nagy József and Dr. Csáki Imre. *Standardizált készségmérö tesztek* (Standardised tests for measuring achievements). Szeged, 1976.

[2] These results are derived from a survey carried out in 1970 by the Institute of Sociology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. See: Zs. Ferge, 'Some relations between social structure and the school system', *The sociological review monograph 17*, Feb. 1972.

TABLE 15. Some comparative data on the qualitative aspects of teaching.

	1969/70				1976/77			
	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	Total	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	Total
Pupils per teacher	15.2	18.6	19.7	18.7	14.5	15.7	15.6	15.7
Percentage of subject teaching in the four upper classes	95	87	62	73	98	95	71	81
Percentage of teachers without a degree in education[1]	0.3	0.7	6.1	4.3	7.5	3.4	11.2	7.7
Percentage of children in full-day classes[2]	...	...	...	...	9.4	4.2	0.4	2.1
Number of gymnasiums per 100 schools	86	55	16	25[3]	107	84	36	48
Percentage of pupils								
— in day centres[2]	29	24	12	17	45	41	25	32
— in study rooms	5.0	0.7	1.3	1.6	4.2	2.4	3.1	2.7
Percentage of pupils								
— in summer camps	...	...	...	...	34	26	17	21
— on study tours	...	...	...	...	4	5	9	8

1. The overall increase of unqualified teachers is a complex issue. It is due to insufficient training places, and to a rapid decrease of the pupil-teacher ratio.
2. Hungarian schools work, as a rule, on a half-day basis. Full-day classes are experimental and have better than average standards. In the case of half-day teaching, there are school day-centres catering and caring for children and study-rooms where teaching help is offered. Day-centres are especially important in towns, if both parents work.
3. 1970/71.

SOURCE Information bulletins of the Ministry of Education.

primary school pupils is 3.7 in Budapest, 3.6 in other towns and 3.3 in villages with school marks going from 1, the lowest, to 5, the highest. However, as will be shown in the following chapter, this difference is due mainly to the special composition of children and is not very significant anyway.

The regional impact becomes more significant and more visible on the basis of the 'real' achievements of children. A large-scale, intensive study was carried out on this issue within the framework of the International Association for Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) programme in 1968.[1] The tendency of the differences between urban and rural areas is similar in the case of marks and in the case of achievements, but the latter indices are more dispersed (see Table 16).

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[1] The data presented here are quoted from the study of Báthory, Zoltán, 'A városfalu különbség hatása a tanulas eredményére' (The impact of the difference between town and village on educational achievement), in *Neveléstudomány és folyamatos korszerűsités*, Szerk., Kiss A. Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972.

TABLE 16. Comparison between average school marks and achievement scores.[1]

Forms within the primary school	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	Budapest as compared to villages (Villages = 100)[2]
4th form (10 years old)				
— school marks	3.90	3.80	3.70	1.05
— achievement scores	6.17	5.59	4.93	1.25
6th form (12 years old)				
— school marks	3.57	3.38	3.36	1.06
— achievement scores	3.90	3.70	2.98	1.31
8th form (14 years old)				
— school marks	3.76	3.59	3.47	1.08
— achievement scores	4.42	3.87	3.39	1.30

1. The achievement scores ranged from 1 (the lowest) to 9 (the highest).
2. The comparison between Budapest and villages is computed on a standardized basis, as if both scales went from 1 to 9.

The same IEA study attempted to assess separately the impact of a number of factors which are usually supposed to influence achievement. All of them—whether social, cultural or educational—seemed to have some individual impact. However, no multivariate techniques were used, so that the results are not really conclusive. It may be assumed, though, that the lower achievement of children in villages was not due only to the differences in the social position and educational level of parents—to which we shall come back presently. The fact that rural schools had less equipment and fewer *specialized* teachers probably had an effect as well.

C. Secondary education

The unified primary-school system becomes tripartite at the secondary level, which starts at the age of 15. Grammar schools of 4 years are the most academically oriented; they qualify the pupil for entrance to higher education, but do not offer any vocational preparation. Secondary vocational schools, also of 4 years, offer complete vocational training at a medium level to future technicians, nurses, highly qualified skilled workers, etc. and also give access to higher education—but the range of institutions in higher education to which the graduates of vocational secondary schools may apply is somewhat limited. Although there are no legal limitations, the chances of success of those graduating from a vocational school at the university entrance examinations are much higher if they choose a branch of studies akin to the character of their secondary-school studies. The third main form of secondary school is vocational training; these schools last two or three years and the pupils follow classes for about half of the time, spending the other half gaining practical experience in enterprises. The schools offer qualifications for skilled manual occupations,

TABLE 17. Enrolment rates in the post-primary age-group, 1975/76.

Age	Number of all persons in the group in '000s	Percentage of those in				Overall percentage of those in school (day, correspondence, evening courses)
		primary education	secondary education (day courses)	higher education (day courses)	total	
14 years old	132.8	14	67	—	81	83
15	139.4	7	74	—	81	84
16	142.3	1	70	—	71	74
17	149.3	0	44	—	44	53
14-17 (total)	563.8	6	63	—	69	73
18 years old	156.1	—	7	3	10	21
19	178.9	—	2	7	9	19
20	194.5	—	1	7	8	18
21	206.7	—	—	6	6	15
22	189.6	—	—	5	5	14
18-22 (total)	925.8	—	2	6	8	17

SOURCE Computations based on data from the 1975 Statistical Yearbook. These data come from national statistics; they are therefore slightly different from the results presented later, obtained on the basis of a sample survey. Also, the sample survey relates to 1972.

which since 1972 may be completed by the 'workers' secondary schools' ending with graduation. Besides these three main categories, there are some other special schools offering secretarial training, etc.

The overall proportion of young people *starting* their studies on the secondary level after the completion of primary studies has been rapidly growing over the last few decades. It was about 50 per cent in 1960, 66 per cent in 1967, and nearly 80 per cent in 1977. More precisely, about 80 per cent of 14- and 15-year-olds are still in full-time education, including some still in primary schools. The enrolment rate shows a marked drop between 16 and 17 years, when those in vocational training end their studies; and there is a second, even greater drop between 17 and 18, at the end of secondary studies (Table 17).

The relative importance of the three main types of secondary schooling described earlier fluctuated somewhat, depending partly on short-term manpower considerations and partly on a long-term conception of the future orientation of secondary studies (see Table 18).

Besides the rapid increase in the number of secondary-school students, the socially most relevant change is probably that at present none of the secondary schools is a 'dead-end' institution. Whereas before World War II only grammar schools qualified a pupil for a university entrance, now all secondary schools provide this opportunity, either directly or indirectly. Their social composition has been entirely transformed—although the three different types still have a

TABLE 18. Secondary schools student (day courses only).

	Number (in '000s)				Percentage distribution			
	1949/50	1960/61	1970/71	1975/76[1]	1949/50	1960/61	1970/71	1975/76
Grammar schools	44.2	108.3	123.0	99.7	31	39	27	27
Vocational secondary schools	37.9	47.2	110.3	107.6	27	17	24	29
Vocational training (schools of skilled workers)	60.2	125.3	223.2	164.6	42	44	49	44
Total	142.3	280.8	456.5	371.9	100	100	100	100

1. The 15-18 year old age-group was much less numerous in 1975 than in 1970—hence the apparently contradictory result that fewer students represent a higher percentage of this age-group.

SOURCE Hungarian Statistical Yearbook, 1949-1955; 1975.
Data about the 25 years of vocational training, Ministry of Work, 1975.

different clientèle in terms of social origin. In the last few years the proportion of children with a worker or peasant origin has been around 45 per cent in grammar schools, 65 per cent in secondary vocational schools and 85 per cent in vocational training.

We cannot speak yet of equal chances, although, as may be seen by looking back at Table 9, the situation has radically changed since the 1930s. The various factors which continually help to promote democratisation are the following: free access to schools and financial help if necessary; regional decentralisation; students' hostels and transport facilities; special remedial courses offered to students from educationally disadvantaged backgrounds; evening and correspondence courses giving additional chances to all adults.

Regional decentralisation of the secondary network was indeed quite effective. Thus, if it is true that village or country primary schools offer less to children than urban ones, this does not have any marked effect on the continuation of studies at the secondary level, at least as far as the overall percentages are concerned. The only condition for entering the secondary school is the completion of primary school; there are no entrance standards or entrance examinations, so that even if the performance of a child happens to be low, it is no obstacle to entering any kind of secondary school. In practice, however, there is a self-selection among children, so that better students go more frequently to grammar schools, etc.

The recent expansion of secondary schooling, after the 1962 Act, affected villages more than towns, where there were already greater opportunities. Data derived from the income survey carried out in 1972 do not show any greater difference between the rates of enrolment in Budapest and the other towns, and even villages came fairly close to the two other groups. There remained a more important difference as regards the composition of students at the secondary

TABLE 19. Composition of the 15-18 year old population according to their main activity (in percentages).

	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All
Students, total[1]	58	58	46	51
of which[2]				
— 4-year school (grammar vocational)	40	37	23	30
— vocational training	16	19	20	19
Earners	41	38	46	43
Dependents (not in school)	1	4	8	6
Total	100	100	100	100
Total in sample	1 128	2 062	4 629	7 819

1. The overall rate of continued studies (51 per cent) is lower than the proportion of those who continued their studies at 15. This difference is due partly to drop-outs in subsequent years, partly to the fact that the age-group covers a four years interval, while secondary vocational training lasts only two to three years.
2. About 2 per cent of the 15-18 year olds are still attending primary school.

SOURCE Income survey, 1972.

level; the proportion of students in the 4-year grammar and vocational schools was higher in towns than in villages (Table 19).

The urban-rural difference is not restricted to secondary schooling, but also has an impact on the proportion of dependents, i.e. those who are neither students, nor employed. This is, however, mainly a sex-related issue. The disadvantage of girls in continued education is gradually disappearing, but in rural areas there still exists a sizeable proportion of girls who discontinue their studies after the primary school and who do not engage in gainful occupations. They are working at home, either waiting to get married or married already (Table 20).

TABLE 20. Composition of the 15-18 year old population according to their main activity, by sex.

	Boys				Girls			
	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All
Students	61	59	49	53	54	57	46	48
Earners	38	39	47	44	45	38	42	43
Dependents	1	2	4	3	1	4	12	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE Income survey, 1972.

It is worth pointing out on the basis of Table 20, that with the exception of dependents, the regional educational disadvantage is smaller in the case of girls than boys, which is an entirely new phenomenon.

The decrease in regional disadvantage at the secondary level is partly due to the creation of new schools in rural areas. Between 1952 and 1975 the number of secondary schools—excluding industrial apprenticeship—increased from 483 to 528. In Budapest there was hardly any change (109 to 115). In other towns there was a decrease (314 to 282), whereas village secondary schools more than doubled (60 to 131), with a peak in the growth rate after the 1961 Education Act, the objective of which was to generalise secondary education.

Another element facilitating access to secondary schools is the slowly developing network of secondary-school students' hostels. The number of places in these hostels rose from 12,000 in 1949 to 31,000 in 1960 and to 44,000 in 1976.[1] Practically all the students in the hostels come from rural areas, mainly from villages. Hostels are used more for vocational schools than for grammar schools, which are spread more evenly across the country (Table 21). The hostels, however, are unable to offer places to all the students who need them; hence, a comparatively large proportion of secondary students are commuters.

Commuting certainly means additional difficulties for the young who live in rural areas, although some efforts are made to adjust the time-tables of trains and buses to the school schedules, and to create adequate waiting-rooms for commuting students. According to a recent study[2] on students in vocational training (industrial apprenticeship), who are the most affected by commuting, the average time spent in daily travelling is 2.67 hours in the case of commuters, 1.46 hours in the case of those live within the locality. It may be added that the educational disadvantage of commuting for students living in villages is further increased because of their greater home duties. These adolescents, especially

TABLE 21. Percentage of secondary school students in hostels and commuting (1973/74).

	Percentage of students in hostels			Percentage of students commuting		
	Budapest	Other areas	All	Budapest	Other areas	All
Grammar schools[1]	2.8	13.8	11.3	4.7	28.6	23.1
Vocational secondary schools[1]	10.2	34.0	27.7	17.9	30.0	26.8
Vocational (industrial) training[2]	13.0	14.6	14.3	26.1	52.8	46.0

SOURCES 1. Státisztikai Tajékoztató: Középfoku Oktatás (Ministry of Education). 1973/74.
2. Tanévnyitó Statisztikai Tájékoztató (Ministry of Work). 1973/74.

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[1] *OM Statisztikai Tájékoztató: : Középfoku oktatós. 1977* (Statistical Bulletin of the Ministry of Education. 1977).

[2] Carried out by the Institute of Sociology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1975. The data referred to here are not yet published.

girls, are expected to take over a sizeable number of the home chores—with the result that the time they can devote to their studies is shortened.

It is safe to conclude, then, that regional disadvantages, in quantitative terms at least, have considerably lessened over the last few decades at the secondary level. Qualitative aspects are, as always, harder to ascertain. The IEA study on educational achievements, already mentioned, gives only a superficial insight into secondary schools. The study, a pilot-study, was conducted according to an international methodology; it covered only two forms of the grammar schools and there were no village schools in the sample. The average marks and the average achievement scores showed a parallel tendency, with the Budapest-other areas difference being somewhat, but not significantly, higher in the case of the achievement scores (Table 22). It is important to note that the Budapest-other areas difference increases from the first to higher forms.

A study carried out in 1971 for another IEA survey on applicants failing the university entrance examination showed that students graduating from secondary vocational schools found the university entrance examinations somewhat more difficult than students graduating from grammar schools; almost 20 per cent of them explicitly mentioned their regional disadvantage as a cause of failure.[1]

The relatively lower educational standard of rural secondary schools does not seem to create a special regional disadvantage. Although the first and last columns of Table 23 are only approximations, they are reliable enough to affirm that the graduates of 4-year secondary schools—once they have graduated—have a practically equal chance of going on to higher education. The regional disadvantage means in this respect that the self-selection of children

TABLE 22. Comparison between average school marks and average achievement scores,[1] 1968 (grammar schools only).

	Budapest	Other towns	Budapest as compared to other towns (other towns = 1.00)
1st form			
— school marks	3.62	3.54	1.02
— achievement scores	5.37	5.06	1.06
3rd form			
— school marks	4.08	3.30	1.24
— achievement scores	3.84	2.92	1.32

1. School marks ranged from 1 (the lowest) to 5 (the highest).
Achievement scores ranged from 1 (the lowest) to 9 (the highest).
SOURCE Báthory, op. cit., p. 252.

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[1] Kovács Zoltánné: *Az egyetemre, föiskolára fel nem vett jelöltek vizsgálata*, 1974. FPK. (Analysis of applicants who failed their entrance examination in higher education).

TABLE 23. Access to higher education (percentages).

	Applicants out of all secondary school graduates		Accepted students out of applicants		Accepted students out of all secondary school graduates	
	1968	1975	1968	1975	1968	1975
Budapest	54	81	38	33	19	27
Other towns	47	66	41	40	19	26
Villages	57	69	39	39	20	27
All	51	72	39	38	20	27

SOURCE Data are calculated from the official statistics of the Ministry of Education (*Entrance examinations* — an annual statistical publication, 1968 and 1975) and from estimates of the regional distribution of graduates computed on the basis of the statistics of the Ministry of Education relating to individual schools.

was stronger in villages than in towns—a lower proportion chose the 4-year schools. In addition, an attempt is made to lessen some of the regional handicaps by the *Studium Generale*. This is a movement launched by university students to help secondary-school students who have the double educational problem of coming from a worker or peasant family and also from a village. Discussions, courses and study tours are organised for them in the student hostels by university students during the summer holidays.

D. Higher education

The main tendencies in higher education are similar to those in secondary education.

The number of students in higher-education day courses increased from 12,000 in 1937/38 to about 65,000 in 1975/76, and to more than 100,000 if we take into account evening and correspondence courses, which did not exist before World War II. The orientation of studies has also been profoundly altered. Before the war law and theology were the main subjects studied; at present the main fields are technology and engineering, but economics, natural sciences and teacher training have also gained in relative importance (Table 24).

The composition of the students has also undergone a radical change. Whereas up to 1944 only about 3 to 4 per cent of university students came from the working class and 1 to 2 per cent from the peasantry, the total is now about 40 per cent or more. (This rate is somewhat fluctuating, depending on the strength of deliberate efforts to increase it).

The democratisation of studies affected the number of women students too. Before World War II girls were entirely excluded from some branches of study and overall accounted for about 10 per cent of the student population. At present there are no formal barriers and the overall proportion of women is nearly 50 per cent.

TABLE 24. The composition of the students by discipline (day, evening and correspondence courses together).

Disciplines	Percentage distribution of students			
	1937/38	1950/51	1960/61	1975/76
Technical engineering	10.5	32.8	27.7	32.6
Agriculture	5.1	5.7	7.4	7.9
Economics	5.6	9.0	5.4	9.7
Humanities	7.2	11.1	8.8	5.0
Sciences		7.7	6.6	5.1
Teacher training			17.1	22.5
Pre-school	—	—	1.7	4.1
Primary	4.4	—	4.0	5.7
Secondary[1]		6.9	11.4	12.7
Medicine	10.7	11.8	12.9	7.2
Law	36.9	5.6	8.6	4.6
Other disciplines (including theology)	19.6	9.4	5.5	5.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number of students	11 747	32 501	44 585	107 555
Percentage girls	12.4	21.9	29.2	48.3

[1] Part of secondary teachers' training is performed within the 'humanities' and 'sciences'.

The above results do not mean that Hungary has attained full democratisation and equality of opportunity in higher education. Sex differences are still quite significant in the *choice* of studies. Whether because of old stereotypes or for other reasons, girls change very slowly to subjects which were traditionally considered 'male', and boys are opting out from, for example, the teaching professions. The problem related to the social origin of students is even more difficult, because of a number of objective disadvantages and the attitudes, the 'habitus', which are related to these conditions. In other words, the successes of democratisation can be maintained and reinforced only if there are continuous deliberate efforts to this effect.

At present, institutes of higher education are very varied, but they belong essentially to two types: traditional universities (with 4, 5 or 6 years of study) and 'advanced high schools' (with 3 or 4 years of study). Teacher training and a large part of training in applied engineering is done in the latter institutions. Of the two types, universities continue to have higher prestige and to give qualifications for jobs which are usually better rewarded in various ways. It is not surprising, then, that the regional (and, as we shall show in Chapter IV, the social) disadvantage is relatively more pronounced in the case of the more selective and more prestigious universities than in the case of other institutes of

TABLE 25. Composition of the 19-24 year old population according to their main activity, 1972 (in percentages).

	19-21 year olds				22-24 year olds			
	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All
Students	16	11	7	10	7	5	2	4
Earners	80	79	79	79	84	78	77	78
Dependents (not in school)	4	10	14	11	9	17	21	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE Income survey, 1972.

higher education. The point can be demonstrated only indirectly,[1] i.e. by examining the enrolment rates in two age-groups (Table 25). The 19-21-year age-group covers all those in higher education, while those who are still students between 22 and 24 are mostly university students.

As in the case of the 15-18-year age-group, the relatively high proportion of dependent persons (neither studying nor working) in the 19-24 year age-group is composed almost exclusively of young women. It has to be added that a sizeable proportion of them are not really dependents, but are at home on the child care grant with a baby (after at least one year of gainful employment).

It is also worth mentioning that the traditional disadvantage of girls, as compared with boys, which is fading away at the secondary level, is perhaps even less marked among the 19-21-year-olds. It becomes, however, quite noticeable in the case of prolonged university studies (see Table 26).

TABLE 26. The proportion of students and of dependents, 1972 (in percentages).

	19-21 year olds				22-24 year olds			
	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All
Percentage of students:								
— among men	16.4	12.7	6.6	9.9	9.2	7.3	3.3	5.4
— among women	15.1	10.3	6.2	9.1	5.8	3.6	1.6	2.9
Percentage of dependents:								
— among men	1.9	1.5	2.7	2.3	0.4	1.0	1.3	1.1
— among women	7.2	17.7	27.3	20.7	17.1	31.3	41.4	33.9

SOURCE Income survey, 1972.

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[1] The survey used here did not make a distinction between the different types of higher education.

TABLE 27. Some data on facilities in higher education.

	1960	1970	1975
Number of students in hostels (in '000s)	14.5	26.4	29.7
— as a percentage of all students	49.6	49.0	46.2
Number of students having meals at university canteens (in '000s)	19.4	37.9	40.9
— as a percentage of all students	66.2	70.4	63.6
Percentage of all students having a state allowance (scholarship, etc.)	76.0	84.7	81.3

SOURCE Statistical Yearbook, 1975.

Higher-education institutes are more concentrated, or more unequally distributed throughout the country, than secondary schools. At the same time, the housing situation is still very strained and renting is rather expensive. Therefore, one of the most important ways of encouraging young people from villages and non-university towns to continue their studies is through the network of students' hostels and canteens, together with scholarships. Some relevant data are given in Table 27.

Another important policy step aimed at the reduction of the urban-rural difference in higher education is the continual decentralisation of institutions, by the creation of a number of new institutions in towns other than Budapest.

In 1975[1] 33 towns had various institutions of higher education. This compares with 1937/38[2] when 26 localities had institutions of higher education, but 19 of these were small theological schools with between 7 and 94 students. This means that in 1937/38 only seven localities offered opportunities to engage in other than theological studies.

The regional distribution of students is still rather uneven. In 1975 43.7 per cent of students were in Budapest, and 56.3 per cent in the 32 other localities (with the three main country universities accounting for 8.4, 8.0 and 6.5 per cent respectively, or approximately 23 per cent altogether). This contrasts with the situation in 1937/38, when 54.3 per cent of the students were in Budapest and another 31.2 per cent in the three other main universities; 14.5 per cent of all students were then scattered around the country, outside the four main towns, while this proportion had increased to 33 per cent in 1975.

E. Adult education

Adult education in Hungary is an essential component of the educational system. Besides vocational courses, which exist in most subjects, there is a complete network—primary, secondary and higher level—of evening and correspondence schools parallel to the 'normal' school system (see Table 28). The various parts of the evening network have played different roles in recent decades. At first, the evening primary schools were extremely important, since the majority of the population lacked elementary education and illiteracy was fairly widespread. The number of students for evening primary courses has gradually decreased in recent years. It has not and will not entirely disappear; about one tenth or so of young people do not finish their primary studies on time, so that a second chance has to be offered to them. The slightly decreasing importance of evening courses in primary education is shown by the number of students. They were 99,000 in 1960, 23,000 in 1975, with an additional 37,000 who participated in a combined course of primary school and vocational training at the latter date. (This course has been in existence only since 1973.)

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[1] *OM Statisztikai Tájékoztató-Felsöoktatás*, 1976/77. (All data here refer to 1975).

[2] Statistical Yearbook, 1938.

The evening courses in secondary and, especially, in higher education are of increasing importance. In 1975/76 the evening schools at the secondary level gave opportunities to 175,000 students (compared with 207,000 in day courses), while in higher education there were 64,000 students in day courses, 9,000 in evening courses and 34,000 in correspondence courses. It is true that at the beginning of the 1960s there was a decline in adult education for several years, caused mainly by a misinterpretation of the so-called 'economic interest', but at present and—according to the plans of the educational authorities—in the future, adult education is considered as an organic part of the educational system.

Since adult education is an important supplement to the normal education cycle, it is of prime interest whether it is available everywhere. Data at our disposal suggest that rural areas are less well-provided with evening and correspondence-course opportunities at the secondary than at the higher education level. In fact the availability of adult education facilities increases very significantly the advantage of Budapest over rural areas at the secondary level, and less so at the higher level (see table 29).

TABLE 28. Students in evening and correspondence courses at different school levels.

	Primary		Secondary		Higher	
Year	in 000s	As percentage of day courses	in '000s	As percentage of day courses[1]	in '000s	As percentage of day courses
1950/51	10.9[2]	0.9	12.1	12.6	6.0	22.6
1960/61	99.3	7.1	85.5	55.0	15.2	51.9
1970/71	21.3	1.9	113.9	48.8	26.7	49.6
1975/76	61.6[3]	5.9	175.2	84.4	43.2	67.2

1. Only the 4-year schools.
2. Only the number who passed examinations at the end of the year.
3. Including 36.6 in vocational training courses combined with the primary cycle.

SOURCE Statistical Yearbooks.

TABLE 29. Percentage of active earners in 15-24 age-group who participate in adult education.

	15-18 age-group		19-21 age-group			22-24 age-group		
				only in			only in	
	in all schools	only in secondary	in all schools	secondary	higher	in all schools	secondary	higher
Budapest	20	16	17	10	2	11	6	3
Other towns	13	9	10	6	1	11	7	3
Villages	7	4	8	4	1	6	3	1
All	10	7	10	6	1	8	5	2

SOURCE Income survey, 1972.

We have already observed, on the basis of other data, that the disadvantages of girls seem to be slowly disappearing. Adult education offers a fairly efficient means of further decreasing the educational gap between the sexes. In all three age-groups under consideration, the proportion of girls in adult education is very significantly higher than that of boys, and girls try harder to overcome the regional handicap. There is a lack of systematic information to explain this somewhat surprising and certainly new pattern. It should be noted that young mothers on the child-care grant, who may participate in adult education, are not included among the earners, so the explanation does not lie with them (see table 30).

TABLE 30. Percentage of active earners, participating in adult education, by sex.

	15-18 age-group		19-21 age-group			22-24 age-group		
				only in			only in	
	in all schools	only in secondary	in all schools	secondary	higher	in all schools	secondary	higher
Boys								
Budapest	23	17	11	9	1	9	5	2
Other towns	9	5	4	3	0	11	7	3
Villages	4	3	4	2	0	5	3	1
All	8	5	5	4	0	7	4	2
Girls								
Budapest	17	14	24	13	4	16	6	4
Other towns	17	13	16	9	2	10	5	3
Villages	10	6	13	6	2	10	4	2
All	12	9	16	8	2	10	5	3

IV. The cumulative effect of regional and social disadvantages

A. General trends

The urban-rural disparity is, in most cases, the outcome of several factors already discussed in detail. There is a certain rural gap in most facilities, but there is also the difference in the social composition of urban and rural inhabitants. In fact, the majority of highly qualified and professional people live in Budapest and some big towns, while more than 80 per cent of earners in villages are workers, half of them having no qualifications. The former division of work between town and village is, no doubt, slowly changing, with a gradual modification of the composition of the rural population—but the differences are still fairly marked.

We also know that despite significant and basic advances in lessening the social inequalities according to class position, or, more precisely, according to

TABEL 31. Social composition of population, on the basis of the socio-occupational group of the heads of households (in percentages).

Socio-occupational group of head of household[1]	1963[2]				1972[3]			
	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All
Leaders, professionals	15.9	10.5	4.3	8.0	21.3	17.4	5.1	10.8
Other non-manuals	20.3	15.7	5.6	10.8	23.3	19.5	8.0	14.4
Skilled workers	34.3	29.0	16.7	22.9	34.3	35.7	27.5	31.2
Semi-skilled workers (excluding agriculture)	17.2	17.6	19.1		12.2	13.9	18.6	16.0
Unskilled workers	11.9	15.5	15.0	14.5	8.4	10.8	13.8	11.8
Agricultural workers	0.4	11.7	39.3	25.4	0.5	6.7	27.0	15.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

1. Actively employed, only.
2. Source: *The stratification of Hungarian society*, CSO, 1968.
3. Source: *The level and dispersion of family incomes, 1972*, CSO, 1975.

the place occupied within the social division of work, the conditions of the various social groups are still rather different: the distribution of social advantages—whether material or symbolic—is still unequal.

Groups with the least favourable conditions are more numerous in rural areas. Therefore, even if regional disadvantage was not a separate factor, the urban-rural disparity would be evident. In other words, it is important to examine how far the overall differences between urban and rural areas are produced by structural differences or how far there is a cumulation of disadvantages produced by a combination of social *and* regional differentiation.

The cumulation of disadvantages is manifest in a number of fields, from local infrastructure to access to specialised services.

Until now, only the survey on social stratification, carried out in 1963, yielded data which clearly demonstrate the cumulation of disadvantages in various aspects of living conditions and life chances. More recent evidence is available for 1972 for incomes only (see Table 32). It is certainly true that since the 1963 survey the development of the 'infrastructure of everyday life' has been more rapid in the rural areas than in Budapest, and usually more significant in villages than in other towns. This, however, has only lessened the former inequalities, without eliminating them. Thus, on a very general level, the cumulation of disadvantages persists, though it is weakening.

From our present viewpoint the question is whether the cumulation in the sphere of education is as persistent and as strong as in other spheres. On the basis of the 1972 data, it appears that there is a strong cumulative effect in some sub-spheres of education, a much weaker one in others.

First, we shall quickly survey some available data. At the pre-primary level we possess some frequency data. The regional difference is strongly present in each social group at the nursery level, i.e. with very young children. It is far less marked at the level of kindergartens (see Table 33). (Data derived from the 1967 income survey, though not entirely comparable, suggest that at that time both differentiations—the social as well as the regional—were far stronger.)

For the primary level the only meaningful data we possess are those showing educational disadvantages in school performance. For the present purpose even the school marks are relevant—they characterise the relative position of children from different social backgrounds *within* the *same* schools (Table 34).

According to these data, the overall regional differences are due to the varying proportion of children from different surroundings. If one holds social origin constant, there are no regional disadvantages. Even if there are urban-rural differences, they do not form a consistent pattern. More precisely, children of leaders and intellectuals fare better, children of unskilled workers score slightly worse in villages than in towns, according to the assessment of teachers. (The explanation of this phenomenon would take us a long way. One hypothesis tested by means of data is that the performance of children from culturally 'disadvantaged' families—disadvantaged at least from the school's viewpoint—is better if the pupils are more 'mixed', i.e. if there is a fair proportion of children with cultural advantages. Village schools are clearly less

TABLE 32. Some data characterizing the cumulation of social and regional disadvantages, 1963 and 1972.

	Leaders, professionals	Other non-manuals	Workers outside agriculture			Agricultural workers	All[1]
			Skilled	Semi-skilled	Unskilled		
Per capita monthly income, forint, 1963							
Budapest	1 482	1 135	1 058	985	923	999	1 079
Other towns	1 207	975	889	790	648	723	840
Villages	1 075	920	811	729	646	718	742
All	1 265	1 010	899	778	678	719	823
Percentage of dwellings with bathroom, 1963							
Budapest	87	67	39	33	25	...	49
Other towns	63	49	32	20	12	5	26
Villages	26	19	12	4	2	2	6
All	64	47	25	12	9	3	19
Percentage of households with more than 50 books, 1963							
Budapest	80	54	28	21	12	...	46
Other towns	72	48	20	12	9	3	26
Villages	58	37	13	5	4	3	9
All	71	47	20	9	7	3	18
Per capita monthly income, forint, 1972							
Budapest	2 515	1 960	1 830	1 532	1 603	2 546	1 983
Other towns	2 146	1 731	1 522	1 397	1 284	1 638	1 608
Villages	2 023	1 722	1 531	1 394	1 354	1 673	1 554
All	2 498	1 795	1 588	1 418	1 365	1 672	1 645

1. Including pensioners.

SOURCE As for Table 31.

TABLE 33. Social and regional differentiation at the pre-primary level: percentages of the relevant age-groups.

The main social group of the family[1]	Children 0-4 years old in nurseries				Children 4-6 years old in kindergartens			
	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All
Non-manuals	32	30	9	24	72	82	67	74
Workers outside agriculture	21	12	4	9	67	57	42	51
Mixed—agricultural and non agricultural—households	—	10	5	6	50	46	46	46
Peasants	—	2	3	2	...	...	38	36
All	24	16	4	11	68	61	45	53[2]

1. We do not possess more detailed occupational classification for these data.
2. In fact, the figure for the country as a whole was at that time 62 per cent. The difference is mainly due—besides random sampling errors—to the fact that the overall figures show the proportion of *all* children to the 4-6 years age-group, while the income survey took only the 4-6 years old children in both cases.

SOURCE Income survey, 1972.

mixed than town schools—thus this additional stimulus is missing, and the impact of the home appears more pervasive. There is probably another, more sociological, component, namely that teachers in villages over-evaluate children of local leaders—or their own children.)

TABLE 34. Average school results of children from different social backgrounds in primary schools, 1970.[1]

Social-occupational group of child's father	Budapest	Other towns	Villages
Intellectuals	4.2	4.3	4.5
Leaders, managers	4.1	4.2	4.2
Other white collars	3.8	3.8	3.8
Skilled workers	3.4	3.5	3.5
Semi-skilled workers	3.2	3.3	3.3
Unskilled workers	3.1	3.0	3.0
Manual workers in agriculture	—	3.0	3.2
All[2]	3.7	3.6	3.3
Difference between intellectuals and unskilled workers	1.1	1.3	1.5

1. School marks ranged from 1 (the lowest) to 5 (the highest).
2. Including children of self-employed and retired parents.

SOURCE S. Ferge, *Some relations...*, *op. cit.*

The achievement scores are, in all probability, a better indication of the real situation. On this basis, social differentiation shows by and large a similar tendency to that of school marks. There appears also a slightly more consistent regional differentiation—although it is not highly significant, and is somewhat marked only in two sub-groups, one of them being the local professionals. The causes of these regional differences are not well known. It may be assumed, as one of the factors, that the broad categories presented in Table 35 differ in many respects, e.g. the level of education of any given category is lower in villages than in towns. Another factor is that the environment is supposed to be richer in stimuli in towns than in villages, especially in stimuli which are relevant from the point of view of school requirements. And, lastly, there is the factor mentioned previously connected with the more or less diversified social composition of classes.

TABLE 35. Achievement scores of children from different social backgrounds in primary schools, 1968.[1]

Socio-occupational group of head of household (father)[2]	Towns, including Budapest	Villages	Towns as percentage of villages
Highly qualified leaders, managers	5.38	5.54	97
Professionals	5.54	4.83	115
Other leaders, managers	4.72	4.47	106
Other non-manuals	4.45	4.00	111
Foremen	4.49	4.49	100
Skilled workers (all sectors)	4.29	3.76	114
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers (all sectors)	3.61	3.48	104
No. of children in sample	2 286	2 864	

1. Achievement scores ranged from 1 (the lowest) to 9 (the highest).
2. The socio-occupational categories were not available in the same classification as in the study on school marks.

SOURCE Báthory, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

The *secondary* level seems to be almost exempt from the cumulative effect.[1] There is a strong though not excessive *social* differentiation in the overall rate of continued studies. The hierarchy of groups formed on this basis is not as graded as the one formed by the level of comfort of dwellings or by the possession of books—an important indicator of the relationship to education. While in other areas we found a clear 'stratification', in the case of continued secondary-education studies there is one strong, and one weaker demarcation line.

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[1] We do not possess the necessary data to analyse the interplay of social and regional differentiation in the case of the *achievement* of students, either in secondary or in higher education. Thus we confine ourselves to the data about the continuation of studies. These are, however, in a way causally related to achievement, especially at the higher education level.

TABLE 36. Proportion of 15-18 year olds continuing their studies.

Socio-occupational group of head of household	Percentage of all children in school				Percentage of children in 4-year secondary schools (grammar and vocational)				Percentage of children in vocational training			
	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All
Leaders, professionals	74	82	77	78	64	71	67	68	9	10	10	10
Other non-manual	53	49	65	56	32	37	38	37	21	11	24	18
Workers excluding agriculture												
Skilled	52	58	55	55	31	31	28	29	20	24	26	24
Semi-skilled	44	50	41	44	20	24	17	19	21	23	21	22
Unskilled	37	43	34	37	16	18	15	15	19	22	17	18
Agricultural workers	—	42	40	40	—	16	16	18	—	25	19	20
All[1]	57	58	46	50	40	36	23	29	16	19	20	19

[1] Pensioners included.

SOURCE Báthory, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

The first separates leaders and professionals from almost everybody else; the second divides the two groups of other non-manuals and skilled workers from the other groups. (In some cases—as with industrial apprenticeship—only the first division prevails). The social differentiation becomes somewhat more pronounced if one separates the two types of 4-year secondary schools: the grammar schools are more marked by stratification than secondary-vocational schools. However, if social strata are held constant, again the regional disadvantage practically disappears. What is more, other towns fare better in many respects than Budapest—which is again a new phenomenon. But second chances in the form of evening courses are greater in Budapest, so that ultimately this difference may disappear (see Table 36).

The interplay of social and regional disadvantages results in a cumulative effect again in higher education, which is accentuated as we pass from the younger age-group (19-21 years old) to the older one (22-24 years) (see Table 37). It seems that young people in villages stand about half as good a chance of going on to the higher levels of higher education as town-dwellers, even if they have the same social background. On the 'lower' level, there is less of a regional

TABLE 37. Proportion of 19-24 year olds continuing full-time studies.

Socio-occupational group of head of household (father)	Among the 19-21 years old				Among the 22-24 years old			
	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All
Percentage in all types of school[1]								
Leaders, professionals	38	34	24	32	15	15	8	13
Other non-manuals	10	9	8	9	9	6	4	6
Workers excluding agriculture								
Skilled	6	6	5	6	1	2	1	1
Semi-skilled	2	6	5	5	5	2	1	1
Unskilled	7	5	4	5	—	1	2	1
Agricultural workers	—	3	5	5	—	—	1	1
All[2]	17	11	6	8	7	5	2	4
Percentage in higher education only								
Leaders, professionals	30	26	19	25	14	15	8	13
Other non-manuals	5	9	7	7	9	6	4	6
Workers excluding agriculture								
Skilled	5	4	4	4	1	2	1	1
Semi-skilled	1	4	3	3	5	2	1	1
Unskilled	5	4	3	3	—	1	1	1
Agricultural workers	—	1	3	3	—	—	1	1
All[2]	13	9	4	7	7	5	2	4

1. There are some vocational training schools for this age group besides higher education and about 1 p.c. of the 19-21 years old are still in secondary schools.
2. Pensioners included.

SOURCE Income survey, 1972.

difference, and among workers the regional gap is entirely absent or even reversed. It may also be worth mentioning that at the level of higher education the demarcation line between manuals and non-manuals reappears quite clearly, with a strong division too between leaders and professionals on the one hand and all the remaining groups on the other, and without any fine gradation among manual workers.

B. Aspirations concerning the children's future

Social and regional conditions have an impact not only on facts, but on desires and aspirations, too. We possess some data—unfortunately only for 1963— by means of which we may relate facts to aspirations. The study on social stratification produced data on the occupational groups of children coming from different social backgrounds, i.e. children who were already gainfully occupied, and also on the aspirations of parents concerning the future occupation of their children who were still in school (see Table 38).

TABLE 38. Facts and aspirations: the proportion of households in which all children became non-manuals (within all the households with children already gainfully employed), and the proportion of households in which all children should become non-manuals according to the parents' aspirations.

Socio-occupational group of head of household (father)	Budapest	Other towns	Villages	All
Percentage of households in which all earning children are non-manuals				
Leaders, professionals	75	68	47	63
Other non-manuals	47	57	49	51
Workers excluding agriculture				
Skilled	37	35	23	30
Semi-skilled	25	24	14	18
Unskilled	25	17	8	13
Workers in agriculture	—	11	8	8
All[1]	44	29	13	21
Percentage of households in which parents would like all their children to become non-manuals				
Leaders, professionals	90	89	79	86
Other non-manuals	80	83	67	77
Workers excluding agriculture				
Skilled	62	60	51	56
Semi-skilled	62	50	38	43
Unskilled	40	35	35	36
Workers in agriculture	—	34	37	37
All[1]	70	60	43	51

[1] Including pensioners.

SOURCE *Társadalmi rétegződés Magyarországon*, op. cit., p. 369 and 375.

Although the results are somewhat impressionistic—we did not carry out a proper multivariate analysis—it is fairly clear that differentiation decreases in both cases as we shift from facts to aspirations, without a change in the main tendencies. However, the *decrease* seems to be more marked with respect to localities than with respect to socio-occupational groups. This suggests that, at least in a sphere intimately connected with educational opportunities, people felt that regional educational disadvantages are easier to overcome than social ones.

V. Some concluding remarks

The analysis of regional and social disadvantages suggests some preliminary conclusions. We consider them preliminary because more data and more sophisticated techniques would be needed to fully substantiate them. Thus, our conclusions are somewhat impressionistic, but they seem to form a pattern.

1. Hungarian society has been deliberately pursuing socialist aims for almost three decades. These aims include the abolition of social inequalities. On a very general level, it can be said that up to now attempts to create greater equality have been more successful in some fields than in others. Regional disparities seem to be somewhat less persistent than many others, so that regional inequalities, at least in many fields, have been significantly reduced in the last few decades.
2. The movement towards greater equality is by no means a spontaneous process. Although economic growth achieved on the basis of the current social system *may* favourably influence some inequalities, it is by no means a rule. It is usually true that inequalities are reduced significantly only by deliberate social action. Even then, it is true that deliberate intervention has more chance of succeeding, if the phenomenon in question is not directly related to, or less organically embedded in, the social division of work. Regional inequalities were substantially reduced because a number of them were only indirectly related to the social division of work and the interest structure generated by it.
3. Experience in overcoming regional disparities shows that progress became rapid and substantial after the principles and methods of regional planning had been worked out. In other words, social action may become effective if the targets are defined with realism and precision, and if adequate policies of direct and indirect intervention are worked out and put into practice.
4. Provided that the targets and policies are made clear, regional differences are likely to be handled efficiently under the following conditions:
   - — if the 'social' interest spelt out for a backward region or locality may be easily harmonised, or at least does not clash, with more narrowly understood economic interests:
   - — if the central priority for a region or locality favours all the social groups

living there, including the relatively more privileged ones. In fact the latter will be likely to be the first in using the new opportunities, or, more exactly, at a higher level of provision the socially differentiated use of any facility is probably reproduced. A continuous shift upwards increases however the probability of subsequent reduction in social inequalities *par excellence*.

— if the (central) priority given to a less advantaged region or locality does not harm (at least in a manifest way) the interests and existing rights (prerogatives) of more advantaged regions or localities. (To give some examples: the creation of a local sewage system or water supply does not harm any interest outside the locality: the loss of relative advantages occurs, but in such cases it is not resented. By contrast, the decentralisation of schools entails a loss in the importance of the former 'central' place, its power position etc.— hence this may be opposed);

— there is also a practical element to be taken into account. It is easier to reduce the regional inequality of facilities in cases where the clientèle can be brought to the facility. In the reverse case—if the facility *has* to be created locally—the regional disadvantage is usually more persistent.

5. It has to be spelt out explicitly (although the issue may be fairly obvious for many) that a deliberate and centrally 'sponsored' policy, oriented towards the reduction of regional inequalities, is not incompatible with the decentralisation of decision-making, or the democratisation of power, in short. On the contrary, a regional redistribution of productive and non-productive assets, of all kinds of resources, including competences and informations, may create much better conditions for the exercise of local autonomy. In fact, if these conditions are lacking, the *legal* opportunity of local self-determination becomes only a *formal* right. (The same holds true, of course, for social inequalities in general).

   This does not mean that all localities will necessarily profit equally from both central redistribution oriented towards regions *and* the increase of local autonomy. There is a high probability that the smallest or/and poorest localities will profit less from decentralisation and redistribution than others. This means that local autonomy cannot be 'limitless': central administration may be (or should feel) somewhat compelled to interfere with the autonomy of *some* localities in the interest of some other, more deprived ones.

6. In the field of education, the significant conclusions are the following:

   (a). Social and regional disadvantages historically formed a cumulative pattern, but it seems that this pattern has now already been partly dismantled. In many sub-spheres of education, regional disadvantages have faded away quite rapidly, while social disadvantages, although they are also steadily diminishing, seem to be more persistent.

   (b). Regional educational disadvantages show differences in terms of the rapidity of their disappearance. An important pre-condition of their diminution is deliberate social intervention. Taking this into account, there are still variations.

   Regional disparities are most easily overcome if adequate facilities (equipment and buildings) are provided 'on the spot', in each commune or settlement. This condition is, however, contingent on two interrelated factors: the facility or service in question should not be too expensive, and this depends partly on it being fairly standardised. To be more explicit: there should be a fairly uniform policy for pre-primary schools and the first stage of the primary school in the provision of equipment and the training of teachers.

Regional educational disadvantages are also fairly easy to deal with if the students—the 'clientèle'—are brought to the institutions. In fact, in this case, they are able and willing to move, at least within a certain age-group. By contrast, specialised medical services are probably more evenly spread than specialised educational services. None the less, the medical services are less easily accessible to those who need them, because sick people move or are moved only with difficulty, and also because social attitudes to health are probably less easy to change than social attitudes to education.

There are some policies of 'regional educational priorities' which seem to have been very effective. Thus, adequate transport and (even more) the network of students' hostels have been of prime importance. Correspondence courses are also helpful, but this is an intermediary solution—the clientèle and the facility meet 'halfway'. Extra educational help, compensatory courses and the like seem to be of less direct relevance, although some such solutions have more than mere educational significance. (The courses of the *Studium Generale*, for instance, offer educational help to rural children. But at the same time, they bring university students in more direct contact with social reality. They offer them an opportunity to put into practice the knowledge they have acquired, and they offer an opportunity to rural children to experience some aspects of city life.)

(c). It has by now been established that rural disparities in education are more amenable to change by deliberate social intervention than social differences are. However, the reduction of the regional gap itself may subsequently have a salutary effect on social inequalities. If, indeed, the social structure is changing in rural areas and the educational attitudes of the better-off sectors of society become similar everywhere, the spread of the new attitude to education in rural areas may influence other spheres. Of course, educational attitudes are not formed in a vacuum. A more fundamental change in the attitudes of various social groups entails adequate changes in their objective living and working conditions. And the further reduction of inequalities in these spheres requires, again, sustained and conscious efforts.

Appendix

A. Some methodological remarks

B. Maps

C. Tables: Table 1. The distribution of the population among settlements.
Tables 2.1 to 2.11. Regional data.
Tables 3.1 to 3.9. Data on the settlements, classified according to their regional role.
Tables 4.1 to 4.8. Data on settlements, classified by size.
Table 5. Highest level of education attained by the population over 7 years of age, 1941-1970.
Table 6. Provision of kindergartens.
Tables 7.1 and 7.2. Provision of primary schools.
Tables 8.1 and 8.2. Provision of secondary schools.
Table 9. Provision of higher education.

Methodological remarks

The majority of data used in the analysis and the Appendix are published data from official sources. The main sources were:

- — Census and micro-census data published by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (CSO)
- — Statistical Yearbooks (CSO)
- — Regional Statistical Yearbooks (CSO)
- — Statistical bulletins relating to pre-primary, primary, secondary and higher education published annually by the Ministry of Education.

In addition we used published data from the large-scale income surveys relating to 1962, 1967 and 1972, also carried out by the Central Statistical Office, as well as data from the Stratification Survey of 1963.

The majority of the data utilised in Chapter III are also based on the Income Survey relating to 1972, but they were obtained by special compilations. A special data-processing programme became necessary because educational statistics offer data—if at all—about students who are studying at different localities, but they do not give information about their original dwelling-place. In the case of the 1972 survey, the students—even those in students' hostels in towns—were counted among the members of the village household. Hence, it became possible to compute the various enrolment rates at different localities.

Map 1. Counties and towns of Hungary, 1.1.1976



Map 2. The economic regions used in regional planning and the regional centres of middle and higher importance





Map 3. Urbanization

Map 4. Some regional aspects of industrialization, 1975


Number employed in socialist industry
(thousands) 150
80
60
40
20
Number employed in socialist industry per 1,000 inhabitants
120
150
170
Gross value of the fixed assets of industry, in billion forints
Towns
Villages
20
15
10
5
0
Budapest

TABLE 1. Distribution of the population by size of settlement, in percentages.

Size or type of settlements	1869[1]	1900[1]	1941[1]	1949	1960	1975
According to the size of settlements						
0- 499	5.7	3.3	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.8
500- 999	15.5	10.9	7.0	7.1	6.0	5.0
1 000- 1 499	13.4	10.2	7.5	7.5	6.9	10.2
1 500- 1 999	9.4	8.7	6.2	6.2	5.4	
2 000- 2 999	11.5	10.3	10.2	10.4	9.7	7.3
3 000- 4 999	10.7	11.5	11.4	12.	12.0	8.9
5 000- 9 999	9.9	11.0	10.1	11.2	11.1	10.2
10 000-19 999	9.2	7.4	9.4	9.5	9.3	10.2
20 000 and over	8.7	14.2	17.7	16.3	19.4	25.7
Budapest	6.0	12.6	18.4	17.3	18.1	19.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
According to the 'urban status' of settlements						
Budapest	6.0	12.6	18.4	17.3	18.1	19.6
Other towns	18.5	19.3	19.9	19.3	21.6	30.8
Villages	75.5	68.1	61.7	63.4	60.3	49.6
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
The proportion of the population living in suburban areas						
	...	...	...	17.3	12.1	8.4[2]
Total population in '000s	6 011.3	6 854.4	9 316.1	9 204.8	9 961.0	10 572.0

1. Only of the territory defined by the Trianon Treaty.
2, 1970.
SOURCE Census data; *Településszerkezet* (settlements), Vol. II. C.S.O. 1977.

TABLE 2.1. Population distribution, by regions.

Region	Population in '000s 1965	Population in '000s 1975	Percentage distribution 1965	Percentage distribution 1975
Central region	2 766	3 019	27	29
North-West (North of Transdanubia)	1 749	1 854	17	17
Northern region	1 340	1 370	13	13
South-West (South of Transdanubia)	1 300	1 312	13	12
South-East (South of the Central Plain)	1 457	1 460	15	14
North-East (North of the Central Plain)	1 554	1 557	15	15
All	10 166	10 572	100	100

TABLE 2.2. Industrial wage-earners per 10,000 inhabitants, by regions.

Region	Number per 10 000 inhabitants 1965	Number per 10 000 inhabitants 1975	Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1) 1965	Multipliers (National average = 1) 1975
Central region	2 473	2 028	82	1.73	1.25
North-West	1 429	1 755	123	1.01	1.08
Northern region	1 419	1 793	126	1.00	1.10
South-West	870	1 347	155	0.61	0.83
South-East	863	1 302	151	0.61	0.80
North-East	542	1 087	201	0.38	0.67
All	1 431	1 632	114	1.00	1.00

TABLE 2.3. Investments by regions (current prices, in million forints).

Region	Yearly average			Percentage distribution		
	1961-1965	1966-1970	1971-1974	1961-1965	1966-1970	1971-1974
Central region	15 164	21 906	37 939	36	34	35
North-West	7 714	12 765	20 967	18	20	19
Northern region	6 246	9 518	15 108	15	15	14
South-West	4 442	6 563	10 893	11	10	10
South-East	4 234	7 340	11 426	10	11	11
North-East	4 236	6 751	11 747	10	10	11
All	42 038	64 842	108 080	100	100	100

TABLE 2.4. Monthly per capita income of the population, by regions.

Region	Amounts in forints			Index (1962 = 100)		Multipliers (National average = 1)		
	1962	1967	1972	1967	1972	1963	1967	1972
Central region	988	1277	1849	129	187	1.20	1.12	1.12
North-West	831	1108	1572	133	189	1.01	0.97	0.96
Northern region	762	1032	1407	135	185	0.93	0.91	0.86
South-West	791	1134	1541	143	195	0.96	0.99	0.94
South-East	775	1149	1595	148	206	0.94	1.01	0.97
North-East	676	1041	1452	154	215	0.82	0.91	0.88
All	822	1140	1645	139	200	1.00	1.00	1.00

SOURCE The special income surveys.

TABLE 2.5. Value of purchases in retail trade per inhabitant, by regions.

Region	Yearly average per inhabitant, in forints		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
Central region	11 956	25 282	211	1.39	1.24
North-West	8 160	19 277	236	0.95	0.94
Northern region	7 538	17 600	233	0.88	0.86
South-West	7 462	19 141	257	0.87	0.94
South-East	7 354	19 043	259	0.85	0.93
North-East	6 282	17 324	276	0.73	0.85
All	8 585	20 275	236	1.00	1.00

TABLE 2.6. Households using electricity, by regions.

Region	Households, in '000s		Index (1965 = 100)	Percentage distribution	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
Central region	828	976	118	31	30
North-West	463	566	122	18	17
Northern region	343	408	119	13	13
South-West	343	416	121	13	13
South-East	317	434	137	12	13
North-East	337	453	134	13	14
All	2 631	3 252	124	100	100

TABLE 2.7. Population served by the water system, by regions.

Region	Percentage distribution		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
Central region	64	79	123	2.46	1.58
North-West	28	54	193	1.07	1.08
Northern region	20	40	200	0.76	0.80
South-West	20	51	255	0.77	1.02
South-East	18	50	278	0.69	1.00
North-East	11	36	327	0.42	0.72
All	32	57	192	1.00	1.00

Table 2.8. Population living in areas served by the sewage system, by regions.

Region	Percentage distribution		Index (1965 = 1)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
Central region	52	58	112	2.36	1.87
North-West	18	29	161	0.82	0.94
Northern region	13	23	177	0.59	0.74
South-West	10	20	200	0.46	0.65
South-East	4	12	300	0.18	0.39
North-East	6	14	233	0.27	0.45
All	22	31	141	1.00	1.00

Table 2.9. Medical doctors per 10,000 inhabitants, by regions.

Region	Number		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
Central region	4.39	4.96	113	1.19	1.14
North-West	3.51	3.32	95	0.95	0.76
Northern region	3.40	4.02	118	0.92	0.92
South-West	3.68	4.41	120	1.00	1.01
South-East	3.33	4.16	125	0.91	0.95
North-East	2.21	2.73	124	0.60	0.63
All	3.68	4.36	119	1.00	1.00

Table 2.10. Places in nurseries per 10,000 inhabitants, by regions.

Region	Number		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
Central region	53.3	64.9	122	1.57	1.38
North-West	29.5	39.9	135	0.87	0.85
Northern region	24.8	37.3	150	0.73	0.79
South-West	26.0	41.1	158	0.77	0.87
South-East	24.7	36.0	146	0.73	0.77
North-East	25.8	42.6	165	0.76	0.91
All	34.0	47.0	138	1.00	1.00

TABLE 2.11. Places in kindergartens per 10,000 inhabitants, by regions.

Region	Number		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
Central region	169.2	250.4	148	0.93	0.89
North-West	202.8	338.7	167	1.11	1.21
Northern region	153.5	250.4	163	0.84	0.89
South-West	196.3	273.0	139	1.07	0.98
South-East	202.3	296.6	147	1.11	1.06
North-East	123.1	307.3	150	0.67	1.10
All	183.0	280.0	153	1.00	1.00

TABLE 3.1. General data on settlements, classified by their regional rank.

Rank of settlement	Number of settlements		Number of inhabitants, in '000s		Percentage distribution of inhabitants	
	Number	Percentage distribution	1965	1975	1965	1975
Budapest	1	0.0	1 930.1	2 071.0	19.0	19.6
Agglomeration around Budapest	44	1.4	304.5	394.8	3.0	3.7
Regional centres of high importance						
High level	5	0.2	692.8	839.3	6.8	7.9
Middle level	7	0.2	436.6	559.7	4.3	5.3
Low level	11	0.4	442.4	546.3	4.4	5.2
Regional centres of middle importance						
Middle level	65	2.0	1 098.3	1 242.5	10.8	11.8
Low level	41	1.3	477.1	502.5	4.7	4.7
Local centres						
High level	147	4.6	878.4	865.6	8.6	8.2
Middle level	544	17.1	1 539.1	1 459.3	15.1	13.8
Low level	281	8.8	460.2	414.6	4.5	3.9
Other settlements	2 037	64.0	1 906.3	1 676.4	18.8	15.9
All	3 183	100.0	10 165.8	10 572.1	100.0	100.0

TABLE 3.2. Industrial wage-earners per 10,000 inhabitants, by settlements.

Rank of settlement	Number per 10,000 inhabitants		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
Budapest	3 135	2 463	79	2.19	1.51
Agglomeration around Budapest	1 207	1 218	101	0.84	0.75
Regional centres of high importance					
High level	2 489	2 474	99	1.74	1.52
Middle level	2 132	2 558	120	1.49	1.57
Low level	2 669	3 045	114	1.87	1.87
Regional centres of middle importance					
Middle level	1 808	2 469	137	1.26	1.51
Low level	1 229	1 906	155	0.86	1.17
Local centres					
High level	762	1 225	161	0.53	0.75
Middle level	421	599	142	0.29	0.37
Low level	159	277	174	0.11	0.17
Other settlements	204	290	142	0.14	0.18
All	1 431	1 632	114	1.00	1.00

TABLE 3.3. Value of purchases in retail trade per inhabitant, by settlements.

Rank of settlement	Yearly average per inhabitant, in forints		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
Budapest	14 422	29 424	204	1.68	1.45
Agglomeration around Budapest	5 961	13 656	240	0.69	0.67
Regional centres of high importance					
High level	12 347	26 257	213	1.44	1.30
Middle level	13 284	29 103	219	1.55	1.44
Low level	12 663	28 162	222	1.48	1.39
Regional centres of middle importance					
Middle level	10 868	26 338	242	1.27	1.30
Low level	8 881	22 395	252	1.03	1.11
Local centres					
High level	7 403	18 560	251	0.86	0.92
Middle level	4 914	12 337	251	0.57	0.61
Low level	3 704	9 431	255	0.43	0.47
Other settlements	3 110	7 708	248	0.36	0.38
All	8 585	20 275	236	1.00	1.00

TABLE 3.4. Housing units: new constructions and demolitions, by settlements.

Rank of settlement	Newly constructed housing units per 1,000 inhabitants 1965	1975	Index (1965 = 100)	Demolished housing units per 100 new constructions 1965	1975	Index (1965 = 100)
Budapest	48	97	202	12	13	108
Agglomeration around Budapest	60	127	212	7	5	71
Regional centres of high importance						
High level	83	136	164	8	16	200
Middle level	108	157	145	15	10	67
Low level	116	148	128	10	15	150
Regional centres of middle importance						
Middle level	63	113	181	13	13	100
Low level	57	92	161	23	26	113
Local centres						
High level	43	78	181	32	31	97
Middle level	39	68	174	42	34	81
Low level	38	52	137	42	53	108
Other settlements	36	55	153	50	42	84
All	54	94	174	23	20	87

TABLE 3.5. Population served by the water system, by settlements.

Rank of settlement	Percentage distribution 1965	1975	Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1) 1965	1975
Budapest	88.7	99.8	113	2.76	1.75
Agglomeration around Budapest	13.3	43.0	323	0.41	0.76
Regional centres of high importance					
High level	65.8	85.0	129	2.04	1.49
Middle level	45.6	77.1	169	1.42	1.36
Low level	55.6	79.1	142	1.73	1.39
Regional centres of middle importance					
Middle level	27.3	62.3	282	0.85	1.10
Low level	16.0	51.0	318	0.50	0.90
Local centres					
High level	8.9	40.2	452	0.28	0.71
Middle level	5.9	28.4	481	0.18	0.50
Low level	2.4	20.5	854	0.07	0.36
Other settlements	2.7	15.5	574	0.08	0.27
All	32.2	56.9	177	1.00	1.00

TABLE 3.6. Population living in areas served by the sewage system, by settlements.

Rank of settlement	Percentage distribution 1965	Percentage distribution 1975	Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1) 1965	Multipliers (National average = 1) 1975
Budapest	73.2	82.6	113	3.36	2.67
Agglomeration around Budapest	2.0	6.1	305	0.09	0.20
Regional centres of high importance					
High level	44.3	62.6	141	2.03	2.02
Middle level	27.1	46.1	170	1.24	1.49
Low level	35.5	54.5	154	1.63	1.76
Regional centres of middle importance					
Middle level	9.6	24.4	254	0.44	0.79
Low level	8.0	16.7	209	0.37	0.54
Local centres					
High level	2.9	4.5	155	0.13	0.15
Middle level	1.2	1.7	142	0.06	0.06
Low level	0.2	0.4	200	0.01	0.01
Other settlements	0.4	0.6	150	0.02	0.02
All	21.8	31.0	142	1.00	1.00

TABLE 3.7. Medical doctors per 10,000 inhabitants, by settlements.

Rank of settlement	Number of doctors per 10,000 inhabitants 1965	Number of doctors per 10,000 inhabitants 1975	Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1) 1965	Multipliers (National average = 1) 1975
Budapest	40	50	125	2.10	2.00
Agglomeration around Budapest	7	10	143	0.37	0.40
Regional centres of high importance					
High level	42	50	119	2.21	2.00
Low level	32	38	119	1.68	1.52
Middle level	32	35	110	1.68	1.40
Regional centres of middle importance					
Middle level	21	30	143	1.11	1.20
Low level	13	17	131	0.68	0.68
Local centres					
High level	7	9	129	0.37	0.36
Middle level	5	7	140	0.26	0.28
Low level	5	7	140	0.26	0.28
Other settlements	3	4	133	0.16	0.16
All	19	25	132	1.00	1.00

TABLE 3.8. Places in nurseries per 10,000 inhabitants, by settlements.

Rank of settlement	Number of places per 10,000 inhabitants		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
Budapest	65	81	125	1.91	1.72
Agglomeration around Budapest	32	32	100	0.94	0.68
Regional centres of high importance					
High level	44	64	146	1.29	1.36
Middle level	52	72	139	1.53	1.53
Low level	52	74	142	1.53	1.57
Regional centres of middle importance					
Middle level	43	56	130	1.27	1.19
Low level	37	51	138	1.09	1.09
Local centres					
High level	33	43	130	0.97	0.92
Middle level	16	22	138	0.47	0.47
Low level	7	10	143	0.21	0.21
Other settlements	4	6	150	0.12	0.13
All	34	47	138	1.00	1.00

TABLE 3.9. Places in kindergartens per 10,000 inhabitants, by settlements.

Rank of settlement	Number of places per 10,000 inhabitants		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
Budapest	164	252	154	0.90	0.90
Agglomeration around Budapest	172	251	146	0.94	0.90
Regional centres of high importance					
High level	189	275	146	1.03	0.98
Middle level	200	311	156	1.09	1.11
Low level	232	331	143	1.27	1.18
Regional centres of middle importance					
Middle level	201	314	156	1.10	1.12
Low level	204	297	146	1.12	1.06
Local centres					
High level	196	293	150	1.07	1.05
Middle level	204	301	148	1.12	1.08
Low level	185	286	155	1.01	1.02
Other settlements	146	238	163	0.80	0.85
All	183	280	153	1.00	1.00

TABLE 4.1. Industrial wage-earners per 10,000 inhabitants, by size of settlements.

Size of settlement	Number per 10,000 inhabitants		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
0- 499	18	102	567	0.01	0.06
500- 999	120	189	158	0.08	0.12
1 000- 1 999	250	388	155	0.18	0.24
2 000- 2 999	338	469	139	0.24	0.29
3 000- 4 999	489	741	151	0.34	0.45
5 000- 9 999	949	1 340	141	0.66	0.82
10 000-19 999	1 053	1 677	159	0.74	1.03
20 000-29 999	2 132	2 614	123	1.49	1.60
30 000-49 999	2 219	2 715	122	1.55	1.66
50 000-99 999	2 244	2 619	117	1.57	1.61
100 000 and over	2 489	2 474	99	1.74	1.52
Budapest	3 135	2 463	79	2.19	1.51
All	1 431	1 632	114	1.00	1.00

TABLE 4.2. Value of purchases in retail trade per inhabitant, by size of settlements.

Size of settlement	Yearly average per inhabitant, in florints		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
0- 499	2 676	6 425	240	0.31	0.32
500- 999	3 050	7 195	236	0.36	0.36
1 000- 1 999	3 899	9 560	245	0.45	0.47
2 000- 2 999	4 334	11 261	260	0.51	0.56
3 000- 4 999	5 472	13 892	254	0.64	0.69
5 000- 9 999	7 037	17 698	252	0.82	0.87
10 000-19 999	8 701	21 716	250	1.01	1.07
20 000-29 999	9 800	23 120	236	1.14	1.14
30 000-49 999	11 828	27 272	231	1.38	1.35
50 000-99 999	12 553	27 690	221	1.46	1.37
100 000 and over	12 347	26 257	213	1.44	1.30
Budapest	14 422	29 424	204	1.68	1.45
All	8 585	20 275	236	1.00	1.00

TABLE 4.3. **Housing units: new constructions and demolitions, by size of settlements.**

	Newly constructed housing units per 10 000 inhabitants					Demolished housing units per 100 new constructed				
	Number		Index	Multipliers (National average = 1)		Number		Index	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
Size of settlements	1965	1975	(1965 = 100)	1965	1975	1965	1975	(1965 = 100)	1965	1975
0- 499	29	32	110	0.54	0.34	73	56	77	3.17	2.80
500- 999	38	45	118	0.70	0.48	55	47	86	2.39	2.35
1 000- 1 999	39	58	149	0.72	0.62	50	41	82	2.17	2.05
2 000- 2 999	41	81	198	0.76	0.86	37	31	84	1.61	1.55
3 000- 4 999	40	71	178	0.74	0.76	40	31	78	1.74	1.55
5 000- 9 999	45	83	184	0.83	0.88	26	27	104	1.13	1.35
10 000-19 999	51	114	224	0.94	1.21	20	17	85	0.87	0.85
20 000-29 999	81	107	132	1.50	1.14	11	13	118	0.48	0.65
30 000-49 999	83	119	143	1.54	1.27	8	13	163	0.35	0.65
50 000-99 999	107	151	141	1.98	1.61	15	14	93	0.65	0.70
100 000 and over	83	136	164	1.54	1.45	8	16	200	0.35	0.80
Budapest	48	97	202	0.89	1.03	12	13	108	0.52	0.65
All	54	94	174	1.00	1.00	23	20	87	1.00	1.00

TABLE 4.4 Population served by the water system, by size of settlements.

Size of settlement	Percentage distribution		Index (1965 = 100)	Multiplier (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
0- 499	1.0	8.5	850	0.03	0.15
500- 999	1.0	10.7	1 070	0.03	0.19
1 000- 1 999	3.4	20.8	612	0.11	0.37
2 000- 2 999	4.1	26.2	640	0.13	0.46
3 000- 4 999	6.7	33.0	493	0.21	0.58
5 000- 9 999	9.9	39.0	394	0.31	0.69
10 000-19 999	14.8	47.5	321	0.46	0.84
20 000-29 999	34.2	67.6	198	1.06	1.19
30 000-49 999	43.2	71.4	165	1.34	1.26
50 000-99 999	45.7	74.6	163	1.42	1.31
100 000 and over	65.8	85.0	129	2.04	1.49
Budapest	88.7	100.0	128	2.76	1.76
All	32.2	56.9	177	1.00	1.00

TABLE 4.5. Population living in areas served by the sewage system, by size of settlements.

Size of settlement	Percentage distribution		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
0- 499	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0
500- 999	0.1	0.1	100	0.01	0.0
1 000- 1 999	0.6	0.9	150	0.03	0.03
2 000- 2 999	0.8	1.5	188	0.04	0.05
3 000- 4 999	1.1	2.2	200	0.05	0.07
5 000- 9 999	2.8	5.8	207	0.13	0.19
10 000-19 999	6.0	14.7	245	0.28	0.47
20 000-29 999	13.5	29.2	216	0.62	0.94
30 000-49 999	23.8	40.4	170	1.09	1.30
50 000-99 999	26.7	44.9	168	1.23	1.45
100 000 and over	44.3	62.6	141	2.03	2.02
Budapest	73.2	82.6	113	3.36	2.67
All	21.8	31.0	142	1.00	1.00

TABLE 4.6. Medical doctors, per 10,000 inhabitants, by size of settlements.

Size of settlement	Medical doctors per 10 000 inhabitants		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
0- 499	1	1	100	0.05	0.04
500- 999	3	4	133	0.16	0.16
1 000- 1 999	4	6	150	0.21	0.24
2 000- 2 999	5	7	140	0.26	0.28
3 000- 4 999	6	8	133	0.32	0.32
5 000- 9 999	9	12	133	0.47	0.48
10 000-19 999	12	18	150	0.63	0.72
20 000-29 999	22	30	136	1.16	1.20
30 000-49 999	27	33	122	1.42	1.32
50 000-99 999	30	34	113	1.58	1.36
100 000 and over	42	50	119	2.21	2.00
Budapest	40	50	125	2.11	2.00
All	19	25	132	1.00	1.00

TABLE 4.7. Places in nurseries per 10,000 inhabitants, by size of settlements.

Size of settlement	Number of places per 10,000 inhabitants		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
0- 499	—	—	—	—	—
500- 999	2	3	150	0.06	0.06
1 000- 1 999	5	7	140	0.15	0.15
2 000- 2 999	12	17	142	0.35	0.36
3 000- 4 999	21	28	133	0.62	0.60
5 000- 9 999	32	43	134	0.94	0.92
10 000-19 999	39	47	121	1.15	1.00
20 000-29 999	45	61	136	1.32	1.30
30 000-49 999	44	60	136	1.29	1.28
50 000-99 999	49	69	141	1.44	1.47
100 000 and over	44	64	146	1.29	1.36
Budapest	65	81	125	1.91	1.72
All	34	47	138	1.00	1.00

TABLE 4.8. Places in kindergartens per 10,000 inhabitants, by size of settlements.

Size of settlement	Number of places per 10,000 inhabitants		Index (1965 = 100)	Multipliers (National average = 1)	
	1965	1975		1965	1975
0- 499	27	48	178	0.15	0.17
500- 999	130	210	162	0.71	0.75
1 000- 1 999	193	312	162	1.06	1.11
2 000- 2 999	207	303	146	1.13	1.08
3 000- 4 999	197	289	147	1.08	1.03
5 000- 9 999	201	294	146	1.10	1.05
10 000-19 999	185	284	154	1.01	1.01
20 000-29 999	196	310	158	1.07	1.11
30 000-49 999	210	308	147	1.15	1.10
50 000-99 999	202	312	155	1.10	1.11
100 000 and over	189	275	146	1.03	0.98
Budapest	164	252	154	0.90	0.90
All	183	280	153	1.00	1.00

TABLE 5. Highest level of education attained by the population over 7 years of age, 1941-1970.

	Highest education level (percentages)										
	Primary school					Secondary school		Studies in higher education			
	None	Forms 1-3	Forms 4-5	Forms 6-7	8 Forms	Forms 1-4	Graduation	Without degree	With degree	Total	Total population
1941											
Budapest	2.8	6.8	20.4	36.5	19.0	5.3	5.8	0.4	3.0	100.0	1 595 859
Other towns	6.4	12.4	25.6	38.0	10.3	3.2	2.5	0.2	1.4	100.0	1 813 991
Villages	9.0	14.3	24.4	48.1	2.5	0.8	0.5	0.1	0.3	100.0	4 815 643
Total	7.2	12.4	23.9	43.6	7.4	2.2	2.0	0.2	1.1	100.0	8 225 493
1949											
Budapest	2.0	6.5	15.8	35.0	23.3	5.4	8.1	0.6	3.3	100.0	1 430 820
Other towns	5.0	12.3	21.3	38.3	14.4	2.9	4.1	0.2	1.5	100.0	1 707 059
Villages	7.0	13.6	20.5	49.3	6.9	1.0	1.3	—	0.4	100.0	4 957 854
Total	5.7	12.0	19.9	44.4	11.4	2.2	3.1	0.2	1.1	100.0	8 095 733
1960											
Budapest	1.7	6.8	12.2	31.1	25.5	6.4	9.4	1.8	5.1	100.0	1 644 492
Other towns	3.3	10.5	16.5	34.5	21.3	4.4	6.3	0.8	2.4	100.0	2 056 561
Villages	5.0	12.4	17.9	45.1	14.9	1.7	2.1	0.2	0.7	100.0	5 036 071
Total	4.0	10.9	16.5	39.9	18.4	3.2	4.5	0.7	1.9	100.0	8 737 124
1970											
Budapest	0.9	4.2	8.2	23.3	31.2	7.6	14.8	2.6	7.2	100.0	1 813 419
Other towns	1.9	7.5	11.5	26.3	30.3	5.5	11.5	1.4	4.1	100.0	2 459 052
Villages	3.2	9.5	14.0	37.1	27.1	3.0	4.5	0.3	1.3	100.0	5 093 575
Total	2.4	8.0	12.2	31.6	28.7	4.5	8.3	1.1	3.2	100.0	9 366 046

TABLE 6. Provision of kindergartens.

	1938	1945	1949	1960	1970	1975
Number of kindergartens	1 140	992	1 448	2865	3 457	4 077
Number of children (000s)	112.1	52.1	98.9	183.8	227.3	329.4
Number of teachers	1 593	...	...	8 538	12 481	20 512
Number of children in kindergartens as percentage of 4-6 year olds	23.6	...	21.7	33.7	57.7	75.4
Number of children per group	...	...	...	31.5	28.8	28.6
Number of teachers per group	...	...	...	1.46	1.58	1.78
Number of children in kindergartens before entering Primary school Form 1	...	...	...	74 051	75 992	118 280[1]
Percentage of children in kindergartens before entering Primary school Form 1	...	...	...	36.5	54.7	75.5[1]

[1] Data relating to 1976.

TABLE 7.1. Number and types of primary schools.

		Percentage of schools				
				Ungraded with		
	Number of schools	Fully graded	Partly graded	1 group	2 groups	3 groups
1937/38	7 296	14	45			41
1945/46	7 440	...	...			...
1949/50	6 205	25	54			21
1960/61	6 307	34	20	6	25	15
1970/71	5 480	43	16	2	14	25
1976/77	4 214	60	10	2	11	17

TABLE 7.2. Teachers and pupils in primary schools.

	No. of pupils in 000s	No. of teachers	No. of teachers per class	Percentage of 6-13 year old children enrolled in school	Percentage of teachers with		
					university degree	teacher-training degree	no teacher-training degree
1937/38	1 096.0	26 017	...	78.8	22.6	77.4	—
1945/46	1 096.7	24 724	1.20	...	14.1	85.9	—
1949/50	1 202.1	35 041	1.16	96.1	22.2	77.5	0.3
1950/51	1 229.9	35 248	1.12	98.3	21.0	78.7	0.3
1960/61	1 392.3	57 290	1.34	98.5	39.1	58.1	2.8
1970/71	1 116.0	63 125	1.52	98.4	50.1	44.8	5.1
1976/77	1 072.4	68 425	1.66	...	51.7	40.6	7.7

TABLE 8.1. Secondary education (excluding industrial apprenticeship): day courses only.

	Number of students				Number of teachers	Percentage of girls		Percentage of children of manual origin	
	In grammar schools	Secondary vocational schools	Other secondary types	Total		In grammar schools	In all secondary schools	In grammar schools	In all secondary schools
1937/38	30 593	—	21 756	52 349	3 504	25.7	34.4	—	—
1950/51	49 254	—	46 511	95 765	6 174	38.1	43.0	49.7[1]	67.7
1960/61	108 258	—	47 269	155 527	8 778	59.4	54.4	55.0[1]	53.2
1961/62	116 809	2 960	51 164	170 933	9 323	60.6	55.1	58.5[1]	60.8[1]
1970/71	122 998	95 989	14 304	233 291	13 442	66.9	58.3	44.8	50.2
1975/76	99 565	105 832	1 825	207 313	14 079	65.1	58.1	49.3	58.8

1. Only first form.

TABLE 8.2. Vocational training (industrial and other apprenticeships).

	Number of students in 000s	Number of full-time teachers			Percentage of girls	Percentage of students in boarding schools
		Theoretical subjects	Practical subjects	Tutors in boarding schools		
1937/38	65.3	...	...	...	...	...
1950/51	56.8	990	594	283	...	25.3
1960/61	125.3	1 582	3 472	517	16.9	17.7
1970/71	223.2	3 351	4 253	513	24.6	13.0
1975/76	164.6	4 172	4 531	777	28.9	18.3

TABLE 9. Provision of higher education.

	Number of students in				Percentage of girls		Percentage of students of worker and peasant origin in day courses
	Day courses	Evening courses	Correspondence courses	Total	Day courses	Total	
1937/38	11 747	—	—	11 747	13.9[1]	13.9[1]	3.5
1950/51	26 509	5 992	—	32 501	23.8	21.9	48.4
1960/61	29 344	1 341	13 900	44 585	43.1	29.2	50.4
1970/71	53 821	8 177	18 538	80 536	44.7	42.3	37.1
1975/76	64 319	8 950	34 286	107 555	47.6	48.3	37.0

[1] 1933/34.

SOURCE Statistical Yearbooks; *A magyar fóiskolak statisztikaja az 1933/34 évben* (Statistics for higher education in 1933/34); *Statisztikai Közlemények 92. Kötet, 11 lap.*

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This book contains four contributions which set out different and often divergent points of view on the question of regional disparities. They deal with such topics as the relationship between disparities in education and the economic, social, cultural and political development process, the pertinence of the regional framework for the analysis of disparities in the field of education, and the potential and implications of a policy of reduction of regional disparities in this field. Three of the contributions are of a general nature, although two of them refer to specific geographical contexts: P. Foster's study is based chiefly on the situation in Africa, and P. Furter's on the situation in Europe. The fourth contribution is a national case study, describing the experiment carried out in a socialist country, Hungary.

The authors were intentionally chosen from contrasting disciplines and schools of thought; the reader, therefore, will find in this work reflections based on an economist's approach as well as on a socio-cultural approach, and on national experiences in different political contexts. At no time did the Institute endeavour to impose a single frame of reference or conclude as to any convergent theory whatsoever. The question of inequalities is by its very nature a subject of controversy. The subject is even more controversial when the discussion is more specifically directed towards the policies of reducing such inequalities, as was the case in this project. This is merely to say that the texts contained in this volume can have no other aim than to pose questions and to stimulate reflection by the planner, to whom they are chiefly addressed, concerning the potential and limitations of a policy of equalization in the context of his own country.

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